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Introduction générale 
La convention de Rio (1992), le protocole de Kyoto (1997), et l'accord de Paris (2015) sur le 
climat, reflètent une préoccupation internationale sur les questions d’environnement durant les 
trois dernières décennies. Cette préoccupation a donné aux  politiques environnementales une 
place de plus en plus importante dans un grand nombre de pays autour du monde. 
 
Les pays de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) ont 
montré un intérêt croissant à l'utilisation des taxes liées à l'environnement comme principal  
instrument dans leurs politiques environnementales (voir OECD, 2006). L’un des avantages 
de cet instrument est qu’il procure des recettes publiques qui peuvent être redistribuées. C’est 
l’une des raisons pour lesquelles la taxation peut être préférée au versement de subventions ou 
aux quotas d’émission. 
Les revenus générés par ces impôts dans la zone de l’OCDE sont passés de 420.754 milliards 
US$ en 1994 à 786.143 milliards US$ en 20131. Dans le même temps, plusieurs pays 
européens procèdent à une réforme dite "verte" de ces revenus. Ils utilisent les recettes de la 
fiscalité environnementale pour réduire d’autres taxes ou subventionner des activités de 
dépollution ou d’innovation en matière d’environnement (European Environment Agency, 
2011; Withana et al., 2013, 2014). 
L’objectif principal des politiques fiscales environnementales est de réduire la pollution et les 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre, par conséquent,  augmenter le bien-être de la société. 
Toutefois, cela peut avoir une influence négative sur la croissance économique, en particulier 
à court terme (Siriwardana et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015). 
 
La façon dont la fiscalité environnementale affecte la croissance économique est une question 
centrale et controversée dans la littérature sur la croissance et l'environnement, ainsi que dans 
le débat politique concernant la conception des politiques environnementales.  
 
Bien qu'il existe de nombreuses études théoriques qui ont répondu à cette question2, il n'y a 
pas de consensus sur la nature de l'impact de la fiscalité environnemental sur la croissance 
                                                          
1 Voir le site : https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ENV_ENVPOLICY 
2 Initialement, la littérature s’est focalisée sur le problème de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles épuisables 
(Nordhaus, 1973; Solow, 1974; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974) ou les limites qu’imposent la pollution sur la 
croissance économique (Keeler et al., 1972). 
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économique à court et à long terme. Certain études montrent un effet négatif (Bovenberg and 
Heijdra ,1998; Labandeira et al., 2004; Siriwardana et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015), alors que 
d’autres trouvent un impact positif (Acemoglu et al., 2012 ; Aloi and Tournemaine, 2011; 
Chen et al., 2017; Ewijk and Wijnbergen, 1994; Gehrsitz, 2017; Gradus and Smulders, 1993; 
Hart, 2008; Hattori, 2017;  Kim et al. 2017; Mabahwi et al., 2014 ; OECD, 2010; Vellinga, 
1999). 
 
Cette divergence dans les résultats est due aux hypothèses utilisées dans chaque modèle, en 
particulier sur le moteur de croissance considéré. Selon la théorie de la croissance endogène, 
il existe quatre moteurs principaux de la croissance économique à long terme : le capital 
physique (Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991), le capital humain (Lucas, 1988), l’innovation (Romer, 
1990), et le capital public (Barro, 1990). Les travaux qui ont conclu à un effet négatif 
supposent que le capital physique est le moteur unique de la croissance économique. Dans ce 
cas, les taxes imposées sur les émissions polluantes contribuent à augmenter les prix des 
combustibles fossiles. Cela réduirait la quantité des combustibles fossiles utilisée dans les 
processus de production. Ce qui se traduit par une baisse de la productivité du capital 
physique et ainsi la croissance économique. Les modèles qui ont montré un effet positif 
supposent qu’en plus du capital physique, le capital humain et/ou l'innovation sont des 
moteurs majeurs de la croissance économique. Dans ce cas, la diminution de la pollution 
grâce à la fiscalité environnementale améliore la santé publique et favorise la capacité 
d'apprentissage, renforçant l'accumulation du capital humain et donc la croissance 
économique. D’autre part, l’augmentation des prix des combustibles fossiles à cause de la 
fiscalité environnementale encourage les entreprises à investir dans les technologies propres et 
donc promouvoir la croissance économique à long terme.  
 
Il est intéressant de noter que les études empiriques qui permettent de vérifier la validité de 
ces hypothèses au niveau macroéconomique sont rares. La rareté des études empiriques sur le 
sujet peut être expliquée par le manque de données structurées sur la fiscalité 
environnementale. Les données fournies par l'OCDE contiennent seulement les recettes 
générées par les taxes liées à l'environnement mais pas leurs taux. En plus, les données les 
plus anciennes ne remontent qu’à 1994. À notre connaissance, il n'existe qu'un seul papier 
économétrique publié sur ce sujet. Il s’agit de l'étude de Abdullah and Morley (2014). 
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En outre, la majorité des modèles théoriques qui ont étudié l’effet de la fiscalité 
environnementale sur la croissance économique supposent que le gouvernement finance ses 
dépenses uniquement par les taxes et que le budget d’Etat est équilibré à chaque période, 
évitant ainsi tout fardeau associé au remboursement de la dette publique. 
 
 Dans cette thèse, nous contribuons à la littérature sur la croissance économique et 
l’environnement en testant empiriquement les effets de la fiscalité environnementale sur la 
croissance économique à court et long terme. Notre approche s’appuie sur les intuitions 
théoriques mises en évidence par la littérature économique et exploitent différentes bases de 
données sur la croissance et la fiscalité environnementales. 
Questions de recherche : 
L’objet de cette thèse est construit dans le but de répondre empiriquement aux questions 
suivantes: 
1. Quelle est la nature de la relation entre la fiscalité environnementale et le taux de croissance 
économique à court et à long terme?  
2. Est-ce que cette relation diffère entre les pays qui ont implémenté la réforme de la fiscalité 
environnementale et ceux qui ne l’ont pas implémentée?  
3. L’effet de la fiscalité environnementale sur le taux de croissance économique est-il sensible 
au niveau des autres variables dans l’économie ?  
4. Dans quelles mesures, le capital physique, le capital humain et l'innovation sont-ils les 
canaux par lesquels les taxes sur l'énergie affectent la croissance économique ? 
5. Est-ce que l’existence et le niveau de la dette publique modifie l’impact des taxes sur l'énergie 
sur ces canaux et donc sur la croissance économique? 
Contexte et revue de littérature 
Depuis la révolution industrielle, la croissance économique a connu un rythme soutenu, 
malgré des fluctuations conjecturelles plus ou moins amples. Elle est ainsi devenue à la fois 
objectif et moyen des politiques publiques. Elle ainsi le paramètre clé des budgets publics et 
souvent assimilé à la réussite de toute politique économique. Néanmoins, la croissance 
économique a également été accompagnée par grands sacrifices de ressources naturelles et 
d'un niveau très élevé d’émissions polluantes. Durant la période 1960-2013, les émissions de 
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CO2 provenant de la consommation de carburant liquide dans le monde ont augmenté de 3 
millions (kt) en 1960 à presque 12 millions (kt) en 20133.  
 
Pour corriger ces externalités négatives de développement économique, Pigou (1920) a 
proposé une taxation sur les activités polluantes. Le but de cette taxe est d’internaliser le coût 
social des activités économiques. Cette proposition a ensuite été acceptée par les décideurs 
publics, et plusieurs  gouvernements européens comme ceux de la France, le Danemark, la 
Finlande, et la Suède ont introduit progressivement des taxes liées à l’environnent dans leurs 
dispositifs fiscaux. Aujourd’hui, la fiscalité environnementale ou ‘les taxes liées à 
l’environnement’, comme elles sont appelées selon les termes des Nations Unies et d’autres 
organisations internationales (United Nations et al. 2003),  ont été introduites dans tous les 
pays de l’OCDE (OECD, 2006). Cela a poussé les chercheurs au cours des trois dernières 
décennies à effectuer un grand nombre d’études théoriques afin d'examiner l'effet de la 
fiscalité environnementale sur la croissance économique. Or, leurs résultats étaient divergents. 
Deux études basées sur un modèle à générations imbriquées (Bovenberg and Heijdra, 1998; 
Wang et al.,  2015) montrent que la fiscalité environnementale entraîne une distorsion du taux 
de rendement du capital physique à court et long terme. Par conséquent, les générations 
futures souffriront d'un petit stock de capital physique conduisant à un faible niveau de 
croissance économique à long terme. Siriwardana et al. (2011) ont utilisé un modèle 
d'équilibre général calculable pour analyser les effets de la taxe carbone sur l'économie 
australienne. Ils trouvent que l'introduction d'une taxe sur les émissions de dioxydes de 
carbone peut diminuer le PIB réel de l'Australie à court terme d'environ 0,68 pour cent. 
 
 En revanche, plusieurs articles démontrent que la fiscalité environnementale peut stimuler la 
croissance économique par deux canaux. Le premier canal est le capital humain. Gradus and 
Smulders (1993) et Ewijk and Wijnbergen (1994) développent le modèle de croissance 
endogène de Lucas (1988), en supposant que la pollution réduit la capacité d'apprentissage 
des individus. Ils trouvent que la réduction des émissions de pollution, grâce à la fiscalité 
environnementale, peut accélérer la croissance économique en améliorant les capacités 
d'apprentissage des gens. Dans le même contexte, Hettich (1998) et Oueslati (2002), utilisant 
un modèle à deux secteurs de croissance endogène, montrent qu’une fiscalité 
environnementale élevée peut augmenter la croissance à long terme par le mécanisme 
                                                          
3 Voir le site: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.LF.KT?end=2013&start=1960&view=chart 
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suivant : l'augmentation de la taxe environnementale incite les entreprises à accroître leurs 
activités privées de réduction de pollution. Cela réduit les ressources allouées à la production 
et donc réduit la production finale. Une baisse de la production finale mène à réduire la 
consommation privée des ménages, ce qui pousse les ménages à passer plus de temps à 
étudier par rapport au temps des loisirs. Cela augmente l'accumulation de capital humain et 
donc la croissance économique à long terme. Plus récemment, Pautrel (2012) démontre que 
lorsque la croissance à long terme s'explique par l'accumulation du capital humain, les effets 
de la pollution sur l'espérance de vie peuvent expliquer par eux-mêmes l'influence de 
l'environnement sur la croissance. Dans ce cas, une taxe environnementale peut stimuler la 
croissance économique en diminuant la pollution, ce qui affecte positivement la santé 
publique et augmente l'espérance de vie. Une augmentation de l’espérance de vie diminuera la 
fréquence de remplacement des générations et réduira ainsi la perte de connaissances due à ce 
remplacement. Par conséquent, cela augmente l'accumulation globale de capital humain et le 
taux de croissance à long terme. 
 
Le deuxième canal par lequel la fiscalité environnementale peut stimuler la croissance 
économique est l’innovation. Plus précisément, il s’agit de l’innovation environnementale. 
Selon Porter (1991) et Porter and van der Linde (1995), une réglementation environnementale 
stricte, mais bien pensée, peut stimuler l’innovation, ce qui augmente la compétitivité des 
entreprises ainsi que celle des nations. Nakada (2004); Aloi and Tournemaine (2011); et 
Ambec et al., (2013) montrent que la taxe environnementale peut conduire à une intensité de 
recherche plus élevée car elle induit une réaffectation de ressources vers des activités de R & 
D qui sont un input  majeur des processus d'innovation. De même,  Hart (2004, 2008) 
confirment  que la taxe environnementale encourage les investissements dans la technologie 
de réduction d'émissions et ainsi améliorer la croissance économique. Acemoglu et al. (2012), 
en utilisant un modèle de deux secteurs (entrées propres et sales) de changement technique 
dirigé, montrent l’importance des instruments de la politique environnementale (les taxes sur 
le carbone et les subventions de recherche) pour orienter l'innovation vers les technologies 
propres. Récemment, Hattori (2017) emploie un modèle d'innovations environnementales 
endogènes et monopolistiques pour déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles les taxes sur les 
émissions peuvent stimuler l’innovation environnementale. Il montre que l'introduction d'une 
augmentation des taxes sur les émissions encourage l'innovation et la diffusion de 
technologies respectueuses de l'environnement si l'élasticité-prix de la demande de produits 
polluants est faible et / ou le fardeau fiscal pour les entreprises polluantes est faible.  
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Les études empiriques sur la politique environnementale et l’innovation ne présentent pas un 
consensus sur l’effet positif de la fiscalité environnementale sur l’innovation. D’un part, 
Costa-Campi et al. (2017) en employant un ensemble de données de panel de 22 secteurs 
manufacturiers espagnols pour la période 2008-2013, constatent que les taxes sur l'énergie 
n'ont pas d'effet significatif sur l'investissement dans la R&D environnementale du secteur 
privé. D’autre part, Haščič et al. (2010) se basant sur un échantillon de 80 pays sur la période 
2000-2007, trouvent que la rigueur de la politique environnementale joue un rôle important 
dans le développement de moyens novateurs de réduction de la pollution de l'air et de l'eau et 
la gestion des déchets solides. Une analyse microéconomique de Veugelers (2012), utilisant 
un sondage Flamand sur l'éco-innovation de la CEI, confirme également que l'intervention du 
gouvernement peut affecter les innovations du secteur privé, où les règlements et les taxes 
sont les instruments les plus efficaces de la politique environnementale pour inciter à 
l'adoption de technologies propres dans les entreprises privées. 
 
En ce qui concerne la réforme de la fiscalité environnementale, plusieurs chercheurs 
supposent que quand le gouvernement utilise les revenus générés de la fiscalité 
environnementale pour réduire d’autres taxes (tels que les impôts sur le revenu et le travail), la 
croissance économique bénéfice de ce mécanisme, à travers la diminution des effets négatifs 
de ces taxes sur l'offre de main-d'œuvre, l'épargne et les décisions d'investissement (voir  
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Mooij, 1997; Fullerton and 
Metcalf 1997;  Markandya, 2005; Oueslati, 2014). Cependant, d’autres études montrent que la 
taxe environnementale peut affecter négativement la croissance économique, dans certains 
cas, même avec l'existence de ce mécanisme de redistribution des revenus. Cela peut se 
produire au sien des entreprises à forte intensité énergétique qui consomment de grandes 
quantités d'énergie, alors qu'elles possèdent un petit stock de main-d'œuvre. Dans ce cas, la 
compensation que les entreprises reçoivent grâce à la réduction de la taxe sur le travail ou des 
cotisations de sécurité sociale peut ne pas correspondre pleinement aux coûts énergétiques 
supplémentaires générés par l’augmentation des prix de combustible fossile à cause des taxes 
sur la pollution. Dans cette situation, la taxe environnementale augmentera le coût de 
production et nuira donc à la croissance économique, même avec l’existence de la 
redistribution des revenus de la fiscalité environnementale (Andersen et al, 2007).  
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Il est à noter que la majorité des travaux sur la fiscalité environnementale et la croissance 
économique suppose que le budget public est équilibré à chaque période, et ainsi la dette 
publique est nulle. Or, une des caractéristiques des économies avancées au cours des dernières 
années est le ratio élevé de la dette publique au produit intérieur brut (PIB) (voir figure 1).  
 
 
Source : Les calculs de l’auteur sont basés sur une base de données des perspectives économiques 
mondiales (Fond Monétaire International). 
Figure 1. La dette brute des administrations publiques en % du PIB, une moyenne pour les 34 
pays de l'OCDE (1994-2016). 
 
Avec des niveaux élevés de la dette publique, la politique budgétaire peut nuire à la 
croissance économique, alors que les faibles niveaux de la dette publique permettent à la 
politique budgétaire de promouvoir le progrès économique (Baharumshah et al, 2017; 
Bhattarai et al., 2014; Chen et al. 2016; Gogas et al., 2014; Galstyan and Velic, 2017; 
Gwartney et al., 1998; Teles and Cesar Mussolini, 2014a). Comme la taxe est l'un des outils 
de la politique budgétaire, l'effet de la fiscalité environnementale sur la croissance 
économique pourrait être affecté par l’existence et le niveau de la dette publique. Le canal par 
lequel la dette publique peut affecter la croissance économique est l’investissement. Un 
niveau élevé de la dette publique peut avoir une influence négative sur l’investissement par 
l’absorbation d’une partie de l'épargne des gens (Teles and Cesar Mussolini, 2014a), 
l’augmentation des taux d'intérêt (Gogas et al., 2014; Gwartney et al. 1998; Mueller, 2004), la 
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dépréciation des taux de change (Galstyan and Velic, 2017), et l’augmentation du taux 
d'inflation (Bhattarai, Lee, and Park, 2014). 
 
Après avoir présenté la littérateur sur le sujet, nous allons maintenant présenter le plan de la 
thèse et les méthodes que nous avons utilisées afin de répondre aux questions posées. 
 
Plan et stratégie de réponse  
Cette thèse est une contribution empirique au débat sur la relation entre la fiscalité 
environnementale et la croissance économique. Elle est constituée de trois chapitres. Dans le 
premier chapitre, notre analyse se focalise sur les revenus totaux générés par les taxes liées à 
l'environnement, mesurés en pourcentage de Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB). Nous utilisons ces 
revenus comme un proxy des taxes liées à l'environnement. Dans ce chapitre, nous cherchons 
à répondre empiriquement aux trois questions suivantes :  
 
1. Les revenus totaux des taxes liées à l'environnement sont-ils associés au taux de croissance 
économique à court et à long terme?  
2. Cette relation est-elle sensible au niveau des revenus générés par les taxes liées à 
l'environnement ou au niveau des autres variables dans l'économie? 
3.  La relation entre les revenus totaux des taxes liées à l'environnement et le taux de croissance 
économique diffère-t-elle entre les pays qui ont mis en œuvre des réformes de la fiscalité 
environnementale  et ceux qui ne l'ont pas fait? 
 
En ce qui concerne la deuxième question, nous supposons que la relation entre les revenus 
totaux des taxes liées à l'environnement et le taux de croissance économique pourrait être 
sensible au niveau initial de richesse du pays, mesuré par le niveau initial du PIB par habitant.  
 
Afin de répondre à la première question à court terme, nous construisons un modèle 
empirique de la croissance qui contrôle les principales variables explicatives de la croissance 
économique selon la littérature empirique et théorique. Ces variables comprennent quatre 
groupes qui s’ajoutent aux revenus totaux des taxes liées à l'environnement. Le premier 
groupe se compose des variables conditionnelles de la croissance qui sont le niveau initial du 
PIB réel par habitant, le taux de croissance de la population active totale, et l’accumulation de 
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capital physique mesurée par la variation annuelle de la formation brute de capital fixe en 
pourcentage du PIB. Le deuxième groupe inclut les variables du capital humain qui est 
mesuré par l'indice de compétences humaines réalisé par le laboratoire d’économie appliquée 
au développement à l’université de Toulon en France4. Suite à Baldacci et al. (2008) et Chi 
(2008), nous utilisons deux variables pour mesurer l’effet du capital humain. Il s’agit du 
niveau initial du capital humain, et de la variation annuelle du capital humain.  Le troisième 
groupe comprend les variables de la politique budgétaire qui sont la dépense productive, les 
taxes distordantes, et l'équilibre budgétaire. Les trois variables sont mesurées en pourcentage 
du PIB. Le dernier groupe inclut deux variables macroéconomiques : le taux d’inflation et 
l’ouverture au commerce international des biens. 
 
Afin de répondre à la première question dans une perspective de long terme, nous utilisons 
des valeurs retardées de toutes les variables explicatives pour cinq périodes, chaque période 
étant d'un an. Cette méthode nous permet d’examiner si les revenus générés des taxes liées à 
l’environnement durant les années précédentes sont associés au taux de la croissance 
économique dans l’année courante.  
 
Pour explorer si l’effet de la fiscalité environnementale sur le taux de la croissance 
économique est sensible au niveau des revenus réalisés ou au niveau initial de la richesse, 
nous permettons au « proxy » des taxes liées à l'environnement d’interagir entre-elles, et avec 
le niveau initial du PIB par habitant. 
 
Nous répondons à la dernière question dans ce chapitre de la manière suivante. D’abord, nous 
collectons des informations sur la mise en œuvre des réformes fiscales liées à l’environnement 
(RFE) dans les pays de l'OCDE en utilisant des revues de littérature et des rapports politiques 
sur (RFE). Ensuite, nous utilisons ces informations pour diviser les pays de l’OCDE en deux 
groupes : les pays qui ont mis en œuvre les réformes et les pays qui ne les ont pas instaurées. 
Enfin, nous effectuons la même analyse empirique utilisée dans la première question sur ces 
deux échantillons. 
 
Les données utilisées pour estimer les paramètres des modèles employés dans ce chapitre sont 
des données de panel de 31 pays de l’OCDE durant la période 1994-2013. Le Chili, le 
                                                          
4 Voir le site: http://lead.univ-tln.fr/ 
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Mexique et les États-Unis ont été exclu d’échantillon, en raison des données manquantes sur 
la variable de la « dépenses productives ». Les autres données manquantes ont été traitées par 
la méthode de l'imputation multiple qui a amélioré la qualité des données et contribué à 
l'obtention d'estimations fiables. L'approche des effets aléatoires corrélés (EAC) développée 
par Wooldridge (2010) a été utilisé pour estimer les coefficients des modèles dans ce chapitre. 
Ensuite, nous avons vérifié la robustesse des modèles en utilisant trois tests. Le premier est le 
test de ‘QIC’ développé par Cui and others (2007). Ce test vérifie si certaines ou l’ensemble 
des quatre catégories de variables explicatives que nous avons collectées devraient être 
incluses dans la régression. Le deuxième test est la ‘variance facteur d'inflation’. Nous 
utilisons ce test pour voir s’il y a une multi-colinéarité entre les variables explicatives. Le 
dernier test est le test de racine unitaire en panel. Ce test a été utilisé pour vérifier si les séries 
chronologiques du taux de croissance économique (gr) et des revenus des taxes liées à 
l'environnement (ETRT) sont stationnaires. Les résultats de ces trois tests montrent que les 
quatre groupes de variables explicatives devraient être inclus dans la régression, qu’il n’y a 
pas de de problème de la multi-colinéarité, et que les séries chronologiques du (gr) et (ETRT) 
sont stationnaires. 
 
Dans le premier et le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse nous nous intéressons à étudier la 
nature de relation, davantage que l’effet causal des taxes environnementales sur le taux de 
croissance économique. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous utilisons le modèle d’EAC qui 
permet de traiter le problème d'endogénéité causé par la corrélation entre les variables du 
modèle et les effets non observés des facteurs invariants dans le temps (Bache et al.,  2013). 
Toutefois, l’endogénéité peut également survenir en raison d’une causalité simultanée. Ce 
type d’endogénéité va être traité au troisième chapitre en utilisant des variables 
instrumentales. 
 
Les résultats d’estimation sur la première question montrent qu'il n'y a pas de relation 
statistiquement significative entre les revenus totaux des taxes liées à l’environnement et le 
taux de la croissance économique à court et à long terme. Mais, quand nous permettons aux 
taxes liées à l’environnement  d’interagir avec eux-mêmes et avec le niveau initial du PIB par 
habitant, cette relation devient significative et négative à court et à long terme. Cependant, les 
résultats montrent que le premier terme d'interaction est statistiquement insignifiant, tandis 
que le second est significatif. Nous concluons que l'effet des taxes liées à l'environnement sur 
le taux de croissance économique n'est pas sensible au niveau des revenus réalisés, mais il est 
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sensible au niveau initial de la richesse du pays. Les résultats montrent également que le terme 
d'interaction entre (ETRT) et le niveau initial du PIB a un signe positif, ce qui indique que 
plus le niveau initial de richesse d’un pays croit, plus l’augmentation des revenus des taxes 
liées à l’environnement entraîne une augmentation du taux de croissance économique. Les 
estimations sur la dernière question dans ce chapitre révèlent des différences notables entre les 
deux groupes de pays. L'association entre les revenus des taxes liées à l'environnement et le 
taux de croissance économique, à court et à long terme, est statistiquement non-significative 
dans les pays qui n'ont pas mis en œuvre des réformes, alors que cette association est 
statistiquement significative et négative dans les pays qui ont mis en œuvre des réformes. 
 
Dans le deuxième chapitre, notre analyse se concentre sur les taxes sur l’énergie, qui est la 
catégorie la plus importante parmi les taxes liées à l’environnement au niveau des revenus 
réalisés. Le proxy de la fiscalité environnementale que nous avons utilisé au premier chapitre 
mesure les revenus générés des taxes liées à l’environnement en pourcentage de PIB. Or, cette  
mesure ne tient pas compte de la variation de l'assiette fiscale, affaiblissant ainsi le rôle qui 
pourrait être joué par la fiscalité environnementale dans l'économie. Cela peut justifier la 
relation non-significative à court et long terme entre les revenus totaux des taxes liées à 
l’environnement et le taux de la croissance économique, lorsque nous ne prenons pas en 
compte leurs interactions avec d’autres variables dans l’économie. Par conséquent, dans le 
deuxième chapitre, nous proposons une nouvelle mesure de la fiscalité environnementale qui 
tient compte de la variation de l'assiette fiscale. Toutefois, étant donné que la fiscalité 
environnementale est imposée sur différentes bases (l’énergie, des véhicules à moteur, des 
substances appauvrissant l'ozone, l’eau et eaux usées, la gestion des déchets, l’exploitation 
minière et extractive, et d’autres taxes liées à l'environnement), il est difficile de construire 
une base d'imposition commune pour ces facteurs. C’est la raison pour laquelle, nous 
décidons de concentrer notre analyse sur une seule catégorie de taxes liées à 
l’environnement : les taxes sur l'énergie. 
 
Comme les taxes sur l'énergie portent essentiellement sur la consommation de combustibles 
fossiles, nous considérons la consommation finale totale des produits du charbon, des produits 
pétroliers, du gaz naturel et de l'électricité produite à partir du combustible fossile comme une 
base d'imposition des taxes sur l'énergie. Par conséquent, le proxy des taxes sur l'énergie est 
calculé comme suit : les revenus générés des taxes sur l'énergie mesurés en millions de dollars 
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américains divisé par la consommation finale totale de produits énergétiques polluants 
mesurés en tonnes d'équivalent pétrole.  
 
Ensuite, nous avons utilisé ce proxy pour atteindre deux objectifs. Premièrement, explorer la 
nature des relations entre les taxes sur l'énergie et le taux de croissance économique à court et 
long terme. Deuxièmement, étudier si l'effet de ces taxes sur le taux de croissance économique 
est sensible au niveau de trois variables dans l'économie. Ces variables sont les suivantes: 
 
x La consommation de produits énergétiques polluants par rapport à la consommation 
d'énergie propre 
x Le niveau initial de la richesse d'un pays 
x Le degré d'ouverture commerciale des biens d'un pays 
 
Pour atteindre nos objectifs, nous utilisons la même méthodologie économétrique que celle 
employée au premier chapitre. Les résultats montrent que les taxes sur l'énergie sont 
négativement associées au taux de croissance économique à court terme, mais cette relation 
n'est pas significative à long terme. Cependant, lorsque nous permettons à ces taxes d'interagir 
avec d'autres variables, cette relation devient significative et négative à court et long terme. En 
outre, les résultats révèlent que le terme d'interaction entre les taxes sur l’énergie et le proxy 
de la consommation de produits énergétiques polluants a un signe significatif et négatif à 
court terme et pour certaines périodes à long terme. Cela signifie que l'effet des taxes 
énergétiques sur le taux de croissance économique est négativement sensible au niveau du 
combustible fossile utilisé dans l'économie, et plus ce niveau augmente, plus les taxes sur 
l'énergie nuisent au taux de croissance économique. D'autre part, nous constatons que le terme 
d'interaction entre les taxes sur l’énergie et le niveau initial de PIB par habitant a un signe 
positif à court et à long terme. Cela indique que l'effet des taxes énergétiques sur le taux de 
croissance économique est positivement sensible au niveau initial de la richesse du pays. En 
d'autres termes, on peut dire que l'expansion des taxes sur l'énergie dans les pays qui ont un 
haut niveau de richesses favorisera le taux de croissance économique, alors que ces taxes 
nuiraient à la croissance économique dans les pays à faible richesse. Enfin, nous constatons 
que l’interaction entre les taxes sur l’énergie et le degré d'ouverture commerciale des biens est 
négative et significative quand le nombre des années tardés est égal à cinq. Cela montre que 
plus le niveau d'ouverture commerciale des biens est élevé, plus l'augmentation des taxes 
énergétiques nuit au taux de croissance économique à long terme. Pour connaitre l’effet net de 
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ces taxes sur le taux de croissance économique, l’effet marginal des taxes énergétiques a été 
calculé. Les résultats montrent que l’effet marginal est négatif à court terme, toutefois cet 
effet négatif diminue à long terme et il devient positif quand les variables explicatives sont 
tardées pour trois et cinq ans.  
 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous vérifions empiriquement les canaux par lesquelles les taxes 
sur l’énergie peuvent affecter le taux de croissance économique. Ce chapitre a deux objectifs : 
premièrement, étudier l'impact potentiel des taxes énergétiques sur le capital physique 
(l’investissement physique), le capital humain et l'innovation environnementale dans le 
contexte d'un modèle de croissance endogène, où le capital physique, le capital humain et 
l'innovation environnementale sont les trois canaux principaux par lesquelles les taxes sur 
l’énergie peuvent affecter la  croissance économique. Deuxièmement, explorer si l’impact des 
taxes énergétiques sur le capital physique et ensuite sur le taux de croissance économique est 
sensible à l’existence et au niveau de la dette publique. Autrement dit, est-ce que la présence 
et le niveau de la dette publique modifiera l'effet des taxes énergétiques sur le capital 
physique et ensuite sur le taux de croissance économique ? 
 
Pour atteindre le premier objectif, nous utilisons des spécifications générales pour le taux de 
croissance économique, l'investissement physique total, le capital humain, les émissions de 
CO2 et les innovations environnementales en nous appuyant sur un ensemble de variables 
explicatives utilisées dans la littérature existante. L’investissement physique, le capital 
humain et l'innovation environnementale sont considérés comme des variables endogènes 
dans l'équation du taux de croissance économique, et les autres variables explicatives de la 
croissance sont considérées comme des variables exogènes. La littérature théorique suppose 
qu'il y a un impact direct et négatif des taxes sur l'énergie sur l'investissement physique. Pour 
tester cette hypothèse, le proxy des taxes sur l'énergie est introduit en tant que variable 
exogène dans l'équation d'investissement physique. Les modèles théoriques (Gradus and 
Smulders, 1993; Ewijk and Wijnbergen, 1994; Vellinga, 1999b ; Pautrel, 2012) supposent 
également qu'il existe un effet indirect de ces taxes sur le capital humain, à travers leurs 
impacts sur les émissions polluants. Cette hypothèse est testée en deux étapes : premièrement, 
nous examinons l'effet des émissions polluantes sur le capital humain. Deuxièmement, nous 
explorons l'impact des taxes sur l'énergie sur les émissions polluantes. À cette fin, les 
émissions de CO2 ont été choisies comme un proxy des émissions polluantes. Ce choix est 
basé sur les résultats de Raymond (2009). Il a trouvé qu'il y a une très forte corrélation entre 
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les paires CO2 & NOx, CO2 & SOx, NOx & SOx, et que prenant l’un ou l'autre donne les 
mêmes résultats. Nous considérons ce proxy comme une variable endogène dans l'équation du 
capital humain, et le proxy des taxes sur l'énergie en tant que variable exogène dans l'équation 
du CO2. Pour tester l'effet direct des taxes énergétiques sur l'innovation environnementale, le 
proxy des taxes sur l'énergie est inclus en tant que variable exogène dans l'équation de 
l'innovation environnementale. 
 
Afin de savoir si la présence de la dette publique modifiera l'effet des taxes énergétiques sur 
l'investissement physique et ensuite sur le taux de croissance économique, la dette publique 
est introduite comme une variable exogène dans l'équation d'investissement physique, et nous 
ré-estimons notre modèle. Enfin, pour examiner si l'effet des taxes énergétiques sur 
l'investissement physique est sensible au niveau de la dette publique, nous permettons au 
proxy des taxes sur l'énergie d'interagir avec la dette publique dans l'équation d'investissement 
physique, puis nous ré-estimons le modèle. 
 
L'analyse a été réalisée à court et à long terme en utilisant le modèle des équations 
simultanées pour 31 pays de l'OCDE sur la période 1994-2013. La méthode d'imputation 
multiple a été implémentée afin de compléter les données manquantes. Ensuite, nous avons 
utilisé l'estimateur du processus mixte conditionnel développé par Roodman (2011) pour 
estimer les coefficients du modèle. Les variables instrumentales ont été utilisées pour traiter le 
problème d’endogéniété.   
 
Les résultats montrent un impact négatif des taxes sur l'énergie sur l'investissement physique à 
court et à long terme. Cet impact est négativement sensible à la présence et au niveau de la 
dette publique. De plus, nous avons constaté qu'il y a un effet indirect des taxes énergétiques 
sur le capital humain par son impact sur les émissions de CO2. En effet, les taxes sur les 
produits énergétiques sont capables de réduire l’augmentation et l’accumulation des émissions 
de CO2 qui ont un impact négatif sur le capital humain à court et à long terme. De plus, les 
résultats empiriques montrent que les taxes sur l'énergie peuvent encourager l’innovation 
environnementale à court et à long terme. Cependant, l'innovation environnementale ne 
favorise le taux de croissance économique qu'après deux ou trois ans. 
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1. Chapter 1: Environmentally related taxes, reforms and 
economic growth: An empirical analysis of panel data 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the relationship between environmentally related taxes and economic 
growth rate. The analysis also investigates whether this relationship differs between countries 
which have implemented environmental tax reforms (ETRs) and ones which have not. In 
order to complete unbalanced data set of (31) OECD countries over the 1994 - 2013 period, 
we implemented a multiple imputation method using an Expectation Maximization 
Bootstrapped algorithm. Multiple imputation has been successfully done, resulting in 
improved data and inferences validity. Estimation results showed that when we allowed 
environmentally related tax revenues to interact with an initial level of real GDP per capita, 
the overall revenues of these taxes were negatively associated with economic growth rate, in 
the short- and long- term. Furthermore, we showed that the higher the initial level of GDP per 
capita, the more environmentally related tax revenues can promote economic growth rate. The 
analysis also revealed that the relationship between environmentally related tax revenues and 
economic growth varies between countries that have a mechanism to redistribute 
environmentally related tax revenues and those that do not.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, all OECD countries have introduced environmentally related 
taxes to a varying extent in order to reduce pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Also, in 
the early 1990s, some of them started implementing environmental tax reforms (ETRs) which 
are based on a “revenue recycling system” that shifts the tax burden from labor, personal and 
corporate income to environmentally harmful activities (European Environment Agency 
2005, 2011). The revenues from environmentally-related taxes are used, for example, to 
decrease labor taxes or social security contributions, with a view to stimulating employment 
and promoting economic growth.  
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In recent literature, the impact of environmental taxes on economic growth has been widely 
debated on a theoretical level. However, there is a disagreement on the short- and long-term 
effects of environmental taxes on economic growth and little empirical evidence on this topic 
have been examined to date. In this chapter we make an econometrical contribution to the 
debate about the growth – environmental tax relationship. We believe that exploring the 
nature of the relationship between environmentally related taxes and economic growth is an 
important issue, as it shows whether the use of tax as an instrument for environmental policy 
has any correlation and whether it will have a positive or negative correlation with economic 
growth. The available data on this topic is not abundant as the OECD statistics only provide 
data about the revenue generated from environmentally related taxes but not about their rates. 
Therefore, we used this revenue as a proxy of environmentally related taxes, and our analysis 
focused on the total revenue of these taxes. According to the data provided by the OECD, the 
overall revenue of environmentally related taxes, in the OECD zone, has increased from 
420.754 billons US$ in 1994 to 786.134 billion US$ in 2013. This significant rise in the 
revenues made us wonder whether the nature of the relationship between environmentally 
related taxes and economic growth is sensitive to the level of revenue generated from these 
taxes. In other word, we want to explore whether there is a non-linear relationship between 
these revenues and economic growth rate. On the other hand, and during the negotiations of 
the Paris Agreement (2015), a dispute between developing and developed countries has 
emerged on the responsibility for the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The developing countries consider that they are 
not responsible for these emissions and that the measures envisaged today should not be 
barriers to economic growth which they are just beginning to reap its benefits. This motivated 
us to suppose that the nature of the relationship between environmentally related taxes 
revenue and economic growth rate may depend on the country’s initial level of GDP per 
capita, justifying that as follows: according to the three-sector theory, when the level of GDP 
per capita increases, agriculture and industry’s share in GDP declines in favor of an increase 
in service’s share in GDP. This means, when the initial level of GDP per capita is low, the 
contribution of agriculture and industry in GDP will be high. As the inputs of the production 
process in these two sectors heavily rely on physical capital and raw materials, like 
machinery, equipment, fossil fuels and electricity, the production will lead to a high level of 
pollutant emissions and pollution, forming a broad tax base of environmental tax. Thus, the 
introduction of the environment tax in countries with a low level of GDP per capita will harm 
economic growth through increasing the cost of production inputs in these two sectors. This 
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situation may be reversed in countries that have a high level of initial GDP per capita, where 
the contribution of agriculture and industry in GDP declines compared to the service sector. In 
this case, the production process depends on human capital more than physical capital and 
raw materials, leading to a decrease in pollutant emissions. In addition, rich countries have 
high capacity for improving energy use efficiency and productivity of physical capital in 
agriculture and industry sectors, and thus reduce the pollutant emissions which are the tax 
base of environmentally related taxes. For these reasons, the initial level of a country’s 
richness measured by the initial level of GDP per capita can affect the nature of the 
relationship between environmentally related taxes and economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, and in the light of the wave of environmental tax reforms that started in the 
early 1990s in a number of OECD countries, the majority of theoretical studies suppose that 
these reforms will generate a positive impact of environmental tax on economic growth (See 
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Goulder, 1995; Lans Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1997; 
Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997;  Markandya, 2005). However, there is no empirical study to date 
that shows whether the nature of the relationship between environmentally related taxes and 
economic growth differs between the countries which made these reforms and those which 
did not. 
 
Consequently, the main contributions of this chapter to literature are by answering empirically 
the following three questions: Are the overall environmentally related tax revenues associated 
with the economic growth rate in the short and long term? Is this relationship sensitive to the 
level of revenue generated from environmentally related taxes or to the level of other 
variables in the economy? Does the relationship between overall environmentally related tax 
revenues and the economic growth rate differ between the countries which have implemented 
ETRs and those which have not?  
 
To achieve our goal, the analysis was divided into two stages. The first stage was based on a 
sample of 31 OECD countries from 1994 to 2013. Then, using information collected from 
academic literature, in particular Oueslati et al. (2017), and policy reports about ETRs, we 
divided the sample into two groups: the countries which have established ETRs, over these 
years, and the countries which have not. After that, we performed the same empirical analysis 
used in the first stage on these two samples. We found that the relationship between 
environmentally related tax revenue and economic growth rate is statically insignificant in the 
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short and long term. However, when we allowed overall environmentally-related tax revenues 
to interact with the initial level of real GDP per capita, this relationship became significant 
and negative. This reflects the importance of a country's richness level in determining the 
nature of the relationship between environmental taxation and economic growth. Moreover, 
this shows that the negative effect of environmentally-related taxes on economic growth rate 
occurs through the interaction of these taxes with other variables in the economy. The results 
also revealed that this association is not sensitive to the level of revenue generated from these 
taxes, but it is positively sensitive to the country’s initial level of GDP per capita. The positive 
sign of the interaction term between environmentally related taxes and the initial level of GDP 
per capita means that, the higher the initial level of GDP per capita, the more environmentally 
related tax revenues can promote economic growth rate. Our findings revealed also that the 
relationship between environmentally related tax revenues and economic growth rate varies 
between the countries that implemented ETRs and those that did not. More precisely, this 
association is statistically insignificant in the countries which have not established ETRs, 
whereas it is statistically significant and negative in the countries which have established such 
reforms.   
 
The rest of this chapter was organized as follows. Section (1.2) presents the literature review 
of environmental taxation and economic growth. Section (1.3) provides an overview of the 
development in GDP per capita growth rate and different environmentally related tax 
revenues in OECD countries over the last two decades. Section (1.4) describes empirical 
strategy including the model and data used. In section (1.5), we discuss the empirical results 
on a short and long term basis. The last section concludes the chapter by summarizing the 
main findings. 
1.2. Literature Review 
Environmental taxation could achieve the desired environmental improvement at minimum 
cost to society at large (Baumol and Oates, 1971). This approach has now become a principal 
approach to justify environmental taxes (Ekins and Speck, 2011). However, the debate about 
the effect of these taxes on economic growth is still a contentious issue among researchers to 
date. Existing research has used a number of different models to address this question. 
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) using an overlapping generations model and modeling the 
quality of the environment as a durable consumption good, found that the environmental tax 
increase, makes the future generations suffer from a smaller physical capital stock, but benefit 
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from a larger stock of natural capita. This result is reversed with the older generations. 
Thereby, at the long term, the economic growth decreases due to the low physical capital that 
the younger generation will have to work with. Similarly, Wang et al. (2015), based on an 
overlapping generation model, showed that pollution tax can reduce pollution but it causes a 
distortion in the rate of return to capital and thus damage growth. In the same context, 
Siriwardana et al. (2011) built a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the 
effects of carbon tax on the Australian economy. They found that Australia’s real GDP may 
decline, in the short term, by about 0.68 per cent after the introduction of a $23 tax on carbon 
dioxide emissions.  
In contrast, several papers demonstrated that environmental taxation policy may boost 
economic growth via a variety of channels. Lans Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Ewijk and 
Wijnbergen (1995) and Lans Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) propose that environmental tax 
improves the quality of the environment, which increases the productivity of other productive 
inputs, and thus the total factor productivity of the economy, thereby stimulating economic 
growth. Based on the Uzawa–Lucas endogenous growth model extended by elastic labor 
supply, Hettich (1998) and Oueslati (2002) showed that, a higher environmental tax enhances 
long-term growth as follows: The increased environmental tax induces firms to raise their 
private abatement activities, which reduces final output net of abatement at the expense of 
households’ consumption. The reduction in private consumption in turn causes a substitution 
away from leisure towards time spent studying, which boosts human capital accumulation and 
thus growth. In addition, environmental tax can lead to higher research intensity as it induces 
a reallocation of resources towards R&D activities, which are the engine of growth (Nakada 
2004; Aloi and Tournemaine, 2011; Ambec et al., 2013). Similarly, Hart (2004, 2008) argued 
that environmental tax encourages investment in emissions-saving technology and thus 
enhances growth. The relationship between environmental taxation and innovation have also 
examined by OECD (2010). The study confirmed that environmental taxation can and does 
increase innovation and diffusion of environmental technologies. Some researchers have 
demonstrated that pollution has a direct impact on long-term growth because it reduces the 
ability to learn (Gradus and Smulders, 1993; Ewijk and Wijnbergen 1995;Vellinga, 1999; 
Withagen and Vellinga, 2001). They also argued that environment does not influence long-
term accumulation of human capital if this direct impact of pollution on education is not taken 
into account. In contrary to this condition,  Pautrel  (2012) demonstrated that, when the long-
run growth is driven by human capital accumulation, the effects of pollution on life 
expectancy may explain by themselves the influence of environment on growth. In this case, 
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environmental tax can stimulate economic growth through decreasing pollution which 
positively affects public health and increases life expectancy. The former decreases the 
frequency of generations’ replacement and thus reduces the loss of knowledge due to this 
replacement. Therefore, this increases the aggregate human capital accumulation and the 
growth rate in the long term. 
On the other hand, some theoretical research in this area showed contradictory effects of 
environmental tax levels on economic growth. For instance, Ono (2003) with an overlapping 
generations model of growth and the environment, demonstrated that, in the long-run, 
environmental taxation has two opposing effects on economic growth. When the tax rate is 
high, the firms emit a lower flow of pollution which leads to a higher quality of the 
environment bequeathed to future generations, which implies a positive income effect. 
Thereby, the new generation can allocate a larger part of its resources toward savings (and 
investment) instead of pollution abatement activities, which increases the accumulation of 
productive capital and then economic growth. On the other side, a higher tax imposes a 
heavier burden on the firms. Therefore, the wages that they pay to workers and the taxes paid 
to the government decrease. This negative income effect causes a decline in savings and 
investment, thereby lowering economic growth rate. In contrast, these effects are reversed 
with a low level of environmental tax rate. In a similar context, but by using an overlapping 
generations model where long-run growth is driven by accumulation of physical capital stock 
(AK model à la Romer (1986)), Pautrel (2009) showed that, when pollution does not affect 
life expectancy, the negative impact of the environmental policy on growth is limited if agents 
smooth their consumption over time; whereas when pollution affects life expectancy, 
economic growth rate and the environmental taxation describe an inverted U-shaped 
relationship.  
Other theoretical studies supposed that the positive impact of environmental tax on economic 
growth can be generated not only via improving the quality of the environment but also 
through recycling environment tax revenues. When the government uses these revenues to 
reduce the rates of distortionary taxes in the economy (such as income and labor taxes), 
economic growth is expected to have a positive effect from such a mechanism, through 
decreasing the negative effects of these taxes on labor supply, saving, and investment 
decisions (See Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Mooij, 1997; 
Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997; Markandya, 2005; Oueslati, 2014). Another scenario of 
environmental tax reforms associated with a change in the structure of public spending has 
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been proposed by Oueslati (2015). He finds that the use of environmental tax revenue to 
increase education spending has a greater positive impact on stimulating growth. 
 
However, environmental tax can negatively affect economic growth in some cases, even with 
the existence of ETRs, through the following mechanism: The reform based on using energy 
taxes revenue to reduce distortionary tax rates changes the relative costs of the products 
produced by all companies and in particular by energy-intensive companies. This change 
comes from increasing the costs of fossil fuels, and decreasing the costs of labor and/or 
capital. Therefore, the net effect of these changes may be positive or negative according to the 
structure of labor, capital and fossil fuel consumption in the company. For instance, in energy-
intensive companies which consume large amounts of energy, while they have a small labor 
stock, the compensation that they receive via the reduction in labor tax or social security 
contributions may not fully match the additional energy costs. In this case, environmental tax 
increases the cost of production and thus harms economic growth, even with the presence of 
ETRs (Andersen et al, 2007). Goulder (1995) suggests also that the positive effect on GDP 
costs of using energy taxes revenue to finance cuts in income taxes cannot be taken for 
granted but depends on the level of pre-existing tax rates that is replaced by energy taxation.  
In the same context, Ekins et al. (2012) explore the implications - for Europe and the rest of 
the world -of a large-scale ETR in Europe designed to achieve the EU's 2020 greenhouse gas 
reduction targets, i.e. cutting GHG emissions by 20 % in the period 1990–2020 (or 30 % in a 
context of global cooperation). In order to investigate whether ETR could deliver these 
targets, they used two well-known macro-econometric models: E3ME and GINFORS. The 
results showed that an ETR that meets the emissions’ target by imposing a tax on material 
inputs and recycling all the revenues through a reduction in employers’ social security 
contributions and income taxes would raise employment, lower resource consumption and 
have a small negative impact on GDP. This is driven by reduction in labor costs, higher 
household incomes resulting from lower income taxes and higher employment rates, 
increasing the price of various products according to their direct and indirect carbon content 
and thus reducing price competitiveness on export markets. However, in other scenarios for 
the same model, when 10 % of environmental tax revenues are spent on eco-innovation 
measures and the remaining 90 % recycling through a reduction in employers’ social security 
contributions and income taxes, the loss of international competitiveness is expected to be 
offset by gains in international trade sector through increasing the exports of renewable 
technologies (EEA, 2011). Consequently, the existence of ETRs mechanism can affect the 
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economy through five channels: international trade, employment, human capital, investment 
and innovation. 
  
Although numerous arguments have been provided regarding the effects of environmental tax 
on economic growth, the suggested results are often contradictory, and empirical evidence to 
support these arguments is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one published 
econometric study about this topic, which is Abdullah and Morley (2014). This paper 
evaluated the causal relationship between environmental taxes and economic growth, using 
the standard Granger non-causality approach. They found some evidence of a short and long-
run causal effect from economic growth to environmental taxes; nevertheless there is little 
evidence of long-run causality in the other direction. These results show an ambiguous 
relationship between environmental tax and economic growth. It should be also noted that 
Abdullah and Morley (2014) do not distinguish between the countries that have implemented 
environmental tax reforms and those that have not. Consequently, rather than studying the 
causal relationship, we investigated the nature of the relationship between environmentally 
related taxes and economic growth in the short and long term, including a large set of 
explicative variables of economic growth. In addition, part of our analysis will be 
concentrated on investigating whether the nature of this relationship differs between the 
countries that have implemented ETRs and those that have not. Furthermore, in order to 
complete our unbalanced data set, we implemented a multiple imputation method using an 
Expectation Maximization Bootstrapped algorithm. 
1.3. Development of GDP per capita growth rate and different 
environmentally related taxes in OECD countries 
Figure (1.1) demonstrates how the average GDP per capita growth rate and the average share 
of overall environmentally related tax revenues in GDP of 31 OECD countries have evolved 
since 1994. Figure (1.2) shows the evolution of the seven categories of environmentally 
related taxes: Energy; motor vehicles and transport; ozone-depleting substances; water and 
wastewater; waste management; mining and quarrying, and other environmentally related 
taxes. The mean GDP per capita growth rate shows a rising trend from 1994 to 2000 and 
reaching 4.18 % in 2000, from which it declined from 2001 to 2003 and stabilized at 1.8% in 
2003. After that we can see an increase to 3.57% in 2007, falling sharply in 2008 to stabilize 
at - 4.57% in 2009, due to the latest world financial crisis in the U.S.A. After its recovery in 
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2010, it re-decreased to - 0.17% in 2012. In 2013 it increased to 0.38%. From these 
evolutions, we note that there are many fluctuations of the average of GDP per capita growth 
rate in OECD countries during the period of study. The share of environmentally related tax 
revenues in GDP also shows many fluctuations during the period of study. From the figure1.1 
and the figure 1.2, the following observations may be made: (i) environmentally related tax 
revenues as share of GDP show a rising trend over the period 1994 – 1999, increasing from 
2.41% in 1994 to 2.61% in 1999. This rise in the aggregated measure comes mainly from the 
rise in the energy, motor vehicle and transport, water and wastewater, waste management and 
other environmentally related tax revenues share in GDP. In contrast, revenues from ozone-
depleting substances and mining and quarrying taxes have decreased as share of the GDP in 
this period. (ii) During 2000 - 2001, environmentally related tax revenues as share of GDP 
decrease to reach 2.55% in 2001. (iii) Then it increased from 2.58% in 2002 until 2.62% in 
2005. (iv) During the period from 2006 to 2008, it decreases sharply from 2.52% in 2006 until 
2.38% in 2008. This decrease comes mainly from the decrease in the energy, motor vehicle 
and transport, water and wastewater, waste management and other environmentally related 
taxes. (iiv) In 2009 - 2010, environmentally related tax revenues as share of GDP increase 
from 2.40% in 2009 to 2.47% in 2010. (iiiv) During 2011-2013 it shows a decreasing trend, 
where it fell from 2.45% in 2011 to 2.44% in 2013. According to OECD (2006), there are 
about 375 environmentally related taxes in the OECD countries. The evolution of these taxes  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank and OECD database. 
Figure 1.1: Evolution of GDP per capita growth rate and total environmentally-related taxes 
revenues over time 1994 – 2013, OECD average (31 countries).  
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Source: Author’s calculations are based on data from the OECD database on Instruments used for 
Environmental Policy and Natural Resources Management. 
Figure 1.2: Evolution of different environmentally related taxes in the years between 1994 
and 2013, OECD average (31 countries). 
has shown that the majority of revenue received comes from energy taxes and motor vehicle 
and transport taxes, whereas the rest constitute a small proportion of total environmentally 
related tax revenues. 
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1.4. Empirical strategy: model & data 
1.4.1. Empirical economic growth model 
In order to explore the nature of the relationship between aggregate environmentally related 
tax revenues and economic growth rate, we built a complete empirical growth model that 
controls the main drivers of economic growth according to the empirical and theoretical 
literature. The specification of this model is based on the Correlation Random Effects (CRE) 
approach, developed by Wooldridge (2010). The CRE model considers endogeneity as an 
unobserved heterogeneity problem without imposing any strict conditions or requiring any 
instruments (Bache et al., 2013). This method, as shown by Wooldridge (2010), is a 
reasonable way to deal with endogeneity and lagged effects within a small N dataset. It also 
has the advantage of allowing the estimation of time and country trends. The explanatory 
variables in this approach are separated into three principal categories, as follows: 
 
                                        𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (1.1) 
 
where 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 indicates the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita in country 𝑖 and 
year 𝑡, 𝜆𝑡 is a vector of time dummies variables for years,  𝑍𝑖 is a set of time-constant 
observed variables; 𝑊𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of  control variables changing across countries and 
over time;  𝜂𝑖 is the unobserved effects (heterogeneity) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 indicates an error term. The 
(CRE) approach combines the fixed effects model, which assumes that there is a correlation 
between 𝜂𝑖 and independent variables, with the random effects model, which supposes that 
the correlation between 𝜂𝑖 and independent variables does not exist5. In particular, the (CRE) 
approach models the relationship between {𝜂𝑖} and {𝑊𝑖𝑡} allowing arbitrary correlation 
between them as follows6: 
 
                                                𝜂𝑖 = Ψ + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖                                                                (1.2) 
                                                          
5 “…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect 
embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic 
or not” (Greene, 2008: 183) 
6 The hypothesis used to model the correlation relationship between 𝜂𝑖 and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is that: as 𝜂𝑖 is, by definition, 
constant across time, it can be correlated by simple linear relationship with the average values of 𝑊𝑖𝑡 across time 
(Wooldridge, 2010) 
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Where Ψ  is a constant, ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑇−1 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 , 𝑎𝑖 is a time-constant component and  
Cov(𝑎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖) = 0. By replacing (2) in (1), the CRE estimating equation becomes: 
 
                         𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + Ψ + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (1.3) 
 
The similarity between equation (1.3) and the equation of random effects model (RE) emerges 
from the hypothesis that 𝑎𝑖 is uncorrelated with (𝑊𝑖𝑡), whereas the equation (1.3) looks like 
the fixed effects model (FE) through including the time-constant variables(𝑍𝑖). Many 
advantages can be achieved by using CRE model. Firstly, an international non-linear time 
trend in economic growth could be controlled by the term 𝜆𝑡. This term takes into account 
international variations in economic growth that cannot be explained with the explanatory 
variables, but could however be correlated to them. For example, the 2001 and 2008 
worldwide economic crises that affected growth may be partly estimated by these time 
dummies for years. Secondly, whereas the fixed effect model cannot estimate the effect of 
time-constant variables, the CRE model has the ability to measure their impact through the 
term (𝑍𝑖). Thirdly, ?̅?𝑖 measures the influence of the average level of 𝑊𝑖𝑡 on the dependent 
variable. This allows us, with respect to environmental tax policy, to take into account the 
systematic differences between countries achieving historically very high revenues of taxation 
and countries more moderate in their taxes revenues. These differences may have an impact 
on growth rate. Fourthly, the CRE regression is robust towards heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation in {𝜀𝑖𝑡}. This robustness comes from a “cluster” option used in the command that 
estimates CRE equation in Stata software. This option produces consistent standard errors for 
linear panel models if the residuals are correlated within cluster (Hoechle et al., 2007). 
Finally, the (CRE) approach is based on a simple test in order to choose between the random 
effects or correlated random effects estimator. The estimations will be the usual random 
effects estimates, if 𝛾 = 0. Variable Addition Test (VAT) is used to test this hypothesis, where 
it examines whether the averages of the explanatory variables changing across the time are 
jointly equal to zero. 
 
Consequently, the generic model that investigates the relationship between aggregate 
environmentally related tax revenues as a share of GDP and economic growth rate, in the 
short term, can be described as follows: 
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𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = Ψ + β0𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                           (1.4) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 denotes the share of environmentally related tax revenues in GDP.  In order to 
explore this relationship in the long term, we re-estimate the equation (1.4) with lagged values 
of all explanatory variables for five periods, each period being one year. This method allows 
us to know whether the revenue generated from these taxes over the last years are correlated 
with economic growth rate in the current year. To examine whether this association depends 
on the level of revenue generated from environmentally related taxes itself or on its 
interaction with the initial level of GDP per capita, we allow ETRT to interact with itself, and 
with lnY0. Therefore, the equation that answers the second question is as follows:  
 
𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = Ψ + β0𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + β1(𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡) + β2(𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝑦0) + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
              𝛾?̅?𝑖 + ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                (1.5)                   
 
Then we re-estimate the equation (1.5) with lagged values of all explanatory variables for five 
periods, each period being one year, in order to answer the second question in the long term. 
 
Moreover, this paper also aims to investigate whether the relation between environmentally 
related tax revenues and economic growth differs between countries which have established 
environmental tax reforms (ETRs) and ones which have not. For this purpose, information 
about the implementation of ETRs in OECD countries in the examined period is collected 
through a literature review. We then used this information to build two groups of countries: 
countries which have implemented ETRs, and those which have not. After that, we applied 
the same empirical approach used in equation (1.4) on the two groups, with the intention of 
identifying possible differences in the relationships between environmentally related taxes 
and economic growth rate in both short and long term. 
1.4.2. Data  
Panel data was chosen to study the nature of the relation between environmentally related tax 
revenues and economic growth for two reasons: firstly, the available data about environmental 
taxation which ranges, according to OECD statistics, from 1994 to 2013 is not long enough 
for using time-series econometrics. Employing panel data will allow us to cover more 
observations and thus raise the statistical power and inference of the model. Secondly, Temple 
31 
 
(1999) and Baltagi (2001) argue that panel estimators are the most appropriate choices for 
growth regression. 
The sample used is annual data covering the period 1994-2013 for 31 OECD countries; 
namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom which are considered for this panel 
analysis. Because of completely missing patterns of data that concern productive expenditure 
variables for Chile, Mexico and USA, we excluded these countries from our sample. In 
addition, Latvia, which joined recently to the OECD, doesn’t have data on environmentally 
related tax revenue. Therefore, it was excluded from the sample. The selection of the period 
was constrained by the availability of data about environmental tax revenues that are newly 
introduced in most OECD countries, and about other explanatory variables7. The data was 
extracted from various sources: (i) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); (ii) World Development Indicators (WDI) published by 
the World Bank; (iii) The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Data on human capital stock are performed by the “Laboratoire d’Économie 
Appliquée au Développement (LEAD)” in Toulon University (France). Appendix (1.A) 
includes a summary of variables and data sources. 
  
The dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
The dependent variable is the economic growth rate, measured as the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. As far as the control variables are concerned, we considered a broad set of control 
variables typically used in the empirical and theoretical growth literature. We classified them 
in five categories as follows: 
 
x Environmental taxes  
 According to Pigou (1920) the optimal environmental tax is the tax that equals between the 
marginal private benefit of emissions in production and the marginal social damage of 
emissions, while the international organizations define environmental tax  as “a tax whose tax 
                                                          
7 The environmental tax revenues data provided by OCED statistics cover the 1994-2014 period. But as the data 
on capital human only run until 2013, we decided to restrict our study from 1994 to 2013. 
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base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) that has a proven specific negative impact on the 
environment” (United Nations et al., 2003). 
The measure of environmental tax revenue in this chapter is based on the United Nations 
definition which is accepted by the main international organizations, such as the OECD and 
the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat). The environmental tax revenue data, 
which is provided by OECD statistics, is comprised of taxes on energy products such as fossil 
fuels, electricity and transport fuel (petrol and diesel). This includes all CO2-related taxes. 
Environmental tax revenue data also encompasses the motor vehicle and transport taxes 
which refer to one-off import or sales taxes on transport equipment, recurrent taxes on 
ownership, registration or road use of motor vehicles and other transport-related taxes 
(excluding transport fuel taxes). Recently, in 2016, new data concerning four categories of 
environmental tax revenues were added to OECD statistics. They are: (i) ozone-depleting 
substances taxes, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and carbon tetrachloride; (ii) water and 
wastewater taxes, like taxes on water extraction, piped water, wastewater treatment; (iii) 
waste management taxes, for example, taxes on final disposal of solid waste, on packaging 
(e.g. plastic bags); and (v) mining and quarrying taxes which include mining royalties and 
excavation taxes (e.g. sand and gravel). The rest of environmentally related tax revenues that 
are not included elsewhere, e.g. hunting and fishing taxes, SOx and NOx emission taxes were 
classified in a category called other taxes. In this chapter, we used the total revenue of all 
environmentally related taxes as a proportion of GDP, extracted from OECD statistics, to 
investigate the relationship between environmental tax and economic growth rate. This 
variable is coded as (ETRT) 
 
x Conditioning variables 
Three variables, usually used in growth regressions literature as conditioning variables8, were 
selected to be included in this group of control variables: (i) the initial level of real GDP per 
capita measured by the natural logarithm of GDP per capita for each country in the year 1994. 
It is coded as 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖0. The growth rate of real GDP per capita is related to the initial level of real 
GDP per capita in the standard growth model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). They predict 
that a country with a low level of initial income per capita relative to its own steady-state will 
tend to grow at faster rates than a country that is already close to its long-run potential level of 
steady-state. As this variable is constant over time, it has been included in the category 𝑍𝑖 of 
                                                          
8 The conditioning variables are the variables used in the Barro-type regressions (Kneller, et al., 1999) 
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equation (1.4). (ii) Total labor force growth rate (TLF). Population structure could influence 
economic growth through its impact on some determinants of growth such as investment and 
saving rate. (iii) Gross fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP was used to account for 
investment in physical capital. It is coded as (k). The annual change in physical capital 
(change k) was employed to capture the effect of physical capital accumulation which is 
considered as an engine of economic growth rate (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
x Human capital 
Human capital refers to “the knowledge, skills, competences and attributes embodied in 
individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being” (OECD 
2001). On the connection between human capital and growth, the endogenous growth models 
predict that human capital could affect growth through two distinct channels. On the one 
hand, human capital might accelerate growth through the externalities that originate from an 
educated labor force which enhances the productivity or both labor and physical capital 
(Lucas Jr., 1988). On the other hand, human capital might affect growth mainly via 
innovation (Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990 and Aghion and Howitt, 1992)  
In an empirical growth application like Baldacci et al. (2008) and Chi (2008), the level of 
human capital in the previous year (𝐻𝑡−1)  and the annual changes of human capital (change 
H) are usually used to capture the effect of human capital on growth. Consequently, these two 
variables were employed to estimate the impact of human capital on economic growth rate in 
this model. We used the human-skill index, published by (LEAD) as a measure of human 
capital. Literacy rate, enrolment in tertiary education and mean years of schooling of adults 
were used to construct this index. As the data of this index is annual, the annual change of 
human capital could be included in the model, whereas this possibility is not available with 
the data of Barro and Lee (2013)  which was constructed for a 5-year age group. 
x Fiscal variables 
With regard to the relation between (non-environmental) fiscal policy and growth, three 
variables have been selected to capture the impact of this policy: productive expenditure 
(exp), distortionary taxation (tax), and fiscal balance (Balance). The productive expenditure is 
defined as the sum of general government9 spending on education, health, public order and 
safety, housing, and defense. All of which are measured relative to GDP. Following (Kneller 
                                                          
9 “General government consists of central government, state government, local government and social security 
funds” (OECD, 2013, pp 62) 
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et al, 1999; Adam and Bevan, 2005; Teles and Cesar Mussolini, 2014a, and Alcántar-Toledo 
and Venieris, 2014), these elements are considered as productive expenditure, because they 
are used in order to form physical and human capital and thus stimulate growth. The other 
government spending on social protection, economic services, recreation and culture as well 
as “unclassified” spending, were not included in the specification, because these categories of 
expenditure are considered growth neutral (Barro, 1990; Kneller et al., 1999; Teles and Cesar 
Mussolini, 2014a). We cited the data of productive expenditure mainly from OECD statistics 
and completed it from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS). The distortionary taxation 
was calculated as the sum of the taxes on income, profit and capital gains; payroll and 
workforce; as well as social security contributions as a percent of GDP. We consider these 
three measures of taxes as the main distortionary forms of taxation, because the revenue of 
environmentally related taxes, in most countries that have established environmental tax 
reform, has been used to reduce one or more of these three distortionary taxes. The presence 
of distortionary taxes in the model is very important when we study the effect of 
environmental taxation on the economy, because this reflects the level of pre-existing tax 
distortions (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Metcalf, 2000). As the non-distortionary 
taxation10 (tax on domestic goods and services) is assumed to have negligible growth effects 
(Barro, 1990) and (Kneller  et al., 1999), we didn’t include it in the model.  
The fiscal balance (surplus/deficit) “also referred to net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of 
general government, is calculated as total general government revenues minus total general 
government expenditure. Revenues encompass social contributions, taxes other than social 
contributions, and grants and other revenues. Expenditure comprises intermediate 
consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, social benefits, other current 
expenditure (including interest spending), capital transfers and other capital expenditure” 
(OECD, 2013, pp 62).  
x  Macroeconomic control variables 
Basing on the literature of macroeconomic theory, we have chosen inflation rate and goods 
trade openness as macro control variables. The Inflation rate (INF) is measured by the annual 
                                                          
10 Our division of taxes into distortionary and non- distortionary taxes has been inspired from Barro (1990) who 
suggests that the effects of taxes on economic growth depend on whether tax is distortionary or non-
distortionary. Distortionary tax is defined as the tax which has an impact on the saving/ investment decisions of 
agents and hence distorts the steady-state rate of growth. Whereas, Non-distortionary tax does not affect saving/ 
investment decisions and thus has no effect on growth rate. 
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percentage change in the Consumer Price Index. This variable is considered a proxy of 
macroeconomic stability. It is expected to have a negative relation with economic growth rate. 
Openness to international trade of goods (OPENG) is defined as (exports plus imports of 
goods) in percentage of GDP. It is a measure of the extent to which a country is linked to the 
rest of the world. In general, trade liberalization promotes economic performance and it is 
expected to be positively related to economic growth rate. 
 
As we indicated in section (1.4.1), the expression 𝑊𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of control variables 
varying across countries and over time. Therefore all the explanatory variables mentioned 
above (except 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖0) are included in the category 𝑊𝑖𝑡 and their averages in the category ?̅?, of 
equation (1.4). After identifying the variables used in this study and collecting their data, we 
used a multiple imputation (MI) procedure to treat missing data. Appendices (1.B and 1.C) 
provide the details about this procedure. Table (1.1) shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables before and after the multiple imputation process.  As the imputation of missing data 
is performed by using all the variables employed in this thesis, table (1.1) includes all these 
variables. The explanations of the rest of the variables used in this thesis will be presented in 
the second and the third chapter.  
As already mentioned, information about the implementation of “revenue recycling system” 
was collected through a literature review. The reviewed literature includes articles published 
in academic journals, books, and policy reports. The “revenue recycling system” shows three 
types of ETRs in which the revenues from environmental taxes are used for reducing those on 
labor or capital, financing renewable energy investment projects or other environmental 
protection initiatives. A full list of the identified ETRs and a summary of some of their 
characteristics are presented in table (1.2). For each reform, the table provides the main 
sources of environmentally related tax revenue and the primary channels via which these 
revenues were recycled. In addition, it also shows when ETRs were introduced and the 
references from which relevant information was collected.  
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 Before MI After MI 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gr 2.0656 3.1079 -14.5730 18.6211 2.0433 3.0543 -14.5598 13.0814 
ETRT 2.5123 0.7398 0.2673 5.3856 2.5123 0.7392 0.2673 5.3856 
lnY0 9.9078 0.7269 8.4973 10.9642 9.9078 0.7263 8.4973 10.9642 
 K 22.741 3.9980 11.7114 37.1010 22.7562 4.002 11.7114 37.1010 
Change k -0.08105 1.7551 -10.2458 10.9068 -0.0874 1.7592 -10.2458 10.9068 
TLF 0.0093 0.0145 -0.0432 .120029 0.0093 0.0145 -0.0432 0.1200 
H 0.8491 0.0644 0.6377 .9502 0.8491 0.0644 0.6377 .9502 
Ht-1 0.8471 0.0647 0.6377 0.9502 0.8471 0.0647 0.6377 0.9502 
Change H 0.0047 0.0111 -0.0155 0.0938 0.0047 0.0111 -0.0155 0.0938 
Exp 15.2256 2.6214 7.9412 24.0129 15.0541 2.7108 4.0452 24.0129 
Tax 21.6628 5.2969 6.78 34.969 21.6541 5.2802 6.78 34.969 
Balance -2.0096 4.5860 -32.3045 18.6959 -2.2141 4.6023 -32.3045 18.6959 
INF 4.5271 9.6895 -4.4799 106.2627 4.5271 9.6818 -4.4799 106.2627 
OPENG 67.6072 35.106 13.8653 181.4052 67.9476 35.2057 13.8653 181.4052 
ET 233.6585 146.8462 11.9701 980.8488 232.7705 146.5881 11.9701 980.8488 
DEBT 57.9122 36.8835 3.664 244.477 57.5186 36.5957 3.664 244.477 
EINNOV 9.1407 3.81463 0 25.4 9.2552 3.71079 -0.2074 25.4 
LCO2 11.5293 1.3908 7.7179 14.0929 11.5293 1.3896 7.7179 14.0929 
DCPS 97.8268 50.6574 4.4165 311.063 98.3125 50.3945 4.4165 311.063 
RQ 1.29396 0.41701 0.0309 2.0766 1.2783 0.4152 0.03 2.0766 
GNS 23.3959 5.9636 3.247 41.689 23.3959 5.9588 3.247 41.689 
FERT 1.64867 0.37641 1.076 3.05 1.6486 0.3761 1.076 3.05 
TID 0.7232 0.10370 0.4831 0.9449 0.7232 0.1036 0.4831 0.9449 
Y 33236.53 12858.03 10053.16 90628.36 33236.53 12847.76 10053.16 90628.36 
TFCPEP_sh 76.8799 16.6601 22.3953 97.2401 76.8799 16.6468 22.3953 97.2401 
LPop 16.21989 1.4427 12.4912 18.6679 16.2198 1.4416 12.4912 18.6679 
ERGRDB 2.6805 1.98008 0.04669 17.6579 2.8592 2.2083 0.046 17.6579 
FDI 5.1247 13.5981 -58.9776 253.4985 5.5952 14.1326 -58.9776 253.4985 
RDPI 1.1520 0.49773 0.08682 2.4622 1.1918 0.5081 0.0868 2.4622 
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics 
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11 For the first three years, the carbon price is fixed (i.e. carbon tax), before moving to an emission trading 
scheme in 2015 (Withana et al., 2013) 
12 SMEs refer to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Country year Environmentally related taxes revenue Revenue recycling system References 
Australia 2012 Introduction of  a carbon pricing mechanism11 Reduction of income tax. Increase in pension 
allowances and in family benefits (lump sum 
transfer/year). Support for ‘emissions intensive 
trade-exposed’ industrial activities. 
Withana et al. (2013) 
 
Austria 2004 Introduction of a coal tax and increase of 
natural gas and mineral oil taxes. 
Reduction of corporate taxes and tax incentives 
for SMEs. Reduction of personal income taxes 
for low and middle income households. 
OECD (2007, 2009) 
Czech Republic 1995 
 
 
 
2008 
Increase of transport fuels tax. 
 
 
 
New taxes on natural gas, coal and electricity. 
Reduction of personal income tax and labor tax. 
Part of revenue is allocated to finance programs 
related to air pollution, including the reduction 
of emissions from smaller emission sources.  
Reduction of personal income tax and on social 
security contributions of employers and 
employees. 
Ercolano, Gaeta, and 
Romano (2014) 
Withana et al. (2014) 
 
 
Ercolano, Gaeta, and 
Romano (2014) 
Denmark 1994 
 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2010 
Increase of energy taxes and introduction of 
taxes on tap water, wastewater tax, and plastic 
and paper bags. 
 
Increase of industrial energy tax rates, and 
introduction of a Sulphur tax and a tax on 
natural gas. 
 
 
Increases of energy taxes (petrol, diesel, coal, 
and electricity, and natural gas, light and heavy 
fuel oil). 
 
 
Yearly price indexation of energy taxes. 
 
 
Increased taxes on energy and wastewater and 
changes in motor vehicle taxation. 
Reduction of marginal income tax rates. 
 
 
 
Reduction of employers’ social security 
contributions, subsidies for energy efficiency 
programs and support for SMEs12, Investment 
grants for energy saving measures. 
 
Reduction of personal income tax rates and 
taxes on the yield of pension savings. 
 
 
Reduction of personal income taxes. 
 
Revenues from energy taxes help reduce 
healthcare payments and the lowest tax rate. 
Households also compensated by green checks 
(small tax deductions for every individual in the 
household). 
Andersen et al. (2007) 
Speck & Jilkova (2009)  
 
 
Andersen et al. (2007) 
Speck & Jilkova (2009)  
Withana et al., (2013) 
 
 
Andersen et al. (2007) 
Speck & Jilkova (2009)  
 
 
Larsen  (2011)   
 
Bragadóttir et al. (2014), 
Larsen (2011)  
 
Estonia 2006 Increase of transport fuel taxes, introduction of 
a tax on natural gas and an electricity output 
tax. 
Reduction of income tax rates. Increase in the 
tax-free allowance and tax exemptions for 
pensioners and families with more than two 
children.  Part of revenue earmarked to finance   
environmental protection projects.  
Ekins and Speck (2011) 
Withana et al. (2014) 
 
Finland 1990 
 
 
1997 
 
1998 
Introduction of a CO2 tax. 
 
 
Increase of CO2, Landfill tax. 
 
Energy and environmental taxes. 
Reduction of personal income tax and social 
security contributions. 
 
Reduction of labor taxes. 
 
Further reduction of labor taxes. 
Bragadóttir et al. (2014), 
Withana et al. (2013),  
 
Ercolano, et al. (2014) 
 
Andersen et al.  (2007), 
Speck & Jilkova (2009)  
Germany 1999 
 
 
 
 
2006 
introduction of an electricity tax and Increase of 
existing energy taxes (heavy fuel oil, natural 
gas, light heating fuels, transport fuels) 
 
 
Heating fuel tax on natural gas and heavy fuel 
oil. 
Reduction of employers’ and employees’ social 
security (pension) contributions. Small fraction 
of revenue used for a program to promote 
renewable energy.  
 
Reduction of employers’ and employees’ social 
security (pension) contributions. 
Andersen et al. (2007) 
Speck & Jilkova (2009),  
Withana et al. (2013) 
 
 
Withana et al., (2013) 
 
The Netherlands 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxes on mineral oil products, natural gas and 
electricity; and taxes on water and waste 
disposal. 
 
 
 
Reduction of corporate profit taxes, employers’ 
social security contributions and income taxes. 
Part of revenue earmarked for energy premium 
system rewarding private households for the 
purchase of energy efficient appliances. 
 
Andersen et al. (2007), 
Ruijs and Vollebergh 
(2013); Withana et al. 
(2013) 
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Note: Part of this table is based on Oueslati et al. (2017), pp 92-93. 
 
 
To check the robustness of the model used in this chapter, firstly, using the QIC program, we 
verified whether certain or all the four categories of control explanatory variables13 should be 
included in the CRE model. Appendix (1.D) shows this program. Secondly, in appendix (1.E), 
we employed the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to verify the absence of 
multicollinearity. Finally, in appendix (1.F), panel unit root tests were used to demonstrate 
that the time series of economic growth rate (gr) and environmentally related tax revenues 
(ETRT) are stationary. We found that all four categories of control explanatory variables 
should be included in the CRE model, that there is no harmful multicollinearity, and that the 
time series of economic growth rate and environmentally related tax revenues are stationary.  
                                                          
13 The four categories of explanatory variables are the variables that we have collected, in addition to 
environmental tax, as determinants of economic growth.  
1999 Increase energy tax. Reduction of income taxes and increase of tax-
free allowances for SMEs. Reduction of 
employers’ social security contributions, taxes 
for self-employed and corporate profit taxes. 
Andersen et al. (2007), 
EEA (2011),  Speck & 
Jilkova (2009)  
 
Norway 1999 Taxes levied on CO2, SO2 and diesel oil Reductions in labor and capital income taxes. 
Reductions in employers’ non-wage labor costs. 
New fund for climate change mitigation, 
renewable energy and energy conservation. 
Hoerner & Bosquet 
(2001), OECD (2001),  
Withana et al., (2013) 
 
Sweden 1991 
 
 
2001 
Energy tax, CO2, SO2 tax. 
 
 
Increase of taxes on CO2, motor vehicles, 
waste landfilling, gravel and pesticides. 
Reduction of personal income tax and social 
security contributions. 
 
Reduction of personal income taxes paid by 
medium and low-income households and social 
security contributions 
Ercolano, et al. (2014), 
EEA (2005) 
 
Andersen et al. (2007), 
Eriksson et al. (2009), 
Speck & Jilkova (2009),  
EEA (2011); OECD 
(2014) 
Switzerland 2008 Introduction of a CO2 tax levied on fossil fuels, 
exempting transport fuels. 
The revenues of the CO2 tax recycled back to 
companies and households as a lump-sum. 
Taxes paid by enterprises redistributed to 
enterprises and taxes paid by citizens shared 
equally among citizens. 
Ekins and Speck (2011) 
 
United Kingdom 1996 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
2002 
Landfill tax. 
 
 
 
Climate change levy on energy products. 
 
 
 
Aggregates tax (sand, gravel, crushed rock) 
Reduction of employers’ insurance 
contributions. Part of revenue earmarked to 
energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Reduction of employers’ insurance 
contributions.  Part of revenue earmarked to 
energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Reduction of employers’ insurance 
contributions.  Part of revenue earmarked to 
energy efficiency improvements. 
Ekins and Speck (2011) 
EEA (2005), Withana et 
al., (2013) 
 
Ekins and Speck (2011) 
EEA (2005), Withana et 
al., (2013) 
 
 
Ekins and Speck (2011) 
EEA (2005), Withana et 
al., (2013) 
Table 1.2: ETRs in OECD countries 
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1.5. Results and Discussion  
Are the overall environmentally related tax revenues associated with the economic growth 
rate in the short and long term? 
 
Following the Variable Addition Test (VAT) for the equation 1.4, in the short and long term, 
(please see appendix (1.G) for the details of tests) we reject the null hypothesis in the short 
and long term, therefore 𝛾 ≠ 0. Thus, all the models have correlated random effects estimates.  
 
First, the estimation results provide information about the appropriate multiple imputation 
model. We can use the number of Largest FMI (Fraction of Missing Information), displayed 
in the last row of the table (1.3), to see if the specified number of imputations is sufficient for 
the analysis. The rule is that “𝑀 ≥ 100 × 𝐹𝑀𝐼 provides an adequate level of reproducibility 
of MI analysis” (Stata Corp, 2013: 48). In our study, the largest FMI is 0.34 for equation (1.4) 
in the short term, and 0.15; 0.10; 0.13; 0.11; and 0.16 respectively for equation 1.4 in the long 
term. The number of imputations, 100, exceeds the required number of imputations: 34 (=
 100 × 0.34); 15 = (100 × 0.15); 10 = (100 × 0.10); 13 = (100 × 0.13); 11 = (100 ×
0.11); 16 = (100 × 0.16). Therefore 𝑀 = 100 is sufficient for the analysis. Concerning the 
results associated with the analysis models, the estimation results of equation (1.4) are 
reported in table (1.3). Column (1) includes the results in the short term, whereas the columns 
from (2) to (6) show the results in the long term for five lagged periods, each period being one 
year. Estimation results revealed that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the overall share of environmentally related tax revenues in GDP and economic growth rate in 
the short and long term. This result may be explained through discussing the following 
question: Is this relationship sensitive to the level of revenue generated from environmentally 
related taxes or to the level of other variables in economy? Table (1.4) reports estimation 
results of equation (1.5) which contains two interaction terms. The first is between ETRT and 
itself. The second is between ETRT and lnY0.  The results reveal that when we allow these 
interactions to happen, the relationship between ETRT and gr becomes significant and 
negative in the short and the long term14. However, the results show that the first interaction 
                                                          
14 In order to know whether the significance of ETRE comes from its interaction with itself or with lnY0, we 
estimated equation (1.5) excluding the term (ETRT#lnY0), we found that the coefficient of ETRT becames 
insignificant. This means that the significance of ETRE comes from its interaction with lnY0. The results of this 
estimation are available upon request. 
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term is statically insignificant, whereas the second is significant.   
 
Variables In the short term In the long term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 
ETRT -0.518 -0.221 0.058 0.232 -0.117 0.140 
 (0.412) (0.272) (0.328) (0.410) (0.321) (0.337) 
lnY0 -0.017 0.010 -0.0003 0.068 0.190 0.140 
 (0.207) (0.184) (0.180) (0.184) (0.198) (0.193) 
Change k 0.219* 0.284*** 0.035 0.073 -0.008 0.034 
 (0.128) (11.666) (0.087) (0.0715) (0.087) (0.122) 
TLF 8.975 3.223 -18.733** -27.82*** -7.373 -17.283 
 (9.585) (11.666) (8.391) (8.124) (11.916) (14.678) 
Ht-1 4.413 -1.660 -0.131 2.652 -1.354 -4.714 
 (7.119) (8.967) (9.733) (10.107) (12.314) (14.614) 
ChangeH 25.285** 21.461*** -4.463 17.042 -17.036 14.640 
 (9.910) (7.927) (15.928) (12.025) (19.995) (9.259) 
exp -0.278*** -0.118 -0.059 -0.075 -0.161 -0.176* 
 (0.103) (0.079) (0.110) (0.137) (0.123) (0.100) 
tax -0.068 0.029 0.036 0.045 0.058 0.046 
 (0.099) (0.09) (0.105) (0.105) (0.101) (0.101) 
Balance 0.080* 0.031 0.054 -0.027 -0.086 -0.129** 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.058) (0.067) 
INF -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.060***  -0.06*** -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) 
OPENG 0.035** 0.029** 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.017 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
Observations 589 554 520 485 449 411 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
imputations 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Largest FMI 0.34 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖)  and a constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 1.3: Regressions results of equation (1.4), in the short and long term 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
 
We conclude that the effect of environmentally related taxes on economic growth rate is not 
sensitive to the level of revenues achieved itself but it is sensitive to the initial level of the 
country’s richness. The results also show that the interaction term between ETRT and lnY0 
has a positive sign, indicating that the increase in environmentally related tax revenues leads 
to an increase in the economic growth rate as the initial level of a country’s GDP per capita 
rises. This finding makes us wonder about the marginal effects of ETRT on economic growth 
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rate for countries having different levels of initial GDP per capita. To answer this question, 
we calculate the average marginal effects of ETRT15 at different quantiles of lnY0, using 
“mimrgns, dydx() at ()” Stata command16 .Table (1.5) shows the results of calculation. We 
find that the marginal effects of ETRT differ greatly between lnY0 levels. When the country 
has a low level of initial GDP per capita (𝑙𝑛𝑌0 = 8.863364), the average marginal effects of 
ETRT on economic growth rate is negative in the short and long term. With the increasing 
level of lnY0, the negative average marginal effects of ETRT decrease and they become 
positive when the country has a high level of initial GDP per capita (𝑙𝑛𝑌0 = 10.76395), in 
the long term. These results allow us to propose a rule concerning the relationship between 
initial level of GDP per capita, environmental taxation and economic growth rate, which is: 
the higher the initial level of GDP per capita, the more environmentally related tax revenues 
can promote economic growth rate. This rule could be justified though two factors: First, 
assuming that environmentally-related taxes lead to higher prices, however, with higher level 
of GDP per capita, people have more discretionary income after paying for basic necessities; 
therefore, they have more ability and amenability to pay higher prices in return for better 
environmental quality. Second, economic development leads to a shift from farming to 
manufacturing which creates greater environmental degradation. However, increased 
productivity and rising real GDP per capita leads to a third shift from industry to the service 
sector. The service sector usually uses human capital more than physical capital. 
Consequently, introducing environmental tax, in countries depend in its growth on the service 
sector more than manufacturing and farming17, could reinforce economic growth due to three 
elements: (i) improving the productivity of human capital, which is the main engine of growth 
in these countries, across increasing people's health and their ability of learning, thanks to 
reducing pollution (Gradus and Smulders, 1993, 1996; Ewijk and Wijnbergen, 1994;  
Oueslati, 2002; Pautrel, 2008, 2009; Aloi and Tournemaine, 2011). (ii) Improving the quality 
of environment, due to reducing pollution, may reinforce tourism which is a principal 
component in the service sector. (ii) Rich countries have the ability to reduce the negative 
                                                          
15 As the coefficient of the interaction term (ETRT#ETRT) is not significant, we exclude it from the equation 1.5 
when we calculate the average marginal effects of ETRT. This allows us to calculate the marginal effect of 
ETRT on economic growth rate taking into consideration only its interaction with lnY0. In this case, 𝜕𝑔𝑟
𝜕𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑇
=
?̂?0 + ?̂?2 × 𝑙𝑛𝑌0. 
16 For more information about the average marginal effects at specific values of explanatory variables see 
Williams (2012) 
17 See appendix (1.H) 
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effect of environmental taxation on physical capital through improved technology and higher 
productivity.  
 
Variables In the short 
term 
In the long term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 
ETRT -8.074** -4.802* -2.589 -1.154 -4.386* -6.155*** 
 (3.804) (2.631) (2.640) (3.391) (2.713) (2.369) 
ETRT#ETRT -0.049 0.019 0.018 -0.077 -0.234 -0.230 
 (0.171) (0.139) (0.154) (0.152) (0.119) (0.147) 
lnY0 -1.899** -1.069 -0.615  -0.317 -1.039 -1.544*** 
 (0.953) (0.668) (0.700) (0.839) (0.661) (0.586) 
ETRT#lnY0 0.763** 0.438* 0.249 0.170 0.519* 0.703*** 
 (0.365) (0.249) (0.277) (0.357) (0.282) (0.246) 
Change k 0.214* 0.277*** 0.031 0.070 -0.016 0.040 
 (0.124) (0.065) (0.089) (0.075) (0.089) (0.119) 
TLF 10.845 4.681 -17.963** -27.40*** -6.158 -14.422 
 (9.647) (11.350) (7.915) (8.027) (12.132) (14.402) 
Ht-1 6.178 -0.599 0.443 2.786 -1.300 -5.427 
 (7.473) (9.098) (9.916) (10.444) (12.781) (15.030) 
Change H 25.736*** 21.596*** -4.374 17.228 -16.852 13.819 
 (10.075) (7.992) (16.015) (11.893) (20.009) (9.252) 
exp -0.282** -0.119 -0.061 -0.078 -0.175 -0.192* 
 (0.103) (0.081) (0.112) (0.138) (0.125) (0.102) 
tax -0.105 0.006 0.024 0.037 0.036 0.019 
 (0.108) (0.092) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.099) 
Balance 0.071 0.025 0.0515 -0.030 -0.097* -0.149** 
 (0.048) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) (0.055) (0.066) 
INF -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0164) (0.020) (0.022) 
OPENG 0.037** 0.030** 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) 
Observations 589 554 520 485 449 411 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
imputations 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Largest FMI 0.36 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.11 0.15 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and a constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented here. 
 
Table 1.4: Regressions results of equation (1.5), in the short and long term 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
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  Short term Long term 
   Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 
Quantile lnY0 value dgr\d(ETRT) dgr\d(ETRT) dgr\d(ETRT) dgr\d(ETRT) dgr\d(ETRT) dgr\d(ETRT) 
P(10) 8.863364 -1.484** -0.702 -0.232 0.065 -0.620 -0.760 
P(25) 9.339503 -1.143** -0.533 -0.131 0.122 -0.459 0.008 
P(50) 10.18427  -0.537 -0.233 0.047 0.223 -0.171 0.008 
P(75) 10.38708 -0.392 -0.161 0.090 0.248 -0.103 0.126 
P(90) 10.76395 -0.121 -0.027 0.169 0.293 0.025 0.346 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively. 
Table 1.5: The average marginal effects of ETRT at different quantiles of lnY0 in the short 
and long term 
 
With respect to control variables and in order to know which equation we should use to 
interpret the findings, we ran the QIC program for equations 1.4 and 1.5. The best fitting 
model is the one that has the smallest value of the average of QIC (Cui and others, 2007). 
Table (1.6) reports the descriptive statistics of QIC values. The best equation to interpret the 
results is the equation 1.5 which has the least value of the mean of QIC (229490.6).  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      QICeq4 100 236990.5 472.0661 236384.2 239105.3 
QICeq5 100 229490.6 570.9566 228643.6 230901 
Source: Author's calculations 
Table 1.6: The descriptive statistics of the values of QIC for equation (1.4) and (1.5) 
 
At the beginning, the discussion will focus on the results obtained in the short term, then will 
continue to discuss those concerning the long term. In the short term, estimation results 
broadly confirm expectations about the relationship between the control variables and 
economic growth rate. The analysis reveals that annul change in physical capital, annual 
change in human capital and openness to international trade of goods are positively associated 
with economic growth rate. In contrast, the natural logarithm of initial value of country’s 
GDP per capita, the productive expenditure and inflation rate are inversely related to 
economic growth rate. The total labor force growth rates, the level of human capital in 
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previous year, as well as distortionary taxation do not seem to have a statistically significant 
relationship with economic growth rate. In the long term, column (6) shows a negative 
correlation between lnY0 and economic growth rates. This result corresponds to expectations 
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) about the convergence effect. 
 
The annual change of physical capital, in column (2), appears to be positively associated with 
economic growth rate. This is in line with the endogenous growth theory assumptions which 
consider the accumulation of physical capital as an engine of economic growth rate in the 
long-term. The columns (3) and (4) indicate that TLF have a negative association with 
economic growth rate. This could be due to the very stable nature of the labor force across the 
OECD countries, relative to that in developing economies. We can see that clearly in the table 
of descriptive statistics where (on average) the annual growth rate of total labor force is 0.009 
percent, and its minimum value is - 0.04, whereas the maximum value is only 0.12. The 
results from column (2) show that the variable that has the largest magnitude of positive 
relationship with growth rate is Change H. An increase of annual change in human capital by 
0.01 point is associated with 21.596 percent increase in the economic growth rate when the 
number of lagged values equals to one. This can be explained by the dominance of the 
services sector, which depends mainly on human capita, on the total output of developed 
countries. We can see this in appendix (1.H). Beginning in 1995, the value added in the 
service sector represents, on average, more than 60% of GDP in our sample of OECD 
countries. The productive expenditure appears to be negatively associated with economic 
growth rate, in column (6). This can be explained by two factors: inefficient use of money 
(Alesina et al., 2002) and/ or “resource displacement” (Ramey, 2011). When the government 
spends money, it uses labor and/or capital and those resources no longer are available for 
private sector uses. The coefficient associated with Balance is negatively correlated with 
growth rate when the values of variables are lagged to four and five years. This could be due 
to the high level of deficit, which reaches -32.30 percent of GDP in some OECD countries 
(please see descriptive statistics of variables in table 2). Finally, the coefficient of INF is 
negatively correlated to the economic growth rate during the first four periods of lagged 
values for explanatory variables, whereas OPENG has a positive association with economic 
growth rate only when the number of lagged periods equals to one. 
 
Now, we present in the table (1.7) a comparison between the results obtained before and after 
imputing missing data in the short term.   
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Variables Before imputation After imputation 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
ETRT -0.6184 -13.91** -0.518 -8.074** 
 (0.577) (3.444) (0.412) (3.804) 
ETRT#ETRT  -0.5408  -0.049 
  (0.129)  (0.171) 
lnY0 0.113 -3.883*** -0.017 -1.899** 
 (0.229) (0.972) (0.207) (0.953) 
ETRT#lnY0  1.616**  0.763** 
  (0.358)  (0.365) 
Change k 0.209 0.197 0.219* 0.214* 
 (0.156) (0.153) (0.128) (0.124) 
TLF 24.972 26.2809 8.975 10.845 
 (9.585) (9.970) (9.585) (9.647) 
Ht-1 17.318*** 17.205*** 4.413 6.178 
 (6.352) (6.607) (7.119) (7.473) 
Change H 23.845** 23.954** 25.285** 25.736*** 
 (9.941) (10.498) (9.910) (10.075) 
exp -0.193** -0.202** -0.278*** -0.282** 
 (0.103) (0.087) (0.103) (0.103) 
tax -0.130 -0.098 -0.068 -0.105 
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.099) (0.108) 
Balance 0.067 0.067 0.080* 0.071 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.044) (0.048) 
INF -0.013 -0.0008 -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.015) (0.014) 
OPENG 0.041** 0.046*** 0.035** 0.037** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
Observations 509 509 589 589 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and a constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented here. 
 
Table 1.7: Regressions results of equations (1.4) and (1.5), before and after multiple 
imputation process, in the short term. 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
 
The column (1) and (2) show the estimated results of equation (1.4) and (1.5) respectively. 
We found that the coefficients of the annual change in gross fixed capital formation (change 
k) and of inflation rate (INF) lose their significant when the incomplete database was used to 
estimate the equations (1.4) and (1.5). In addition, the association between the fiscal balance 
(Balance) and economic growth rate becomes insignificant when the equation (1.4) was 
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estimated with missing data. This difference in findings can be explained as follows: when the 
sample contains missing values, the list-wise deletion - a method  used by most statistical 
packages for handling missing data - removes any row that contains a missing value from the 
analysis (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011a). Since statistical power relies partly on a large 
sample size, list-wise deletion will reduce the statistical power of the tests conducted 
(Olinsky, Chen, and Harlow 2003), which is the reason why the results were less significant 
with the reduced database (15.7% reduction in size of the database). On the other side, when 
the multiple imputation process was run on our incomplete data, the size of the sample and the 
statistical power of the test increased, allowing us to observe more significant effects. Thus 
we can say that the imputation improved data quality and contributed to obtaining reliable 
estimates. 
 
Does the relationship between overall environmentally related tax revenues and the economic 
growth rate differ between the countries which have implemented ETRs and those which have 
not? 
Tables (1.8) and (1.9) show the results in the short and long term of the equation 1.4 when it 
is estimated on two samples; a sample containing the 12 countries which have established 
“revenue recycling system” in the examined period and a sample including the other 19 
countries. The estimation results reveal notable differences between the two groups of 
countries. The association between environmentally related tax revenues and economic 
growth rate, in the short and long term, is statistically insignificant in the countries which 
have not implemented ETRs, whereas this association is statistically significant and negative 
in the countries which have implemented ETRs18. These results do not lend themselves as 
evidence of a negative effect of “revenue recycling system” on the relationship between 
economic growth rate and environmentally related tax revenues. They only show that there is 
a significant difference in this relationship between countries which have and countries which 
have not implemented ETRs. We think that the changes in distortionary taxes structure, 
energy efficiency improvements, and environmental protection projects due to the use of 
environmentally related tax revenues may have given a role more important of ETRT effect 
on economic growth in the countries that have implemented ETRs compared with those that 
have not.   
                                                          
18 In the long term, the association between environmentally related taxes revenue and economic growth rate is 
statistically significant and negative when the number of lagged period equals to one, three and four. 
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Variables Countries without   
revenue recycling 
 
Countries with   
revenue recycling 
 
ETRT -0.280 -1.916** 
 (0.379) (0.820) 
lnY0 -0.079 0.980** 
 (0.299) (2.064) 
Change k 0.061 0.635*** 
 (0.085) (0.210) 
TLF 10.410 16.666 
 (11.510) (16.400) 
Ht-1 4.077 9.310 
 (14.228) (5.947) 
Change H 33.559** 7.465 
 (15.184) (10.816) 
exp -0.355 -0.228*** 
 (0.223) (0.044) 
tax -0.088 0.024 
 (0.144) (0.180) 
Balance 0.126* -0.048 
 (0.067) (0.067) 
INF -0.046*** -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.076) 
OPENG 0.024 0.067*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) 
Observations 361 228 
Number of countries 19 12 
Number of imputations 100 100 
Largest FMI 0.41 0.60 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and a constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
 
Table 1.8: Regression results of Eq.1.4 in the short term for countries that have implemented 
ETRs and those that have not 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
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Variables Countries without revenue recycling 
 
Countries with revenue recycling 
 
 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 
ETRT 0.044 0.244 0.543 0.043 0.187 -1.326*** -1.216* -1.648** -1.137* -0.831 
 (0.38) (0.501) (0.626) (0.360) (0.455) (0.430) (0.649) (0.821) (0.690) (0.757) 
lnY0 -0.122 -0.262 -0.239 -0.082 0.056 0.830*** 1.253*** 0.415 0.404 0.489 
 (0.304) (0.284) (0.274) (0.277) (0.313) (0.231) (16.070) (5.104) (0.651) (0.396) 
Change k 0.328*** 0.185** 0.164** -0.046  -0.058 0.218* -0.315*** -0.272* 0.098 0.311** 
 (0.087) (0.082) (0.056) (0.110) (0.126) (0.127) (0.113) (0.146) (0.134) (0.148) 
TLF 5.506 -15.574 -29.76*** -14.592 -9.781 -3.357 -22.264 -26.265 12.969 -24.061 
 (13.615) (9.980) (10.740) (13.272) (17.641) (16.019) (15.141) (17.093) (20.077) (25.680) 
Ht-1 -12.123 -7.613 -1.415 -7.362 -7.927 12.910 17.772 14.752 7.838 -0.269 
 (16.618) (17.152) (17.725) (18.292) (19.031) (8.862) (12.487) (13.539) (14.070) (16.266) 
Change H 16.038 -23.214 13.943 -26.576 5.368 27.454*** 16.932* 29.385 1.938 18.997** 
 (12.337) (28.832) (16.142) (30.206) (14.851) (9.242) (10.341) (27.010) (36.313) (9.005) 
exp -0.004 -0.026 -0.050 -0.252 -0.290 -0.238*** -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.106 -0.112* 
 (0.204) (0.229) (0.293) (0.256) (0.278) (.058) (0.046) (0.069) (0.124) (0.060) 
tax -0.023 -0.067 -0.044 0.069 0.050 0.139 0.265 0.261 0.256 0.102 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.146) (0.165) (0.134) (0.166) (0.164) (0.179) (0.186) (0.161) 
Balance 0.020 0.047 -0.031 -0.063 -0.144 -0.057 -0.106* -0.132*** -0.222** -0.261 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.055) (0.081) (0.098) (0.116) (0.059) (0.027) (0.115) (0.164) 
INF -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.051* -0.069*** -0.035* -0.101 -0.116** -0.233** -0.062 -0.178* 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.074) (0.053) (0.097) (0.043) (0.059) 
OPENG 0.034 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.022 0.024 0.024* 0.012 0.039 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) 
Observations 339 320 298 276 251 215 200 187 173 160 
Number of 
countries 
19 19 19 19 19 12 12 12 12 12 
Number of 
imputations 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Largest FMI 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.15 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and a constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 1.9: Regression results of Eq.1.4 in the long term for countries that have implemented 
ETRs and those that have not 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have provided empirical evidence of the macroeconomic relationship 
between environmentally related tax revenues and economic growth rate in the short and long 
term. The analysis also investigates whether this relationship differs between countries which 
have implemented environmental tax reforms and those which have not. In order to complete 
an un-balanced data set of 31 OECD countries from 1994 to 2013, multiple imputation 
method with an Expectation Maximization Bootstrapped algorithm was implemented, 
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improving data quality and inferences validity. In addition, information about the 
implementation of ETRs in the examined period is collected through a review of policy 
literature. The Correlated Random Effects (CRE) panel data model developed by Wooldridge 
(2010) was employed to estimate the effects. Empirical results reveal that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the overall share of environmentally related tax 
revenues in GDP and economic growth rate in the short and long term. However, when we 
allow ETRT to interact with lnY0, this relationship becomes significant and negative 
reflecting the importance of a country's richness level in determining the nature of this 
relationship. Furthermore, we found that, the higher the initial level of GDP per capita, the 
more environmentally related tax revenues can promote economic growth rate. We believe 
that these results could be insightful to policymakers. Governments seeking to introduce 
environmentally related taxes or planning to increase these taxes in order to curb emissions, 
should take into consideration the initial level of GDP per capita in order to promote 
economic growth rate. More precisely, introducing environmentally related taxes in countries 
having a low level of initial GDP per capita will damage the economic growth rate, while 
these taxes could promote the economic growth rate when the initial level of GDP per capita 
is high. Our results reveal also that the relationship between environmentally related tax 
revenues and economic growth rate varies if there is a mechanism to redistribute the revenues 
generated from these taxes. In countries where such mechanisms are present, the association 
between environmentally related tax revenues and economic growth rate is statistically 
significant and negative in the short and long term. On the contrary, no significant association 
is identified between these variables when such mechanisms are absent.  
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2. Chapter 2: Exploring the link between energy based 
taxes and economic growth  
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides a new approach to measure energy taxes. Then, this measure was used 
to investigate the relationship between energy based taxes and economic growth rate. The 
analysis was based on a panel dataset of 31 OECD countries from 1994 to 2013. Using the 
Correlated Random Effects (CRE) panel data model, we found that interacting with other 
variables in the economy, energy based taxes are negatively associated with economic growth 
rate in the short and long term. This association may rely significantly on the level of the 
economy's dependence on polluting energy use as a share of total energy used in the 
production process in the short and long run, and on the commercial trade openness only in 
the long run. In addition, the study showed that an increase in energy based taxes can enhance 
significantly the economic growth rate, as the initial level of country’s richness increases. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
How environmental taxation affects economic growth is a central and controversial issue in 
environmental economics. Although the literature is quite abundant on the subject, it is worth 
noting, as we saw in the literature review of the first chapter, that most contributions are 
theoretical and do not lead to a consensus on the short- and long-term effects of 
environmental taxes on economic growth. The lack of structured data on environmental 
taxation may explain the scarcity of empirical studies on the subject. The data provided by the 
OECD contains only statistics about the revenue generated from environmentally related taxes 
but not about their rates. These revenues are measured in four unites: millions of USD, a share 
of total tax revenues, per capita, and percent of GDP. However, these methods of 
measurement consider the revenue from taxes without taking into account the variations in the 
tax base. This may weaken the role that environmental taxation can play in the economy and 
does not reflect its real impact on the economic variables. In this chapter, we propose an 
alternative approach taking into account not only the revenue generated but also the variations 
in the tax base. Environmentally related taxes include seven categories: energy; motor 
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vehicles and transport; ozone-depleting substances; water and wastewater; waste 
management; mining and quarrying, and other environmentally related taxes. This implies 
that environmentally related taxes are imposed on different tax bases. Therefore, it is difficult 
to construct a common base for these factors. For this raison and in order to apply our new 
approach, we focus our analysis on the most important category among them: energy taxes 
(see section 2.2). The total final consumption of polluting energy products is considered as a 
base of these taxes. Therefore, the proxy that we construct to measure energy taxes is 
calculated as follows: energy taxes revenues measured in millions American dollars divided 
by the total final consumption of polluting energy products measured in ton of oil equivalent. 
This proxy is then used to achieve two objectives: First, examining the nature of the relation 
between energy taxes and economic growth rate in the short and long term. The second 
objective is to test whether the effect of energy taxes on the economic growth rate is sensitive 
to the level of other variables, such as: the initial level of a country’s richness, polluting 
energy use (as internal factors in the economy) and commercial openness of goods (as 
external factor in the economy).  
 
The novelty in this chapter lies in three aspects. First, we propose a new approach to measure 
energy taxes. This approach showed more ability to capture the effect of energy taxes on 
economic growth than the measurements provided by the OECD statistics. Second, we 
provide the first empirical evidence on the sensibility of the effects of energy taxes on 
economic growth rate for the level of other variables in the economy in the short and long 
term. Third, the analysis is based on a balanced dataset for a large sample of OECD countries, 
where the multiple imputation method was used in order to complete the missing data.This 
method has improved data quality and inferences validity.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the motivation for this 
study by providing an overview of trends in energy taxes revenues, total final consumption of 
polluting energy products, and GDP per capita growth rate in OECD countries over the last 
two decades. Section 2.3 presents the empirical model. Section 2.4 describes the data used. In 
sections 2.5, we discuss the empirical results on a short and long term basis. The last section 
concludes the chapter by summarizing the main findings. 
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2.2. Trends in OECD countries 
Data on energy tax revenues are taken from the OECD database on “Instruments used for 
Environmental Policy and Natural Resources Management”2. Energy taxes can be broadly 
defined as compulsory, unrequited payments to general government levied on energy products 
(OECD, 2001). Compared to other tax revenues, the revenues raised by energy taxes are the 
most important among environmentally related taxes over the period (1994 – 2013) (see 
figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Development of different environmentally-related tax revenues as a % of total tax 
revenue over time, OECD average (31 countries19) 
Figure (2.2) shows the evolution of the OECD average of energy tax revenues measured in 
billions United States Dollars (USD), the share of total final consumption of polluting energy 
products20 in total final consumption of energy (in %) (TFCPEP_sh) and GDP per capita 
growth rate over the period of study (1994 – 2013). 
                                                          
19 Our sample includes 31 OECD member countries. Chile, Mexico and the USA were excluded because there 
was no data for the productive expenditure variable. We explain this in the section 1.4.2 of chapter 1. 
20 The definition of this variable exists in the section 2.4. 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
Energy tax revenues
Other environmentally related taxe revenues (motor vehicle and transport, Ozone-depleting
substances, Water and wastewater,  Waste management, Mining and quarrying and other taxes
revenues)
53 
 
On average, the energy tax revenues show a slow rising trend over the period 1994 – 1996, 
and then it continues without showing great changes over the period 1997-2001. In 2002, 
energy tax revenues are starting to take an upward trend until 2008. It increased from 8.2 
billion in 2001 to 14.11 billion in 2008. After that, it decreased to 13.4 billion in 2009. Then it 
restarts an increasing trend between 2010 and 2013. In general, revenues of energy taxes 
measured in billions USD had an increasing trend from 2002 (8.2 billion) until the end of 
study period (15. 22 billion). This trend was accompanied by a reduction in (TFCPEP_sh) 
which decreased from 75.17% in 2003 to 70.17% in 2012, while it maintained almost the 
same level over the period 1994 - 2002. This implies that there was an expansion in the types 
of energy taxes imposed or an increasing in their rates over the period 2002-2012. The 
average GDP per capita growth rate shows many fluctuations during the period of study with 
a rising trend appearing from 1994 to 2000 and reaching 4.18% in 2000, from which it 
declined from 2001 to 2003 and stabilized at 1.8% in 2003. After that, we can see an increase 
to 3.57% percent in 2007, falling sharply in 2008 to stabilize at - 4.57% in 2009, to due to the 
latest world financial crisis in the U.S.A. In 2010 it recovered, but once again decreased to - 
0.17% in 2012. In 2013 it increased to 0.38. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of energy taxes revenues, total final consumption of polluting energy 
products and GDP per capita growth rate over the time, OCDE average (31 countries), 
1994– 2013. 
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2.3. Empirical model 
In order to explore the link between economic growth rate and energy based taxes, the 
equation of GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑔, is assumed to take the following form: 
𝑔 = 𝑓(ET, 𝜍, Η, 𝑋, Ω, ) 
Where ET represents a proxy of energy taxes, 𝜍 are the conditioning variables; 𝛨 represents 
human capital; 𝑋 refers to fiscal variables;  Ω is a vector of other macroeconomic variables. 
With this equation, we consider variables that are considered to have a significant effect on 
economic growth rate, according to the empirical growth literature. In order to know more 
about the justification of control variables, please see section 1.4.2 in chapter 1. The baseline 
specification of the growth equation is based on the Correlation Random Effects (CRE) 
approach, developed by (Wooldridge 2010). As it was shown in the first chapter, the structure 
of this model takes the following form: 
 
 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∅𝜆𝑡 + Ψ + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (2.1) 
 
where subscript 𝑖 indicates country 𝑖; subscripts 𝑡 indicate year, 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP21 per capita in country 𝑖 and year 𝑡,  𝑍𝑖 is a set of time-constant observed 
variables; 𝑊𝑖𝑡 denotes the variables that change across the country(𝑖) and the time (𝑡); 𝜆𝑡 is a 
vector of aggregate time effects (time dummies for years); Ψ is a constant; ?̅?𝑖 =
𝑇−1 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 ; 𝑎𝑖 is a time-constant component and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 indicates an error term.  
 
Consequently, the baseline specification of the growth model is described in equation (2.2). 
 
    𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = Ψ + β0𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (2.2) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 refers to the proxy of energy taxes. It is defined as the total revenues from energy 
taxes divided by the total final consumption of coal and coal products, oil products, natural 
gas and polluting electricity. It measures tax revenue from energy taxes per unit of fossil fuel 
energy use, in US $ per ton of oil equivalent. More details about this proxy will be presented 
by the section 2.4. The other explanatory variables are as follows:                                                                                                                       
                                                          
21 “Gross domestic product (GDP) is the standard measure of the value of goods and services produced 
by a country during a period”(OECD 2013, 62). 
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𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖0 denotes the natural logarithm of GDP per capita for each country in the year 1994, and 
as this variable is constant over time, it will be included in the category 𝑍𝑖. The coefficient of 
this variable represents the rate of convergence. Due to the conditional convergence effect, 
lnyi0 is expected to have a negative relationship with growth. 
 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑡 represents the annual change in physical capital. 𝑇𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the total labor force 
growth rate. 𝑦𝑖0, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 are called the conditioning variables. 
𝐻𝑡−1 is the level of human capital in the previous year. The human-skill index is used as a 
proxy of human capital. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐻 denotes the change in human capital from year 𝑡 − 1 to 
year 𝑡.  
Productive expenditure (exp); distortionary taxation (tax) and fiscal balance (Balance) are 
used to capture the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth rate.  
From the existing literature especially macroeconomic theory, the following variables 
constitute macro control variables: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  is  the  inflation  rate  which  proxies  macroeconomic stability  and  is  expected  to  be  
negatively  related  to  economic  growth rate. 
 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 denotes trade openness of goods22, which measures the extent to which a country is 
integrated with the rest of the world. In general, trade liberalization promotes economic 
performance and it is expected to have a positive correlation with the economic growth rate. 
 
All the explanatory variables mentioned above (except 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖0) change with different countries 
and over time, thereby they will be included in the category 𝑊𝑖𝑡 and their averages in the 
category ?̅?, in the equation (2.2). 
To test whether the effect of energy taxes on growth rate depends on the levels of polluting 
energy use, a country’s richness, and commercial openness of goods; we estimate a second 
regression equation with a similar specification to model (2.2) but one that additionally 
includes interaction terms between energy taxes and each of the total final consumption of 
polluting energy products as a share of total energy use, natural logarithm of initial value of 
                                                          
22 Since energy taxes are expected to affect the production of goods more than services and as we later aim to 
explore whether growth impacts of energy taxes depend on the level of trade openness of goods and services has 
been excluded from trade openness index. 
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GDP per capita, and trade openness of goods respectively. This second model is described by 
equation (2.3) below. 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = Ψ + β1𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + β2(𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐸𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡) + β3(𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝑦0𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 ×
                       𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + ∅𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (2.3) 
 
The estimated marginal effect of energy taxes in this model is equal to: 
𝜕𝑔𝑟
𝜕𝐸𝑇
= β̂1 + β̂2. 𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐸𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + β̂3. 𝑙𝑛𝑦0𝑖𝑡 + β̂4. 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡                        (2.4) 
2.4. Data  
This study is based on panel data sets covering 31 OECD countries over the period 1994-2013 
to examine the nature of relationship between energy based taxes and economic growth. We 
use annual data obtained from five main sources: (a) World Development Indicators (WDI) 
published by the World Bank; (b) the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD); (c) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); and (d) International Energy Agency (IEA). Data on 
human capital stock are performed by the “Laboratoire d’Économie Appliquée au 
Développement (LEAD)” in Toulon University (France). Summary and data source for each 
variable is listed in Appendix (2.A). 
x Energy taxes proxy 
As we mentioned earlier, in this chapter we propose a new approach to measure energy taxes. 
This approach takes into account not only the revenue generated but also the variation in the 
tax base. In line with (OECD 2006) the energy taxes are levied on petrol and diesel for 
transport purposes and on fossil fuels and electricity for stationary purposes. Therefore, to 
account for the variation in the use of energy products that are harmful to the environment, the 
total final consumption of energy products that pollute the environment through carbon 
emissions is considered as a proxy of energy taxes’ base. The energy products include: coal 
and coal products, oil products, natural gas and electricity. Electricity is different from other 
energy products as it is a secondary energy generated through a primary energy, which can be 
polluting (e.g. coal, oil, natural gas) or clean (e.g. hydro, nuclear, solar, tides, wind…etc). To 
ensure that only the electricity generated by a polluting fuel was included, the total final 
consumption of electricity was multiplied by the rate of total final consumption of electricity 
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generated from oil, gas and coal sources (% of total electricity generated) for a given year. 
Thus, the electricity category used in the energy taxes’ base shows the energy content or 
pollutant emissions, of underling primary fuel used to generate electricity, rather than 
electricity itself. We call it “polluting electricity”. We then computed the energy tax revenue 
per unit of total final consumption of polluting energy products, expressed in USD per ton of 
oil equivalent. It was considered as a proxy of energy taxes. The elements of this proxy are 
presented in appendix (2.A). 
 
x Interaction terms 
As previously mentioned, the purposes of this chapter are to examine the nature of the 
relationship between energy taxes and economic growth rate, and to explore whether this 
relationship depends on the level of other variables in the economy. As energy is an essential 
input of the production process, especially in the industrial sector, and as energy taxes are 
oriented toward polluting energy, we expect that economies that are more heavily dependent 
on polluting energy for production than clean energy, to be more sensitive to energy taxes.  
To control this effect, the proxy of energy taxes is interacted with the proxy of the 
dependency of production on energy use targeted by energy taxes. The later proxy is 
measured by the total final consumption share of coal and coal products, oil products, natural 
gas and polluting electricity in the total final consumption of energy. Coal and coal products, 
oil products, natural gas and polluting electricity are considered as polluting energy products. 
According to Ito (2017), the consumption of polluting energy products is expected to have a 
negative linkage to economic growth. 
 
The effect of energy taxes on growth may depend also on the initial level of a country’s 
richness measured by the initial level of GDP per capita. The justification of this hypothesis is 
mentioned in the section 1.1 of the first chapter. We tested this assumption in the first chapter 
when we used the total revenues of environmentally related taxes measured in percent of GDP 
as a proxy of environmental tax. In this chapter we want to verify the validity of this 
assumption by using a new proxy of energy taxes. To this end, the proxy of energy taxes has 
been interacted with the natural logarithm of initial value of the GDP per capita in each 
country in the year 1994.  
Due to an increased energy taxes, the relative prices of final consumption goods and 
production inputs increase with the increasing of prices of electricity, fuel, and in fact all 
58 
 
inputs whose price strongly depends on transportation costs (see also Fullerton and Heutel, 
2007; Martinez et al., 2012). This will increase the costs of produced goods. Therefore, firms 
reduce their domestic market production at previous prices, or they offer the same quantity at 
higher prices. In both cases, the consumption of goods will decrease, causing a decline in 
growth rate. In the era of globalization, international markets have become a substitute for 
domestic markets, especially for small countries. Hence, if companies were able to transfer 
that additional environmental cost to foreign markets, or offset the decline in the quantity 
produced to local markets through exportation to new markets, that may pay more attention to 
environmental protection topics (OECD, 2010b), we expect that pollution taxes will not be 
harmful to growth rate. Conversely, if these assumptions were not to be carried out, these 
taxes might have a negative impact on growth through increasing input prices, rising prices 
for the consumer and decreasing competitiveness of products in international markets. 
Consequently, we suppose that the economic growth impacts of energy taxes may depend on 
the degree of a country’s trade openness toward goods. In order to test this proposition, an 
interaction term between energy taxes and the index of openness to international goods’ trade 
has been used in this study. The calculations of the variables TFCPEP, lny0 and OPENG are 
presented in appendix (2.A).  
After identifying the variables and collecting their data, we used a multiple imputation 
procedure to treat missing data. Appendices (1.B, 1.C) provide the details about this 
procedure. Table (1.1) in the first chapter shows the descriptive statistics of the variables 
before and after multiple imputation process. 
 
To check the robustness of the model used in this chapter, firstly, using the QIC program, we 
verified whether certain or all the four categories of control explanatory variables should be 
included in the CRE model. Appendix (2.B) shows this program. Secondly, in appendix (2.C), 
we employed the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to verify the absence of 
multicollinearity. Finally, in appendix (2.D), panel unit root tests were used to demonstrate 
whether the time series of energy taxes (ET) are stationary. We found that all the four 
categories of control explanatory variables should be included in the CRE model, that there is 
absence of multicollinearity, and that the time series of energy taxes are stationary.  
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2.5. Results and Discussion 
2.5.1. In the short term 
Following the Variable Addition Test (VAT) for each of the equations (2.2 and 2.3) before and 
after multiple imputation, (please see appendix (2.E) for the details of tests), we reject the null 
hypothesis, ( 𝛾 ≠ 0). Consequently, all the models have correlated random effects estimates. 
The results from estimating Eq. (2.2 and 2.3), before and after multiple imputations, are 
presented in column (1) and (2) respectively in table (2.1). Firstly, we focus our discussion on 
the estimations results that we have obtained from the regressions after implementing multiple 
imputations process, then we compare these results with those obtained from the regressions 
estimations before the multiple imputations process. 
 
The results in column (1), after MI, indicate that energy taxes are negatively associated with 
economic growth rate in the short term. A 1 US $ increase per ton of oil equivalent of fossil 
fuel energy use is associated with a 0.7 percent decrease in growth rate over the year. 
Moreover, when energy taxes interact with TFCPEP_sh, lnY0 and OPENG in column (2), 
After MI, the coefficient of energy taxes increases from 0.007 to 0.049. This means that the 
magnitude of the correlation between economic growth rate and energy taxes is sensitive to 
the interaction of energy taxes with other variables in the economy.  
 
The results of the model with the interaction terms, reported in column (2), After MI, also 
show that an increase in energy taxes leads to lower economic growth as the share of total 
final consumption of polluting energy products in the energy mix increases. This result 
suggests that the use of energy taxes in economies, which depend more heavily on polluting 
energy for production processes than cleaner energies, harms the economic growth rate. We 
can conclude from this result that the switch to clean energies could have a positive impact on 
growth rate in countries that receive high revenue from energy taxes per ton of oil equivalent. 
The trend towards clean energy production and investing in new technology to increase the 
efficiency of polluting energy use may help reduce the proportion of polluting energy 
consumption in the overall energy mix of the economy and thus reduce the negative impact of 
energy taxes on economic growth. We also find that the interaction of energy taxes with the 
natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita was positive and significant, indicating that an 
increase in energy taxes leads to an increase in the economic growth rate as the initial level of 
a country’s richness rises. This result allows us to say that the more a country is rich, the more  
60 
 
 Before MI After MI 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
ET -0.005* -0.046*** -0.007** -0.049*** 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.018) 
TFCPEP_sh  0.055  0.063 
  (0.072)  (0.067) 
ET #  TFCPEP_sh  -0.00004  -0.0001* 
  (0.00004)  (0.00006) 
lnY0 -0.017 -1.053*** -0.071 -1.175*** 
 (0.214) (0.386) (0.204) (0.422) 
ET # lnY0  0.004***  0.005 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.0017) 
OPENG 0.034** 0.049** 0.027* 0.041** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) 
ET # OPENG  -0.00006  -0.00004 
  (0.00004)  (0.00005) 
Change k 0.204 0.183  0.213* 0.191 
 (0.158) (0.153) (0.127) (0.120) 
TLF 24.434 21.766 9.202 9.622 
 (9.852) (9.912) (9.625) (9.718) 
Ht-1 19.001*** 16.969*** 8.602 7.341 
 (6.152) (6.607) (6.284) (5.915) 
ChangeH 25.020** 21.036** 26.003*** 22.431** 
 (10.299) (9.550) (9.906) (8.923) 
exp -0.185** -0.180** -0.278*** -0.278** 
 (0.087) (0.083) (0.103) (0.108) 
tax -0.169 -0.166 -0.123 -0.121 
 (0.106) (0.087) (0.099) (0.100) 
Balance 0.076 0.092* 0.095** 0.093** 
 (0.055) (0.049) (0.045) (0.047) 
INF -0.014 -0.041 -0.038*** -0.035** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.013) (0.018) 
Observations 509 509 589 589 
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 
Number of imputations   100 100 
Largest FMI   0.43 0.28 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖) and the constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 2.1: Regressions with energy tax revenue per polluting energy products (US $ / ton of 
oil equivalent) 
Dependent variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
its ability to impose energy taxes and to bear its burdens increases. The last term of interaction 
between energy taxes and trade openness of goods appears to be slightly negatively associated 
with growth rate but without statistical significance. The control variables are consistent with 
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the findings of previous empirical studies. In order to know which equation we should use to 
interpret the findings of control variables, we ran QIC program for equations 2.2 and 2.3. 
As mentioned in appendix (2.D), the best fitting model is the one that has the smallest value 
of the average of QIC. Table (2.2) reports the descriptive statistics of QIC values. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
QICeq2.2 100 228734.4 405.2977 228212 230428.2 
QICeq2.3 100 216639.6 437.7918 216014.7 218438.6 
Source: Author 
Table 2.2: The descriptive statistics of the values of QIC for equation (2.2) and (2.3) 
 
 The best equation to interpret the results is equation 2.3 which has the least value of the mean 
of QIC (216639.6). Thereby, column (2), After MI, in table (2.1) is used to explain the effects 
of selected control variables on growth rate. Consistent with the neoclassical hypothesis of 
convergence, a higher level of initial GDP per capita is associated with a lower economic 
growth rate. The estimated coefficient of lnY0 is strongly significant. In line with much of the 
literature, openness to international trade of goods is positively correlated with economic 
growth rate and statistically significant. Total labor force growth rate was found to have 
positive effect on growth rate but were statistically non-significant. The annual change in 
human capital is positively and significantly associated with economic growth rate. 
Concerning financial policy variables, productive expenditure is appeared to be negatively 
correlated with economic growth rate. This result consistent with some empirical studies that 
found that government spending can undermine economic performance due to inefficient use 
of money (Alesina et al., 2002) and/ or due to “resource displacement” (Ramey, 2011). The 
distortionary taxation doesn’t have a significant correlation with economic growth, while the 
fiscal balance is positively associated with it. Finally, inflation rate is negatively related to 
economic growth rate. 
 
Now we return to compare our results before and after implementing the multiple imputation 
process. This will help us to understand the information and features that we have obtained 
through the use of this missing data treatment. In order to accomplish this objective, we 
estimated the same models as before using an unbalanced database (data with missing 
observations). The estimations of equations 2.2 and 2.3 are presented in table (2.1), (before 
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MI), column (1) and (2) respectively23. After comparing the results obtained before and after 
IM, we observed that the relationship between energy taxes and economic growth rate 
becomes more significant by using imputed database in regression 2.2. We also found that the 
interaction term between energy taxes and the share of total final consumption of polluting 
energy products in the energy mix, presented in equation 2.3, loses its significance when we 
use the incomplete database. This difference in results shows that the multiple imputation 
improved data quality and contributed to obtaining reliable estimates. 
 
The energy tax revenue per unit of its tax base was employed as a proxy of energy taxes in 
this chapter. To compare the results obtained by this approach with those obtained by using 
OECD measurements, we estimated equation 2.3 using four units of energy taxes: percent of 
GDP (ET_GDP), a share of total tax revenues (ET_TTR), per capita (ET_PC), and millions of 
USD (ET_MUSD). For the last unit (ET_MUSD), we took the logarithm in order to simplify 
the coefficient’s interpretation. These units are provided by OECD Statistics. The estimations 
are based on unbalanced database (before imputation). The results are reported in the 
appendix (2.3). In order to simplify the comparison, estimation results of equation 2.2 by 
using energy tax revenue per unit of its tax base (ET) are reported in column (1). The results 
presented in the columns (2-5) do not show any significant association between energy taxes 
and economic growth rate, whereas this association is significant in column (1). This shows 
that taking into account the variation in the tax base of energy taxes is important to capture a 
significant correlation between energy taxes and economic growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 The results of The Variable Addition Test (VAT) of equations 4 and 5, which have been implemented with 
unbalanced dataset, are reported in the appendix (2.G). Following the results of this test we reject the null 
hypothesis, therefore 𝛾 ≠ 0and  the models have correlated random effects estimates 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ET ET_GDP ET_TTR ET_PC ET_MUSD 
Energy taxes proxy -0.005* -0.623 -0.226 -0.001 -1.059 
 (0.003) (0.654) (0.221) (0.001) (0.690) 
lnY0 -0.017 0.005 0.008 -0.011 -0.033 
 (0.214) (0.191) (0.190) (0.185) (0.187) 
Change k 0.204 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.206 
 (0.158) (0.156) (0.157) (0.158) (0.154) 
TLF 24.434** 24.217** 23.721** 24.841** 25.714** 
 (9.852) (9.951) (10.0132) (9.987) (10.139) 
Ht-1 19.001*** 17.345*** 17.805*** 17.344*** 16.207** 
 (6.152) (6.263) (6.242) (6.381) (6.581) 
ChangeH 25.020** 24.517** 24.727** 23.848** 22.348** 
 (10.299) (10.113) (10.174) (10.134) (10.784) 
exp -0.185** -0.189** -0.192** -0.175** -0.163** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.082) (0.078) 
tax -0.169 -0.112 -0.145 -0.125 -0.154 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.111) (0.099) (0.106) 
Balance 0.076 0.059 0.056 0.059 0.072 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) 
INF -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.004 -0.055 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.066) (0.052) 
OPENG 0.034** 0.042** 0.042** 0.042** 0.040** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Observations 509 509 509 509 509 
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and the constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 2.3: Regression of equation 2.2 using the four measurements provided by OECD 
statistics of energy taxes 
2.5.2. In the long term 
In order to capture the impact of energy taxes on economic growth rate in the long term, we 
re-estimate the equations 2.2 and 2.3 with lagged values of all explanatory variables for five 
periods, each period being one year. The results are presented in table (2.4). Column (1) and 
(2) for every lag represent estimates results of equation 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. Column (1) 
of every lag shows that the correlation between energy taxes (ET) and the economic growth 
rate (gr) is statistically insignificant. This correlation becomes negative and statistically 
significant when energy based taxes interact with other variables in the first two lagged 
periods. This means, in the long term, that the negative association between economic growth 
rate and energy taxes could come from the interaction of energy taxes with other variables in 
the economy, especially with the total final consumption of polluting energy products as a 
share in energy mix and the country’s openness of trade goods. The interaction between ET 
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and TFCPEP_sh appeared to be negatively related to economic growth rate when the years of 
lags equal to one, two, and four. We also find that the interaction term between ET and 
OPENG has a negative effect on economic growth rate in all lagged periods but with 
statistical significance only when the number of lagged years equals to five. This shows that, 
the higher the level of country’s commercial openness of goods, the more the increase of 
energy taxes harms economic growth rate in the long term. This could be explained by 
increasing input costs because of energy taxes, which raises prices for the consumer and 
decreases competitiveness of products in international markets. Thus the exportation 
decreases leading to economic growth decline. Conversely, the results reveal that the 
interaction between the proxy of energy taxes and the natural logarithm of initial GDP per 
capita was positive in the five lags. This indicates that, in the long term, an increase in energy 
taxes could lead to an increase in the economic growth rate as the initial level of a country’s 
richness rises. This result could be interpreted by two factors. Firstly, the nature of the 
economic growth motor in rich countries, which usually depends on human capital 
accumulation rather than physical capital accumulation. Therefore, energy taxes oriented 
toward polluting energy products, which are used in physical capital accumulation, will not 
harm economic growth for rich counties as much as poor countries. Secondly, the efficiency 
and improvement in energy use usually require investments in high technology, R&D, and 
renewable energy. As rich countries have a greater ability to realize these investments than 
poor ones, they could reduce the negative impact of energy based taxes on growth more easily 
than poor countries. 
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 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 Lags=4 Lags=5 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
ET -0.004 -0.034* -0.001 -0.041** 0.002 -0.030 0.001 -0.024 0.004 -0.020 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.002) (0.018) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004) (0.019) 
TFCPEP_sh  -0.066  -0.042  -0.062  -0.139*  -0.038 
  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.082) 
ET #  TFCPEP_sh  -0.0001*  -0.0001*  -0.00004  -0.0001**  -0.0001 
  (0.00004)  (0.00004)  (0.00004)  (0.00005)  (0.00005) 
lnY0 -0.013 -0.903** -0.007 -1.048** 0.070 -0.810* 0.188 -0.534 0.134 -0.615 
 (0.176) (0.451) (0.177) (0.404) (0.170) (0.430) (0.173) (0.404) (0.160) (0.412) 
ET # lnY0  0.003**  0.004***  0.003**  0.00374***  0.003** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
OPENG 0.026* 0.040* 0.011 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.014 0.026 0.0030 0.046** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.0170) (0.019) 
ET # OPENG  -0.0001  -0.00005  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001** 
  (0.00006)  (0.00006)  (0.00006)  (0.00006)  (0.0001) 
Change k 0.272*** 0.278*** 0.031 0.029 0.085 0.080 -0.002 0.014 0.047 0.059 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.092) (0.096) (0.077) (0.090) (0.089) (0.077) (0.123) (0.106) 
TLF 3.479 6.730 -19.059** -15.052* -28.071*** -24.253*** -7.729 -2.947 -17.533 -14.001 
 (11.657) (11.608) (8.390) (8.046) (8.064) (8.143) (11.334) (12.113) (14.194) (13.926) 
Ht-1 0.214 -5.337 0.863 -2.946 1.335 -2.308 -2.2394 -7.889 -6.963 -10.108 
 (8.783) (8.790) (9.693) (8.976) (10.724) (9.783) (12.520) (12.112) (15.248) (14.524) 
ChangeH 21.856*** 14.539* -4.811 -11.140 16.627 10.077 -16.823 -25.999 14.340 7.860 
 (8.376) (8.179) (16.052) (15.665) (12.128) (11.093) (20.106) (18.326) (9.601) (10.258) 
exp -0.120 -0.079 -0.0707 -0.029 -0.080 -0.046 -0.154 -0.100 -0.175* -0.148* 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.111) (0.108) (0.138) (0.132) (0.125) (0.121) (0.100) (0.091) 
tax 0.003 -0.018 0.026 0.009 0.060 0.029 0.068 0.019 0.069 0.001 
 (0.089) (0.087) (0.104) (0.105) (0.110) (0.110) (0.105) (0.117) (0.101) (0.103) 
Balance 0.040 0.049 0.060 0.068 -0.033 -0.027 -0.091 -0.086 -0.142** -0.145** 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.042) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044) (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.067) 
INF -0.050*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.074*** -0.061*** -0.084*** -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) 
Observations 554 554 520 520 485 485 449 449   411 402 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
imputations 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Largest FMI 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.17 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The dummy variables of time (𝜆𝑡), the averages of the variables that 
change across the time (?̅?𝑖), and the constant were included in the regressions but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 2.4: Estimates of equations 2.2 and 2.3 with lagged values for all explanatory variables 
 
2.5.3. Marginal effect of energy taxes  
To estimate the marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate per capita, 
“mimrgns, dydx()” Stata command was used.  It calculates the average marginal effects of 
explanatory variable on dependent variable. The estimations are reported in table (2.5). The 
results show that the average marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate is 
negative in the short term. However, the magnitude of this effect decreases in the long term 
and the sign becomes positive when the number of lagged years equal to three and five. 
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 Short term Long term 
  Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 lag4 Lag5 
𝒅𝒈𝒓/𝑬𝑻 -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.005** 0.0001 -0.003 0.001 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively. 
Table 2.5: Average marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate per capita 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have provided empirical evidence of the macroeconomic relationship 
between energy based taxes and economic growth rate in the short and long term. We have 
focused our analysis on this category of environmentally related taxes for two reasons: Firstly, 
energy taxes constitute the largest proportion in terms of the number of taxes imposed and the 
revenues achieved. Secondly, to be able to take into account for not only the revenue 
generated from taxes but also the variations in the tax base. The multiple imputation method 
with an Expectation Maximization Bootstrapped algorithm was implemented in order to 
complete an un-balanced data set of 31 OECD countries over 20 years, improving data quality 
and inferences validity. The Correlated Random Effects (CRE) panel data model developed 
by Wooldridge (2010) was used to estimate the effects. Empirical results reveal that when we 
neglect the interaction between energy taxes and other variables in the economy, the 
relationship between energy taxes and economic growth rate was found to be negative and 
significant only in the short term. When this interaction was taken into account, energy taxes 
negatively associated with economic growth rate, in the short and long term (two lagged 
years). This shows that the negative effect of energy based taxes on economic growth rate, on 
the long term, occurs through the interaction of energy taxes with other variables in the 
economy. In particular, we found that energy taxes seem to have a negative correlation with 
economic growth rate in the short and long term and this correlation relies significantly on the 
level of economic dependence on polluting energy use as a share of the mix energy in the 
short and long run, and on commercial openness of goods only in the long run (the fifth 
lagged years). On the other hand, our study shows that an increase in energy taxes can 
significantly enhance economic growth, as the initial level of a country’s richness increases. 
Finally, we compared the estimation results obtained by using our proposed approach to 
measure energy taxes with those provided by the OECD statistics in the short term. We found 
that taking into account the variation in the tax base is important to capture a significant 
correlation between energy taxes and economic growth rate. We believe that our results could 
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be insightful to policymakers, especially after COP21 (the agreement signed in Paris in 2015 
concerning climate changes). Governments having introduced energy taxes or planning to 
increase these taxes in order to curb emissions, should at the same time work to encourage the 
shift toward clean energy use and to increase the efficacy of polluting energy use, because this 
could reduce the negative effect of energy taxes on economic growth. Additionally, the 
government should provide support to industrial enterprises that direct their production for 
export, in order to compensate for part of the increase in costs resulting from energy taxes. 
This may improve their competitiveness in the global markets and thus increase their exports. 
On the other side, rich countries are more able to use environmentally related taxes as an 
instrument for environmental policies, without harming economic growth, than poor 
countries. Finally, the method used to measure energy taxes is an important issue and it can 
change the implications of public policy. For this reason, we propose to build a new measure 
of the categories of environmentally related taxes which takes into account the variation in 
their bases.   
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3. Chapter 3: Physical capital, human capital, CO2 
emissions, eco-innovation, public debt, energy taxes 
and economic growth in OECD countries 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is an extension of the second chapter. It explores the channels through which 
energy taxes may affect economic growth, using a simultaneous equations model for a 
balanced panel data of 31 OECD countries over the 1994–2013 period. The empirical results 
reveal a negative impact of energy taxes on physical investment in the short and long term. 
This impact is negatively sensitive to the existence and level of public debt. Additionally, the 
results show that energy taxes have an indirect effect on human capital through their impact 
on CO2 emissions. The taxes on energy products are able to reduce both the flux and the stock 
of CO2 emissions that have a negative impact on human capital skill in the short and long 
term. Finally, we found that energy taxes can encourage eco-innovation in the short and long 
term. However, eco-innovation only promotes economic growth only after a period of two or 
three years. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
According to the theoretical literature on environmental economics, imposing taxation on 
pollution (e.g., energy taxes) can affect economic growth through three main channels: 
physical capital (physical investment); human capital; and eco-innovation. On one hand, these 
taxes harm economic growth through their negative impact on physical capital (see for 
instance, Bovenberg and Heijdra,1998; Labandeira et al., 2004; Ono 2003b; Siriwardana et 
al., 2011; and Wang et al., 2015). On the other hand, when the level of pollutant emissions 
decreases, as a result of energy taxes, this will improve public health and promotes learning 
capacity, reinforcing human capital accumulation and thus economic growth (Aloi and 
Tournemaine, 2011;  Chen et al., 2017; Ewijk and Wijnbergen, 1994; Gehrsitz,  2017; Gradus 
and Smulders, 1993;  Kim et al., 2017;  Mabahwi et al., 2014; Pautrel, 2012; and Vellinga, 
1999b). Moreover, some studies show that energy taxes encourage investment in 
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environmental technologies and therefore stimulate economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2012 ; 
Ambec et al., 2013; Hart, 2008; Hattori 2017; Nakada, 2004; OECD, 2010a; and  Porter and 
van der Linde, 1995). Figure 3.1 shows these channels. 
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The impact of energy tax on economic growth has been widely discussed. Nonetheless, the 
majority of studies are theoretical, and empirical research examining the validity of these 
hypotheses is rather weak. This is probably due to the lack of available data on energy taxes.  
 In addition, we noticed that the majority of the theoretical models applied to studying the 
effect of energy taxes on economic growth assume that the government finances its 
Human capital 
Environmental 
innovation 
Physical 
capital 
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emissions 
Energy 
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Figure 3. 1: The channels through which energy taxes can affect economic growth 
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expenditures only through taxes and that the public budget is balanced in every period. As a 
result, these models ignore any burden associated with government debt. Many studies 
showed that, high levels of public debt can lead fiscal policy to adversely affect economic 
growth, while low levels of public debt allow fiscal policy to promote economic progress 
(Baharumshah et al, 2017; Bhattarai et al., 2014; Chen et al. 2016; Gogas et al., 2014; 
Galstyan and Velic, 2017; Gwartney et al. 1998; Teles and Cesar Mussolini 2014a). In recent 
years, sustaining a high level of public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio has been 
one of feature of advanced economies. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, many OECD 
countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, have found themselves with high debt-to-GDP 
ratios. These ratios are due to high budget deficits from rising public spending and declining 
tax revenue with the aim of saving the banking sector and stabilizing economic growth.  
In view of the above, the econometric approach in this chapter aims to achieve two objectives. 
Firstly, to investigate the potential impact of energy taxes on physical capital (physical 
investment), human capital and environmental innovation in the context of an endogenous 
growth model, where physical capital, human capital and environmental innovation are the 
three mains channels through which energy taxes could affect economic growth. Secondly, to 
explore whether this impact is sensitive to the existence and level of public debt. In other 
words, does ignoring public debt alter the impact of energy taxes on these channels and thus 
on growth? The analysis covers the short and long term for both objectives.  
This chapter innovates in three ways: Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt at 
empirically testing the validity of these hypotheses together for the short and long-term using 
a simultaneous equations model (SEM). Secondly, we provide the first ever macro-
econometric evidence on how sensitive of the effects of energy taxes on physical investment, 
and thus on economic growth are with regard to the existence and the level of public debt. 
Finally, the analysis is based on a balanced dataset for a large sample of OECD countries and 
uses multiple imputation method for completing the missing data.   
After a review of the existing relative literature in section 3.2, the rest of this article is 
organized as follows. Section 3.3 presents the empirical model. Section 3.4 contains a 
description of the data. Section 3.5 shows how the endogeneity problem is treated. Section 3.6 
highlights the estimator used to estimate the coefficients for equations. In section 3.7, we 
discuss the empirical results for the short and long term. The final section concludes the 
article by commenting on the main results. 
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3.2.  Literature review 
Many existing studies on the effect of energy taxes on economic growth through its impact on 
physical capital (physical investment), human capital, and eco-innovation are performed on a 
piecemeal basis and without a comprehensive model in mind, thus ignoring the potential 
interaction between these variables. Therefore, this chapter reviews the literature under five 
subsections, i.e., (a) endogenous growth factors, (b) energy taxes and investment, (c) energy 
taxes and CO2 emissions, (d) CO2 emissions and human capital, and (e) energy taxes and 
environmental innovation. 
3.2.1. Endogenous growth factors 
According to the endogenous growth theory, there are four main engines of economic growth 
rate on the long term: physical capital (Romer, 1986), human capital (Lucas Jr,. 1988), 
innovation (Romer, 1990) and public capital (Barro, 1990). The literature review of the 
environmental economic shows that energy taxes can influence economic growth through 
three channels: physical capital, human capital, and innovation. The effect mechanism of 
energy taxes on each of these channels is explained in the following sections. 
3.2.2. Energy taxes and physical capital (physical investment)  
Several studies show that taxes imposed on energy products negatively affect economic 
growth due to a negative impact on physical capital (physical investment) through the 
following mechanism. In the short term, energy taxes lead to an increase in the relative prices 
of fossil fuels which are considered as a production factor. Price increases decrease the 
quantity of fossil fuel used in production processes, thus reducing the productivity of physical 
capital compared to the situation where there are no taxes (Labandeira et al., 2004). By 
modeling the quality of the environment as a durable consumption good in an overlapping 
generations model, Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) confirm the result of Labandeira et al. 
(2004) but only over the long term. They found that environmental tax increases make future 
generations suffer from a smaller physical capital stock, but benefit from a larger stock of 
natural capital. Therefore, in the long term, economic growth decreases due to the lower 
physical capital that the younger generation will have. Ono (2003) showed that a higher 
environmental tax increases production costs for firms, leading to a decrease in the wages 
paid to workers and the taxes paid to the government. This negative income effect leads to 
decline in savings and investment, thereby lowering the economic growth rate. In a more 
recent study, Siriwardana et al. (2011) explored the effects of carbon tax on the Australian 
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economy by employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. They found that the 
introduction of a $23 tax on carbon dioxide emissions led to a decline in Australia’s real GDP 
by about 0.68 per cent in the short term. They explained the GDP contraction through four 
factors: (a) an increase in consumer prices, (b) a reduction in energy consumption, (c) a 
decline in real household consumption, and (d) a reduction in export volumes. All of these 
factors directly and negatively affected physical investment. In the same context, using an 
overlapping generation model Wang et al. (2015) showed that pollution tax can reduce 
pollution but causes a distortion in the rate of return to capital, thus damaging growth. 
It is worth noting that all these studies are theoretical. There are no empirical studies to verify 
their validity at a macroeconomic level. This chapter proposes to fill this in this gap. 
3.2.3. Energy taxes and CO2 emissions 
The effect of energy taxes on human capital is generally considered through its impact on 
polluting emissions. Therefore, in this section, we review the papers that examine the effect of 
energy taxes on CO2 emissions, which we consider as a proxy of polluting emissions, and in 
the next section we show how polluting emissions affect human capital.  Imposing taxation on 
energy products is considered to be one of the most efficient tools for reducing polluting 
emissions resulting from development activities. However, empirical studies examining the 
validity of this hypothesis show conflicting results. Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) evaluated the 
environmental effects of CO2 taxes in Norway over the 1990-1999 period. They combined a 
Divisia index decomposition method and an applied general equilibrium model. They found 
that despite the relatively high Norwegian carbon tax rates, the impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions was modest. The taxes contributed to a reduction in onshore emissions of only 1.5 
percent and a decrease of only 2.3 percent in overall emissions. They considered that the 
reason for these results was the exemption of a broad range of fossil fuel intensive industries 
from carbon taxes for fear of reducing competitiveness. Similarly, Lin and Li (2011) showed 
that although a carbon tax introduced by the government of Finland had a significant and 
negative effect on per capita CO2 emissions growth, the effects of a carbon tax on carbon 
emissions in Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands were not significant. Loganathan et al. 
(2014) also found that the carbon tax in Malaysia did not have much impact on the reduction 
of carbon emissions. In contrast, Kim et al. (2011) estimated the effects of a gasoline tax on 
CO2 emission reductions within the transportation sector in Korea over the 1999–2009 
period. They found that when the CO2 tax on gasoline was charged an additional 50,000 per 
ton of CO2, carbon dioxide emissions could be reduced by 916,124 tons of CO2, without the 
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possibility of using more fuel efficient vehicles. If more efficient emitting less CO2 were 
available, the tax effect on CO2 reduction could reach 1,090,325 tons of CO2. In a similar 
study, using monthly data over the 1989-2008 period Davis and Kilian (2011) found that a 10-
cent increase in gasoline tax would decrease CO2 emissions from the transportation sector by 
about 1.5% and total carbon emissions by about 0.5% in the United States. More recently, 
using an unbalanced annual panel of US airline industry from 1995 to 2013 (Fukui and 
Miyoshi 2017) suggested that a 4.3 cents increase in aviation fuel tax would reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions in the US by approximately 0.14–0.18 % in the short run. However, due to 
the supposed rebound effect the percentage of reduction in CO2 emissions would decrease to 
about 0.008–0.01% in the long run.  
 
These conflicting findings have opened an avenue of research for investigating whether 
imposing tax has significant impact on carbon emissions. In addition, the majority of previous 
studies on this topic have been conducted for a specific economy (specific country), and 
therefore, they cannot generalize their results. Using 31 OECD countries, our study has 
enabled us to obtain general results.  
3.2.4. CO2 emissions and human capital  
In this section, we firstly reviewed the theoretical works that showed the effect of pollution 
emissions, in general, on human capital. We then highlighted the studies that explored, in 
particular, the effect of CO2 on human capital. According to theoretical studies, pollution 
emissions can negatively affect human capital through two channels: public health and 
learning ability. Many studies have examined the link between pollution and public health  
(see  Chen et al., 2017; Gehrsitz, 2017; Kim et al., 2017; and Mabahwi et al., 2014). However, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research investigating the impact of CO2 
emissions on learning ability by using panel data, and majority of existing studies on this 
topic are theoretical. For example, in order to study the effect of environmental care on long-
term economic growth, Gradus and Smulders (1993) expanded on the endogenous growth 
model of Lucas (1988) by assuming that pollution reduces the learning ability of people. In 
this case, the increased willingness to clean up pollution could stimulate growth through 
increasing human skills over the long term. To study the influence of environmental care on 
the short-term economic growth rate, Vellinga (1999)  also expanded on the model of Lucas 
(1988) by assuming that output leads to pollution, and that there is a stock of pollution. In 
addition, he supposed that the stock of pollution remains constant over the long-term. This 
74 
 
hypothesis made the utility function dependent on consumption only, and the long-term 
growth rate was independent of the preference for a clean environment. His analysis for the 
short term showed a negative relationship between the level of pollution and human capital. If 
there was a high level of pollution, people’s desire for consumption and investment decreases 
and they spend more time and resources on pollution abatement activities than studying, 
leading to a lower level of human capital and thus a lower economic growth rate. Likewise, 
Ewijk and Wijnbergen (1994) expanded on the model of Lucas (1988) by linking the scale of 
production to pollution. They found that pollution has a negative impact on productivity both 
directly in productive activities and in the learning process. More recently,  Pautrel (2012) has 
demonstrated that, when long-run growth is driven by human capital accumulation, the effects 
of pollution on life expectancy may explain by themselves the influence of environment on 
growth.  
 
To explain the causal link between CO2 and air pollution mortality, Jacobson (2008) used the 
nested global-urban 3-D model, GATOR-GCMOM. He found that fossil-fuel CO2 increases 
increase U.S. surface ozone, particulate matter, and carcinogens, thereby increasing death, 
hospitalization, asthma, and cancer rates. In the same context, Jacobson (2010) showed that 
local CO2 emissions can increase local ozone and particulate matter due to feedbacks to 
temperatures, atmospheric stability, water vapor, humidity, precipitation and winds. 
Therefore, their corresponding health effects can increase premature mortality by 50-100 and 
300-1000/per year in California and the U.S., respectively.   
 
On the other side,  Satish et al. (2012) evaluate the effects of increased CO2 concentrations on 
decision making. To do this, six groups of four participants have been exposed to CO2 at 600, 
1,000, and 2,500 ppm (parts per billion) in an office-like chamber, for 2.5 hours per case. The 
sessions for each group took place on a single day. During each exposure case, participants 
completed a computer-based test of decision-making performance. The results showed that 
increases in CO2 concentrations were associated with significant reductions in decision-
making performance. In a similar and more recent study, Allen et al. (2016) studied the 
association between the carbon dioxide and cognitive function scores. They used twenty-four 
participants that spent 6 full work days (9 a.m. – 5 p.m.) in an environmentally controlled 
office space. The participants were been exposed artificially to different carbon dioxide (CO2) 
levels. Then, the cognitive assessment was performed daily using the Strategic Management 
Simulation (SMS) software tool, which is a validated, computer-based test, designed to test 
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the effectiveness of management-level employees through assessments of higher-order 
decision making ( Satish et al., 2004). Their results reveal a negative correlation between CO2 
and cognitive function scores. In addition, they found declines in cognitive function scores 
when the level of CO2 concentration was increased.  
 
After these results, carbon dioxide emissions are considered today as polluting emissions and 
have a negative impact on human cognition and decision-making.  
3.2.5. Energy taxes and environmental innovation 
The assumption that energy taxes can spur environmental innovation is inspired by the “Porter 
hypothesis”. Porter and van der Linde (1995) argued that well-designed environmental 
regulation (in particular, market-based instruments such as taxes or cap-and-trade emissions 
allowances) can lead to “innovation offsets” that not only improve environmental 
performance, but also partially—and sometimes more than fully—offset the additional cost of 
regulation, through increasing the competitiveness of firms. The Porter hypothesis is based on 
a broad definition of innovation and on the effect of innovation on competitiveness. In this 
chapter, we focused our analysis on a specific type of innovation: environmental innovation. 
We then aspired to explore whether this type of innovation could promote the economic 
growth rate. Consequently, our literature review focuses on the studies based on this type of 
innovation. According to the OECD (2010a), the tax put on pollution leads firms with 
resources to seek new cleaner solutions through investing in environmental innovation, and 
firms with less resources to bring in the latest technologies already developed elsewhere. To 
study the response of different types of technologies to environmental policies, Acemoglu et 
al. (2012) employed a simple two-sector (clean and dirty inputs) model of directed technical 
change. They found that when the clean and dirty inputs (non-fossil and fossil fuels) were 
highly substitutable, the absence of governmental intervention, led to environmental 
degradation, because the initial productivity advantage of dirty inputs and the market size 
effect would direct innovation and production towards the dirty sector. However, the 
instruments used by environmental policy (carbon taxes, which change the relative prices of 
fossil fuel, and research subsidies) would be sufficient to redirect technical change to clean 
technologies and avoid an environmental disaster. Likewise, Hattori (2017) determined the 
conditions under which emissions taxes could spur eco-innovation. He used a model of 
endogenous and monopolistic environmental innovations, with perfect or imperfect 
competition in a polluting goods market. He showed that introducing higher emissions taxes 
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encourages innovation and diffusion of environmentally clean technologies if the price-
elasticity of the demand for polluting goods are small and/or the tax burden on polluting firms 
is small. The empirical work of Haščič et al. (2010), which was based on a broad cross-
section of countries over the 2000-2007 period, confirms the assumption of Hattori (2017). 
They found that environmental policy stringency plays a significant role in developing 
innovative means of air and water pollution abatement as well as solid waste management. 
The role of policy stringency comes from changing in the relative prices of production factors, 
driving firms to invent new methods of production to reduce the consumption of factors 
which had become relatively expensive. A microeconomic analysis performed by Veugelers 
(2012) using a Flemish CIS eco-innovation survey also confirms that government intervention 
can affect private sector innovations. Here, regulations and taxes are the most effective 
environmental policy instruments in inciting private firms to adopt clean technologies. 
However, using a panel data set of 22 Spanish manufacturing sectors for the 2008–2013 
period, Costa-Campi et al. (2017) found that energy taxes do not have a significant effect on 
investment in environmental R & D in the private sector. 
3.3. Empirical model  
To achieve the first goal of this chapter, we employed general specifications for the economic 
growth rate, total physical investment, human capital, CO2 emissions and environmental 
innovation, drawing on a set of explanatory variables used in the existing literature. We 
assumed that physical investment, human capital and environmental innovation are 
endogenous variables in the growth equation. The other explanatory variables of growth were 
regarded as exogenous. As we mentioned earlier, the theoretical literature supposes that there 
is a direct and negative impact of energy taxes on physical investment. To test this hypothesis, 
we introduced a proxy of energy taxes as an exogenous variable in the physical investment 
equation. The theoretical models also suppose that there is an indirect effect of these taxes on 
human capital, through their impacts on polluting emissions. This hypothesis was tested in 
two steps: firstly, by examining the effect of CO2 emissions (proxy of polluting emissions) on 
human capital; secondly, by exploring the impact of energy taxes on CO2 emissions. To do 
this, we introduced CO2 emissions as an endogenous variable in the human capital equation, 
and the proxy of energy taxes as an exogenous variable in the CO2 equation. Finally, to test 
the direct effect of energy taxes on environmental innovation, the proxy of energy taxes was 
included as an exogenous variable in environmental innovation equation.  
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Economic growth equation 
 
grit = 𝜂1𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑡 + β11𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + β12𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + β13𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑖𝑡 + β14𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 
                                ∑ β1𝑚11𝑚=5 Ω𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡,                                                                             (3.1) 
 
Where grit is the economic growth rate in the country (𝑖) for the year (𝑡); 𝜂1𝑖 and 𝜆1𝑡 
correspond to the country-specific effect and time-specific effect, respectively; and 𝑘 is a 
proxy of physical capital, measured in terms of gross fixed capital formation in percentage of 
GDP. We used the annual change in physical capital (change k) to capture the effect of 
physical capital accumulation which is considered as an engine of economic growth (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Its coefficient is expected to be positive. 𝐻 refers to the stock of 
human capital. Following the empirical works of Baldacci et al. (2008) and Chi (2008), the 
initial level of human capital (𝐻𝑡−1) and its annual change (Change H)  were used to capture 
the effect of human capital on economic growth rates. 𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 is an environmental 
innovation. Ω𝑖𝑡 indicates a set of control explanatory variables for economic growth rates 
which included the following variables. (𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖0) denotes the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita for each country in the year 1994. (TLF) is the total labor force growth rate. (exp) is 
productive expenditure. (𝑡𝑎𝑥) denotes the distortionary taxation. (𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) represents the 
fiscal balance (surplus/deficit). (INF) is the inflation rate which is considered as a proxy of 
macroeconomic stability. (OPENG ) denotes trade openness of goods. It is defined as (exports 
plus imports of goods) in percentage of GDP. The justification of the selected control 
explanatory variables of economic growth rate is presented in the section 1.4.2 in the first 
chapter. 
 
Physical investment equation 
 
The physical investment equation was used to explore the impact of energy taxes on gross 
physical investment (private and public investment).  
 
kit = 𝜂2𝑖 + 𝜆2𝑡 + β21𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + ∑ β2𝑛6𝑛=2 𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑛 +  𝜀2𝑖𝑡,                                    (3.2) 
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Where, the gross physical investment (k) was measured by the real gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP. This variable was represented as a proxy of physical 
capital. 𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 denotes a proxy of energy taxes. The calculation method for this proxy is 
explained in the section 2.4 of the second chapter.  𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑛  refers to a set of control explanatory 
variables of investment which are as follows: productive expenditure (exp); distortionary-
taxes (tax); domestic credit accorded to the private sector (DCPS); regulatory quality (RQ); 
and gross national saving (GNS). 
Theoretically, productive expenditure was expected to positively affect gross investment, as it 
increases the  productivity of capital for the private sector, thus promoting economic growth 
(Barro, 1990). However, this effect may vary depending on the means of funding. When 
productive expenditure is financed by non-distortionary tax, the effect is expected to be 
positive, whereas when it is financed by distortionary-tax the predicted effect is ambiguous 
(Kneller et al. 1999). The total tax burden (as a percentage of the GDP) is also used as a 
determinant of investment in empirical studies (Tadeu and Silva, 2013). However, in this 
chapter we followed Barro (1990) and Knelleret al. (1999) who distinguish between 
distortionary and non-distortionary tax. We only used the distortionary tax, which is 
considered to have a negative impact on saving and investment decisions. In this way, we 
avoided the collinearity problem that can be occur between total tax burden and energy tax, as 
the latter is a part of the total tax burden.   
According to Blejer and Khan (1984); McKinnon (2010), and Sen and Athukorala (2002),  
credit availability is a key factor influencing investment behavior, independent of the cost of 
capital. In empirical studies, credit availability is usually measured by the domestic credit 
accorded to the private sector (DCPS) as a percentage of GDP (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 
2008).  
Regulatory quality is an institutional variable. “It reflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). We considered this variable as 
a proxy of governance quality.  
The level of gross national saving (GNS) is also considered as a main determinant of 
investment, where higher savings enable higher investment (Harrod, 1939). 
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Human capital equation 
Hit = 𝜂3𝑖 + 𝜆3𝑡 + β31𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑂23𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ β2𝑙5𝑙=2 𝜋𝑖𝑡𝑙 +  𝜀3𝑖𝑡,                                        (3.3) 
Where 𝐻 refers to the stock of human capital, which is proxied by the human-skill index 
constructed by the “Laboratoire d’Économie Appliquée au Développement (LEAD)” in 
Toulon University (France). Literacy rate, enrolment in tertiary education, and mean years of 
schooling of adults were used to construct this index based on the work of Archibugi and 
Coco (2004). The advantage of this indicator is that its data is annual, which allowed us to 
include the annual change of human capital in the model. The data of Barro and Lee (2013)  
did not offer this possibility as it is based on 5-year age group. 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑂2  denotes the logarithm of carbon dioxide emissions,  𝜋𝑖𝑡𝑙  refers to a set of control 
explanatory variables of human capital, which are as follows: exp denotes productive 
expenditure. According to the 1995 pamphlet from the IMF on unproductive public 
expenditures, public expenditures in basic infrastructure represent a crucial precondition for 
physical and human capital accumulations (Chu and International Monetary Fund, 1995). This 
idea is confirmed by Escobar-Posada and Monteiro (2015); FERT is the total fertility rate 
(births per woman). In developed countries, the increase in the rate of technological progress 
leads to human capital plying a greater role in the production process. This makes households 
favor quality of children over quantity, leading to increased investment in children’s 
education and to a decline in fertility rate (Galor, 2012; Hafner and Mayer-Foulkes, 2013). 
Therefore, the fertility rate was expected to be negatively correlated with human capital 
formation; TID refers to technology infrastructure development. It is measured by the 
technology-infrastructure index24 presented by the LEAD at Toulon University. In countries 
with a high level of technology infrastructure development, there is easier access to 
communication tools, which are the main channels through which knowledge can spill over, 
leading to increases in human capital (Alfaro et al., 2017; Jang et al., 2017); and RQ refers to 
the regulatory quality. 
CO2 emissions equation 
LogCO2it = 𝜂4𝑖 + 𝜆4𝑡 + β41𝐸𝑇4𝑖𝑡 + ∑ β2𝑟5𝑟=2 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑟 +  𝜀4𝑖𝑡,                                   (3.4) 
                                                          
24 This index has been built around four indicators: 1) Fixed broadband Internet subscribers per 100 people, 2) 
Telephone fixed-lines per 100 people, 3) Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people, 4) Electric power 
consumption (kWh per capita). 
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Where 𝐶𝑂2  is carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the 
manufacturing of cement. They are measured in kiloton (kt). The choice of CO2 as a proxy of 
pollution emissions is based on the findings of Raymond (2009).He found that there is a very 
strong correlation between the pairs CO2 & NOx, CO2 & SOx, NOx & SOx, and that taking 
one or the other gives the same results. In addition, Rezza (2015) showed that the use of more 
than one proxy to represent environmental stringency in the regression does not have a 
statistically significant influence on the results. Consequently, as CO2 emissions have no 
missing data for all OECD countries; it was chosen as a proxy of pollution emissions.   𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑟  is a 
set of control explanatory variables of CO2 emissions, which include the variables below. 
Based on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), pollution emissions rise with income in 
early stages of economic growth. However, after a certain level of economic growth, society 
becomes more aware of the need to protect the environment, leading to a decline in the level 
of pollutant emissions. Consequently, we included GDP per capita (Y) as a determinate of 
CO2 emissions in equation (3.4). In studies that seek to test the EKC hypothesis, the square of 
GDP per capita is included in the CO2 equation, to verify the quadratic relationship between 
economic growth and environmental pollution. However, in this study we did not aspire to 
examine the EKC hypothesis, and we identified a high correlation between the level of GDP 
per capita and its square, which can create a collinearity problem. Therefore, we did not 
include the square of GDP in equation (3.4). In keeping with Ang (2007), Dogan and Seker 
(2016), Jiang and Guan (2016), Rüstemoğlu and Andrés (2016), and Shao et al. (2011), we 
used energy consumption, trade openness, and population growth as determinants of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Concerning energy consumption, we distinguished between renewable and 
non-renewable energy by only including the non-renewable energy, which is the main source 
of CO2 emissions (Dogan and Seker, 2016). Therefore, energy consumption was measured 
according to the share of total final consumption of polluting energy products in the total final 
consumption of energy (TFCPEP_sh). The calculation of this variable is presented in the 
appendix (2.A) of the second chapter. With respect to trade openness, Dogan and Seker 
(2016) found that a 1% increase in trade openness mitigated carbon emissions by 0.06%. This 
result can be explained by an increase the ratio of services to commodities in the trade 
openness index, where the production of services generates less carbon dioxide emissions 
than the production of goods. Consequently, we distinguished between goods and services 
trade by only using the trade openness of goods as CO2 emissions determinant. Consequently, 
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the link between this variable and CO2 emissions is expected to be positive. Finally, the 
emissions of carbon dioxide are expected to increase with population growth (LPOP).  
Environmental innovation equation 
To explore the effect of energy taxes, used as an instrument in environmental policy, on 
environmental innovations, we constructed the following equation: 
 
EINNOVit = 𝜂5𝑖 + 𝜆5𝑡 + β51𝐸𝑇5𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ β5𝑣5𝑣=2 𝜚𝑖𝑡𝑣 +  𝜀5𝑖𝑡,                             (3.5) 
 
Where EINNOVit refers to environmental innovation. It was measured based on the 
development of environment-related technologies as a percentage of all technologies. This 
indicator was obtained from OECD statistics on green growth. The measure of this indicator 
was based on patent data for about 80 environment- related technology fields (for more 
information please see Haščič and Migotto (2015)). Patent data is preferred as an alternative 
measure of environmental innovation to research and development expenditure data, for two 
mains reasons. Firstly, patent data measures the output of inventive processes, while R&D 
data measures only the input (OECD, 2009). Secondly, as patent data provides information on 
the inventor(s), the nature of the invention, and the applicant, it is easy to identify 
environmental technologies, whereas this is more difficult with R&D expenditure data 
(Haščič and Migotto, 2015). The terms “environmental innovation” and “eco-innovation” are 
used synonymously here. 𝜚𝑖𝑡𝑣   includes the control variables that were identified in the 
empirical literature as being determinants of eco-innovation. It consists of four variables. 
Firstly, the environmentally-related government R&D budget as a percentage of total 
government R&D (ERGRDB), extracted from the OECD database. The direct financial 
support provided to research and development through the public sector budget is one of the 
most common means of encouraging inventive activity (Hascic and Johnstone, 2011). 
However, as our focus in this chapter is on environmental innovation, we only used the public 
R & D budget share allocated to support R & D activities related to the environment. 
Secondly, foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered as the most important and least 
expensive channel of direct and indirect technology transfer between countries (Damijan et 
al., 2003; Maskus, 2004).Therefore, we used FDI as a proxy variable for external technology 
acquisition and the influence of exogenous technology on domestic environmental innovation 
levels. Thirdly, Horbach (2016) found that the reduction of energy use is one of the 
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motivations for eco-innovation. Consequently, the share of total final consumption of 
polluting energy products in the total final consumption of energy (TFCPEP_sh ) was used as 
a determinant of environmental innovation in equation (3.5). The level of fossil fuel 
consumption compared to clean energy could be a motivation for environmental innovation to 
reduce the additional production costs caused by energy taxes and to improve the quality of 
the environment at the same time. Finally, we included a measure of the intensity of the effort 
dedicated to innovation. This is R & D personnel intensity (RDPI), which was calculated as 
follows: (total number of employees engaged in R & D, as well as those providing direct 
services such as R & D managers, administrators and clerical staff divided by total number of 
employees)×100. This variable was expected to have a positive impact on eco-innovation 
(Costa-Campi et al., 2017) . 
 
The equations from (3.1) to (3.5) allowed us to answer the first question in our study. We then 
explored whether the effect of energy taxes on these channels, and subsequently on economic 
growth, is sensitive to the existence of public debt. To do this, we first determined the channel 
through which public debt could affect economic growth. According to the literature, public 
debt may hamper economic growth through its negative impact on investment. This negative 
effect of public debt on investment depends on who the government borrows from, and how it 
uses the money. When the government borrows from its citizens, using government bonds, 
this may absorb a portion of people's savings that would otherwise be used to finance private 
investment, and thus reduces economic growth (Teles and Cesar Mussolini, 2014a). Similarly, 
the neoclassical school of thought supposes that financing government deficit through 
borrowing increases the demand for money.  A higher demand for money due to increased 
government expenditure raises the interest rates, crowding out investment and eventually 
lowering growth (Gogas et al., 2014; Gwartney et al., 1998; Mueller, 2004). On the other 
hand, if the government borrowed from other countries, a high level of public debt could 
increase money or cash supply, leading to an increase in inflation (Bhattarai et al., 2014), and 
thus harming investment and economic growth. Additionally,  Chen et al. (2016) showed that 
when the public debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than 59.72%, the positive effect of public debt on 
economic growth turns into a negative effect, supposing that the excessive public debts crowd 
out private investment through reducing personal incomes and raising the distortionary costs 
of taxation. Using a panel of emerging market economies, Galstyan and Velic (2017) 
investigated the empirical relevance of public debt for short-run exchange rate dynamics. 
They found that countries with higher government debt levels tend to have more depreciated 
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exchange rates than those with lower debt levels. These depreciations arise as debt-intolerant 
locals and foreign investors flee the currency and other local assets, rebalancing their 
portfolios toward less risky and more liquid securities. Consequently, a possible implication 
of this result is that after a certain threshold, public debt can hamper investment and growth in 
the short term through its impact on exchange rates, whereas before that threshold the debt is 
less harmful. 
Based on these studies, we included the public debt (DEBT) as an exogenous variable in the 
physical investment equation, and we re-estimated our model to see whether the existence of 
public debt would alter the effect of energy taxes on investment. To explore whether the 
effect of energy taxes on investment is sensitive to the level of public debt, we allowed the 
proxy of energy taxes to interact with the public debt variable in physical investment 
equation, and then we re-estimated the model. Consequently, the model had the following 
structures: 
1. Benchmark model: the benchmark model controlled the interest and explanatory variables 
of each equation in the system, without including public debt in the physical investment 
equation. 
2. Model A: in model A, we added public debt as a % of GDP (DEBT) to the physical 
investment equation in the benchmark model, with the aim of investigating whether the effect 
of energy taxes on physical capital, and subsequently on growth is sensitive to the existence of 
public debt. 
3. Model B: Here, we introduced an interaction term between energy taxes (ET) and public 
debt (DEBT) to the physical investment equation in model A, to test whether the effect of 
energy taxes on physical capital and, subsequently on growth is sensitive to the level of public 
debt. 
3.4. Data 
The dataset used in this chapter spans a period from 1994 to 2013 and comprises 31 OECD 
members. The three OECD countries not included in our sample are Chile, Mexico, and the 
United States, as there was no data on productive expenditure for them at all. In addition, 
Latvia, was excluded from the sample because it doesn’t have data on environmentally related 
tax revenue. The starting and ending periods were selected according to the availability of 
data on energy tax revenues and other explanatory variables. The data was extracted from 
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various sources: (i) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and the World Economic Outlook 
Database (WEOD) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); (ii) World 
Development Indicators (WDIs) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) published by 
the World Bank; and (iii) the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Data on human capital stock was sourced from the “Laboratoire d’Économie 
Appliquée au Développement (LEAD)” in Toulon University (France). A summary of 
variables and their sources are reported in appendix (3.A).  
 
As mentioned above, the issue of incomplete data sets is a common encumbrance in the world 
of empirical economic studies which hampers scientists in their quest for obtaining unbiased 
results. In order to treat the missing data problem, a multiple imputation method was used in 
this study.  The details about this method are presented in the appendix (1.B) and (1.C) of 
chapter (1). Table (1.1) in the first chapter shows the descriptive statistics of the variables 
before and after multiple imputation process. Moreover, we verified that there is no harmful 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables by using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
test for each equation in the model. The details about VIF test are reported in the appendices 
(3.B).  
3.5. Endogeneity issue & proposed solution 
The issue of endogeneity is well known to economists studying growth empirics. An 
endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term 
(Wooldridge, 2013). This problem is linked to many sources, such as omitted variables, 
measurement error, and causal simultaneity (Antonakis et al., 2010). As three of the 
explanatory variables in the economic growth equation, (investment, human capital and 
environmental innovation), were to be simultaneously determined with the dependent variable 
(economic growth rate), a correlation between these three variables and the error term of the 
growth equation could arise. For the same reason, the CO2 emissions variable could also be 
correlated with the error term of the human capital equation. Although simultaneity was the 
most likely candidate to cause an endogeneity problem in our model, in reality, it can be 
difficult to distinguish precisely between the three causes. In order to deal with the 
endogeneity problem, a cmp approach25 would allow instrumental variables to be used, as in 
                                                          
25 Conditional mixed process (cmp) estimator was used to estimate the parameters of equations in this study. We 
talk about it in section 3.6. 
85 
 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. In this case, cmp is a limited-information 
maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, and only the final stage parameters are structural 
Roodman (2011). The instrumental variable must satisfy two conditions: (i) it must be 
uncorrelated with the error term of the structural equation; and (ii) it must be correlated with 
the endogenous variable (Wooldridge, 2013). These conditions allow predicted values of the 
endogenous variable to be uncorrelated with the error term in the first stage of estimation. 
Thus, the problem of endogeneity is addressed. In practice, the first condition is difficult to 
confirm because the error term is not observed. Consequently, researchers rely on economic 
theory to find instrumental variables that satisfy the first condition. The second condition can 
be checked by conducting F-tests on the estimators of the instrumental variables. To do this, 
we estimated a regression model each for k, H, EINNOV and LCO2 on exogenous variables, 
which included instrumental variables and other exogenous variables. We then performed F-
tests on the estimators of the instrumental variables, where the null hypothesis is that the 
estimated coefficients of the instrumental variables are jointly equal to zero. If the null 
hypothesis was rejected, the second condition would  be satisfied and then the instruments 
would be validated (Wooldridge, 2013). By applying this to our model, we found that 
investment, human capital, and environmental innovation were endogenous variables in the 
growth equation, and that the CO2 emissions were an endogenous variable in the human 
capital equation. Therefore, a good instrumental variable for investment was a variable 
correlated with investment and with no direct effect on the economic growth rate. Similarly, a 
suitable instrument for human capital was a variable correlated with human capital with no 
direct effect on the economic growth rate. The same criterion was applied to environmental 
innovation. Similarly, a good instrument for CO2 emissions was a variable correlated with 
CO2 emissions with no direct effect on human capital. Consequently, based on the economic 
theory, we proposed gross national saving (GNS) as an instrument for investment, total 
fertility rate (FERT) as an instrument for human capital, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
R & D personnel intensity (RDPI) as an instrument for environmental innovation.  
With regards to the H equation, the proxy of energy taxes was chosen as an instrument for 
carbon dioxide emissions.  
The instruments satisfying the first condition were chosen theoretically, however, we also 
performed a statistical test proposed by Roodman and Morduch (2014), for testing whether 
instruments are correlated to the error term of a structural equation. The test results showed 
that the proposed instruments satisfied the first condition. The details of this test are in 
86 
 
appendix (3.C). To verify the second condition for instrument validity in our model, we 
estimated the equations of the system, and then we conducted an F-test on the instruments to 
see whether they were jointly significant. In other words, we examined whether GNS in the k 
equation, FERT in the H equation, FDI and RDPI in the EINNOV equation, and ET in the 
LCO2 equation were jointly significant. The F-test results are presented in table 3.1. They 
show that the five instruments were jointly significant. Therefore, the second condition was 
satisfied and the instruments were valid. 
 Null hypothesis 
(1) [k]GNS = 0 
(2) [H]FERT = 0 
(3) [EINNOV]FDI=0 
(4) [EINNOV]RDPI=0 
(5) [LCO2]ET = 0 
 F( 5,54064.3) =   9.50 
 Prob > F =    0.0000 
Table 3.1: F-test results 
3.6. Model Estimations 
To estimate the equation’s coefficients, we used the conditional mixed process (cmp) 
estimator developed by Roodman (2011). This approach is suitable for estimating 
simultaneous equations models (SEMs) satisfying two conditions: 
(i) “Recursivity, meaning that the equations can be arranged so that the matrix of 
coefficients of the endogenous variables in one another’s equations is triangular. 
Recursive models have clearly defined stages with one or more equations in each 
stage. 
(ii) Full observability, meaning that endogenous variables appear on the right sides of 
equations only as observed” Roodman (2011, pp 160 ). 
 
As our model satisfied these two conditions, a cmp approach was adopted to estimate the 
equation parameters. In the context of panel data, the treatment of the individual effects, as 
fixed or random, is an important issue. These two kinds of effects could be added to the 
(SEM) and estimated by cmp. However, Baltagi (2008) shows that when a study focuses on a 
specific set of N countries, the fixed effects specification is more appropriate than random 
effects. As this study focuses exclusively on a sample of OECD countries, we chose to treat 
individual effects as fixed.  
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With regards to the identification issue, the estimation of the parameters of a simultaneous 
equations model requires two conditions: order and e rank condition. The appendix (3.D) 
shows that the model satisfies both conditions. 
Concerning the inference of estimated coefficients, if there is a correlation between one of the 
explanatory variables (X for example) and the error term (endogeneity problem), the 
empirical relationship between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable (Y) does 
not identify a causal effect of X on Y, because the variation in X also moves the conditional 
mean of the error term (Heckman, 2008). As the cmp approach can treat endogeneity 
problems by using instrumental variables, the estimated coefficients could be used to capture 
the causal effect of explanatory variables on dependent variables. (Heckman, 2008) shows 
that the models that use particular methods of estimation (e.g., matching or instrumental 
variable estimation) are associated with a “causal inference”. 
3.7. Results and discussion 
3.7.1. In the short term 
Firstly, table 3.2 presents the estimation results of “atanhrho” for each pair of equations in the 
benchmark model. The coefficient of “atanhrho” shows the correlation between the error 
terms of each pair of equations in the model (Roodman, 2011). The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
represent the equations of economic growth rate, physical investment, human capital, CO2 
emissions and environmental innovation respectively. The results reveal that the error term of 
the economic growth equation is correlated with the error term of each of the other equations 
in the model. In addition, the error term of the human capital equation is associated with the 
error term of the CO2 emissions equation and the environmental innovation equation. Finally, 
the error term of the CO2 equation is correlated with the error term of the environmental 
innovation equation. These results imply that the equations should be estimated as a system 
rather than separately. 
 
The short term results for economic growth, physical investment, human capital, CO2 
emissions, and environmental innovation are presented in table 3.3. The benchmark model 
shows estimation results without including the public debt in the model. Model A reports 
estimation results when the public debt is included in the physical investment equation. Model 
B presents the findings when we allow energy taxes (ET) to interact with public debt (DEBT) 
in the physical investment equation. 
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 Coef. 
atanhrho_12 0.088** 
 (0.046) 
atanhrho_13 -0.243*** 
 (0.079) 
atanhrho_14 -0.127*** 
 (0.045) 
atanhrho_15 1.261*** 
 (0.272) 
atanhrho_23 0.017 
 (0.043) 
atanhrho_24 -0.010 
 (0.046) 
atanhrho_25 0.034 
 (0.043) 
atanhrho_34 0.512*** 
 (0.064) 
atanhrho_35 -0.122*** 
 (.043) 
atanhrho_45 -0.131*** 
 (0.042) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively. 
Table 3.2: atanhrho results 
 
(i) Economic growth equation 
The physical capital accumulation appears to positively contribute to the economic growth 
rate in the benchmark model. An increase of one percent in the change of physical capital is 
shown to increase growth rate by 0.186 percent. However, when the public debt is included in 
the model (model A), or when we allow energy taxes to interact with public debt (model B), 
the effect of the physical capital accumulation on the economic growth rate decreases to 0.182 
and 0.183 percent respectively. This can be explained by the negative effect of public debt on 
physical investment (see the estimation results of the physical capital equation), which 
weakens the role of physical capital in promoting growth. As Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas 
(1988) predicted, the initial level of human capital and its annual changes are significant and 
positively related to the economic growth rate in the benchmark model. Model A and model B 
show that this positive impact of human capital on the economic growth rate decreases when  
public debt is included in the model and/or when energy taxes interact with public debt in the 
physical investment equation. This implies that the public debt through its negative impact on 
the physical investment also weakens the role of human capital in promoting growth. 
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Reducing physical investment can lead to a reduction in the number of schools and physical 
materials necessary for the education process, thereby reducing the contribution of human 
capital to stimulating growth. Environmental innovation is shown to be negatively associated 
with economic growth in the short term for the three models. This result is logical as the 
measure of environmental innovation in this study is based on patent data. A patent may need 
some time to become applicable in the production process and support economic growth. We 
can clearly see in table (3.4) that environmental innovation appears to be positively correlated 
with economic growth when we use lagged values for two and three years. As the estimation 
results of the other explanatory variables of economic growth rate are almost identical in the 
three models, we move on to discuss the results presented in model B. Productive expenditure 
is negatively correlated with the economic growth rate. As we mentioned in the first and 
second chapter, this result is consistent with some empirical studies that found that 
government spending can undermine economic performance due to inefficient use of money 
(Alesina et al., 2002) and/ or due to “resource displacement” (Ramey, 2011). When the 
government spends money, it uses labor and/or capital resources, which are then no longer 
available for private sector use. Other key policy-related variables also affect growth. The 
fiscal balance and the trade openness of goods have a positive impact on the economic growth 
rate, while the inflation rate shows a negative effect.  
 
(ii) Physical investment equation 
The results indicate that energy taxes negatively affect physical investment. A 1 US $ increase 
per ton of oil equivalent of fossil fuel energy use is associated with a 0.6 percent decrease in 
physical investment over the year when public debt is ignored26. This negative effect increases 
to 0.7 percent when public debt is included in the investment equation. Moreover, the 
interaction term between energy taxes and public debt has a negative and significant 
coefficient, meaning that the effect of energy taxes on physical investment is negatively 
sensitive to the level of public debt. In other words, the higher the level of public debt, the 
                                                          
26 When the independent variable (the proxy of energy taxes) is measured in units while the dependent variable 
(the investment) is measured in percent or in log transformation, the interpretation of the independent variable 
coefficient is as follows: one unit increase in the independent variable is associated with a (independent variable 
coefficient * 100) percent increase in the independent variable, whereas all other variables in the model remain 
constant. See: https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/faq/how-can-i-interpret-log-transformed-variables-in-terms-of-
percent-change-in-linear-regression/ 
. 
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more the increase in energy taxes harms physical investment in the short term. Based on these 
findings, we can confirm that the assumption that energy taxes harm economic growth 
through a negative impact on physical investment (physical capital) is valid in the short term. 
In addition, we can say that the theoretical models studying the effect of energy taxes on 
investment or economic growth must include public debt in their analysis, because the effect 
of energy taxes on investment, and subsequently on economic growth, is sensitive to the 
existence and level of public debt. For this reason, we continue to discuss the estimation 
results for the other investment determinants resulting from model B. In keeping with 
expectations, public debt shows a negative impact on investment; whereas the domestic credit 
accorded to the private sector as a percentage of GDP and the regulatory quality have a 
positive effect. 
(iii) Human capital equation 
As public debt is only included in the physical investment equation, it does not affect the 
estimation results for the human capital, CO2 emissions and environmental innovation 
equations. Given that the results of the three models in the table (3.3) are almost identical for 
theses equations, we only discuss the results presented for each one in model B. The results of 
the human capital equation show that the growth of carbon dioxide emissions has a negative 
effect on human capital. A one percent increase in the level of CO2 emissions is associated 
with a 0.0008 unit decrease in human capital skills. This is an important and unprecedented 
result; to our knowledge no empirical work has tested the effect of CO2 emissions on human 
capital skills by using panel data. This result made us wonder on the effect of the stock of 
CO2 on human capital. To answer this question, we generated a new variable that measures 
accumulated CO2 emissions (ACO2), where the level of CO2 in each year is the level of CO2 
emissions flux in this year plus the CO2 flux in the previous years. We then replaced CO2 by 
ACO2 in the model and re-estimated the coefficients in the short and long-term. Estimations 
results are presented in the appendix (3.H). We found that the increase of accumulated CO2 
emissions level has a negative impact on human capital. This result is in line with Allen et al., 
(2016).  The other determinants of human capital perform as expected. While fertility rate has 
a negative impact, productive expenditure, technology infrastructure development, and 
regulatory quality are found to be positively correlated with human capital. These results are 
consistent with the expectations of Escobar-Posada and Monteiro (2015); Galor (2012); 
Hafner and Mayer-Foulkes (2013); Alfaro et al. (2017); and Jang et al. (2017). 
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(iv) CO2 emissions equation 
The results of model B reveal that energy taxes exert a negative significant influence on CO2 
emissions. A 1 US $ increase per ton of oil equivalent of fossil fuel energy use is associated 
with a 0.02 percent decrease in CO2 emissions. This finding means that the tax is an efficient 
tool used by the government to reduce pollutant emissions. Based on these results and on the 
finding that an increase in both flux and stock of CO2 emissions has a negative impact on 
human capital- as shown in the human capital equation- we can confirm the hypothesis that 
pollution taxes have an indirect effect on human capital, through their impact on CO2 
emissions in the short term. 
 
Concerning the control variables, firstly, we can see that GDP per capita (Y) is positively 
related with Log CO2. A one unit increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 0.06 percent 
increase in CO2 emissions. Secondly, the share of total final consumption of polluting energy 
products in total final consumption of energy appears to be positively correlated with logCO2 
emissions. A one percent increase in (TFCPEP_sh) is associated with a 0.009 percent increase 
in CO2 emissions. Thirdly, population growth is found to be positively related to CO2 
emissions. A one percent increase in the population is associated with a 1.378 percent 
increase in CO2 emissions. Finally, the trade openness of goods has a positive effect on 
carbon dioxide emissions. A one percent increase in OPENG is associated with a 0.0006 
percent increase in CO2 emissions. 
 
(v) Environmental innovation equation 
The empirical findings show that energy taxes have a positive and significant impact on 
environmental innovation. A one unit increase in the proxy of energy taxes is associated with 
a 0.6 percent increase in the development of environment-related technologies. We can thus 
conclude that the assumption that energy taxes encourage eco-innovation is valid in the short 
term. The coefficient of foreign direct investment is significant and positive. A one percent 
increase in FDI increases environmental innovation by 0.01 percent. This is in line with the 
results of Damijan et al. (2003) and Maskus (2004). The R & D personnel intensity is found to 
be positively associated with environmental innovation. A one percent increase in RDPI is 
associated with about a two percent increase in the development of environment-related 
technologies. This result is consistent with the findings of Costa-Campi et al. (2017). 
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 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation   Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
Ht-1 43.328** 39.877** 39.303** 
 (18.88) (18.932) (18.910) 
Change H 67.974*** 64.716*** 64.014** 
 (21.865) (21.860) (21.824) 
EINNOV -1.171*** -1.168*** -1.158** 
 (0.388) (0.395) (0.382) 
lnY0 -1.208 -1.337 -1.333 
 (1.752) (1.745) (1.748) 
TLF 3.492 4.140 4.136 
 (7.936) (7.944) (7.946) 
exp -0.369*** -0.361*** -0.360*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
tax -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Balance 0.082** 0.088** 0.088** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
INF -0.040** -0.041** -0.041** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
OPENG 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
Physical investment equation Real gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
ET -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
DEBT  -0.056*** -0.043*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
ET#DEBT   -0.0001* 
   (0.000) 
exp -0.106 -0.052 -0.057 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.092) 
tax -0.154** 0.010 0.018 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
DCPS 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
RQ 4.327*** 3.109*** 2.853*** 
 (0.759) (0.760) (0.775) 
GNS 0.090** -0.007 -0.018 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
    
Human capital equation Human-skill index 
LCO2 -0.077** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
exp 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
RQ 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
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 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
CO2 equation Logarithm of carbon dioxide emissions 
ET -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Y 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.0099*** 0.0098*** 0.0097*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LPOP 1.382***   1.380*** 1.378*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
OPENG 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
    
Environmental innovation equation  Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ERGRDB -0.070 -0.071 -0.070 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
FDI 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.043 -0.039 -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
RDPI 1.675** 1.682** 1.696** 
 (0.683) (0.689) (0.687) 
Observations 620 620 620 
Number of countries 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.3: Estimation results in the short term 
3.7.2. In the long term 
In order to investigate the potential impact of energy taxes on physical investment, human 
capital and environmental innovation over the long term, and to know whether this impact is 
sensitive to the existence and level of public debt, the system of equations was re-estimated 
with lagged values for all explanatory variables for five one-year periods. This method was 
used to reveal whether the revenues from energy taxes per ton of oil equivalent of fossil fuel 
energy use generated in previous years had an impact on the endogenous variables in the 
current year. The results are presented in tables (3.4) and (3.5). Table (3.4) shows the 
estimation results for the three models (benchmark model, model A and model B), when lags 
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are equal to 1, 2 and 3 years.  The table (3.5) presents the findings for the three models when 
lags are equal to 4 and 5 years.  
(i) Economic growth equation 
Focusing on the endogenous variables of the growth equation, firstly, the benchmark model 
shows that the accumulation of physical capital (change k) has a positive impact on the 
economic growth rate at one lag year. However, when public debt is included in the model ( 
model A) or when energy taxes  interact with public debt (model B), this positive impact of 
(change k) decreases from 1.81 percent to 1.58 and 1.54 percent respectively. The negative 
effect of public debt on physical investment (see the results of the physical investment 
equation) can explain why the contribution of (change k) to promoting growth decreased with 
the presence of public debt in model A and model B. Secondly, the change in human capital is 
found to be positively associated with the economic growth rate in the first lagged year, and 
negatively correlated with the economic growth rate in the fourth lagged year. Similarly, 
environmental innovation shows a positive impact on the economic growth rate when the 
explanatory variables are lagged for two and three years. This effect becomes negative when 
the number of lagged years equals to five. This may reflect a U relationship between the 
change in human capital skill and the economic growth rate and between environmental 
innovation and the economic growth rate in the long term. This is possible because some of 
the skills that have been learned over four years or the technology that has been innovated 
over five years, may be not usable in the current year, or usable but with low productivity, 
especially in view of the rapid technological and cognitive progress seen in recent years. 
Concerning the exogenous variables of economic growth equation, total labor force growth is 
found to be negatively associated with economic growth in the second and the third lag years. 
As we mentioned in the first and second chapter, this could be due to the very stable nature of 
the labor force across the OECD countries, compared with the labor force in developing 
economies. In line with the results of Alesina et al. (2002) and Ramey (2011), the productive 
expenditure is appeared to be negatively correlated with the economic growth rate in the first 
lagged year. Other results indicate that the inflation rate enters regressions with a negative 
impact on economic growth at one, two and three lag years. Finally, the trade openness of 
goods positively affects the economic growth rate for the first three lagged years. 
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(ii) Physical investment equation 
The benchmark model of each lag shows that energy taxes have a significant and negative 
effect on physical investment. This result allows us to confirm the validity of the assumption 
that energy taxes harms physical investment (physical capital) over the long term. When we 
include public debt in the physical investment equation, the negative impact of energy taxes 
on investment increases by (0.01%) at one, two and three lag years (see model A for each 
lag). However with the last two lagged years, the magnitude of the energy taxes’ coefficient 
does not show any change when we add public debt to investment regression. The other 
results for model A in each lag shows that public debt negatively affects physical investment 
for the five lagged years. The interaction term between energy taxes and public debt, in model 
B, has a significant and negative sign for the first three lagged years. This means that, in the 
long term (three years), the effect of energy taxes on physical investment is negatively 
sensitive to the level of public debt. In other words, if a country has a high level of public 
debt, the negative effect of energy taxes on investment is greater than for a country with a low 
level of public debt. These results could be used to make insightful recommendations to 
policymakers, especially for governments that are planning or implementing environmental 
tax reforms. Using a part of energy tax revenues to reduce public debt levels could decrease 
the negative effects of public debt and energy taxes on physical investments over the short 
and long term. 
 
The other determinants of investment are discussed based on model B for each lag.  
Productive expenditure is found to be negatively associated with physical investment in the 
first two lagged years. As mentioned earlier, this negative impact can occur due to inefficient 
use of money (Alesina et al., 2002) and/ or due to “resource displacement” (Ramey, 2011). 
The domestic credit accorded to the private sector has a positive effect on investment at one 
lag year and a negative impact at four and five lag years. These results can be linked to the 
findings of Samargandi (2015). The increase in credit, along with a lack of regulatory control 
and monitoring from the bankers, may result in an inappropriate selection of projects 
(Sundararajan and Baliño, 1991) and an engagement in non-operating activities, ultimately 
leading to stagnant levels of physical investment (Tori and Onaran, 2017). Regulatory quality 
is found to be positively related to investment in the first three lagged years. Finally, gross 
national savings have a positive effect on investment at 2-5 lag years.  
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(iii) Human capital equation 
As public debt and its interaction with energy taxes are only included in the physical 
investment equation, it only affects the estimation results for the physical investment and 
economic growth equations. The estimation results for the human capital, CO2 emissions, and 
eco-innovation equations are almost identical in the three models for each lag. Therefore, we 
discuss only the results of the model B of each lag for these three equations. 
  
The logarithm of carbon dioxide emissions has a negative effect on human capital for lags 1-
3. This implies that the increase in the level of CO2 emissions during the previous three years 
negatively affects the human capital skill in the current year. In addition, estimation results 
reported in the appendix (3.H), which show the results when ACO2 was used instead of CO2, 
indicate to a negative impact of the logarithm of accumulated carbon dioxide emissions on 
human capital at lags 1-4.  The fertility rate also appears to be negatively associated with 
human capital for lags 1-3. In contrast, productive expenditure is positively correlated with 
human capital in the first three lagged years. As expected, technology infrastructure 
development has a positive effect on human capital over the five lagged periods. Finally, 
regularity quality is only found to be positively correlated to human capital in the first lagged 
year. 
 
(iv) CO2 emissions equation 
The empirical results reveal that energy taxes have a negative impact on CO2 emission at one 
and two lag years. This means that the revenues from energy taxes per ton of oil equivalent of 
fossil fuel use generated over the two previous years can reduce the CO2 emissions in the 
current year. Based on this result and the finding that CO2 emissions negatively affect human 
capital skills for three lagged years, we conclude that the assumption that there is an indirect 
effect of pollution taxes on human capital, through their impacts on CO2 emissions is valid 
over the long term. 
With regards to the other control variables of the CO2 emissions logarithm, we found that the 
GDP per capita, the share of total final consumption of polluting energy products in total 
energy use, and the population growth have a positive effect on CO2 emissions for lags 1-5. 
The trade openness of goods also shows a positive impact on the carbon dioxide emission but 
only for lags 1-4.   
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(v) Environmental innovation equation 
Our study found that energy taxes have a significant and positive effect on environmental 
innovation for the five lagged years. This means that the revenue from energy taxes per ton of 
oil equivalent of fossil fuel use generated over each of the previous five years encourages the 
development of environment-related technologies in the current year. This result is very 
important and unprecedented, because it represents the first empirical evidence at a 
macroeconomic level of the effect of energy taxes on eco-innovation in the long term. 
Consequently, we can confirm the validity of the assumption that energy taxes encourage eco-
innovation in the long term. 
 
As for the results of the other determinants of eco-innovation, the environmentally related 
government R&D budget as a percent of total government R&D (ERGRDB) only shows a 
positive impact on environmental innovation at two lag years. The magnitude of the positive 
effect of (ERGRDB) is higher than that of energy taxes when the explanatory variables are 
lagged for two years. We conclude that after two lagged years, the direct financial support 
provided to environmental research and development can be more effective than energy taxes 
for promoting eco-innovation. However, the positive effect of energy taxes on eco-innovation 
is more sustainable than direct financial support in the long term. This leads us to the 
conclusion that both the tax and the subsidy are two important instruments of environmental 
policy for encouraging eco-innovation in the long term. Here, it should be noted that the 
public R & D budget share allocated to support R & D activities related to the environment is 
relatively small. The average of this share represents only 2.8% of total government R&D 
expenditure in the OECD zone. Despite this small share, a positive impact on eco-innovation 
can be observed at two lagged years. This result is very important for policymakers, as the 
increase of this share alongside energy taxes could significantly promote environmental 
innovation in the long term. Finally, while the share of total final consumption of polluting 
energy products in total energy use has a negative impact on environmental innovation for the 
first and second lags, we found that the R & D personnel intensity positively affects the 
development of environment-related technologies at one and three lag years. 
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 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation      Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k 0.181*** 0.158** 0.154** -0.064 -0.090 -0.095 0.005 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Ht-1 -0.170 -1.941 -2.100 -12.251 -13.639 -13.847 -4.834 -5.431 -5.544 
 (10.138) (10.152) (10.145) (8.373) (8.312) (8.292) (7.205) (7.165) (7.158) 
Change H 28.718** 27.905* 27.742* -15.416 -16.363 -16.9100 10.787 15.939 15.697 
 (14.721) (14.674) (14.662) (13.587) (13.473) (13.449) (12.509) (11.473) (11.456) 
EINNOV 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
lnY0 -1.442 -1.498 -1.466 3.644 4.001 4.046 2.284 2.438 2.454 
 (2.543) (2.529) (2.528) (2.565) (2.552) (2.548) (2.344) (2.334) (2.333) 
TLF -0.289 0.989 1.247 -25.61*** -23.40*** -22.891** -31.198*** -29.718*** -29.417*** 
 (8.566) (8.566) (8.568) (9.059) (9.041) (9.041) (9.121) (9.093) (9.082) 
exp -0.139* -0.139* -0.139* -0.090 -0.088 -0.089 -0.093 -0.088 -0.087 
 (0.084) (.084) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
tax -0.027 -0.024 -0.025 -0.080 -0.076 -0.077 -0.072 -0.071 -0.074 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Balance 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.020 0.019 -0.046 -0.0418 -0.040 
 (0.040) (0.04) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
INF -0.046** -0.049***   -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
OPENG 0.032*** 0.0341*** 0.034*** 0.017* 0.019** 0.019** 0.017* 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
          
Physical investment equation    Real gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
ET -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.006** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DEBT  -0.052*** -0.032***  -0.049*** -0.025**  -0.040*** -0.018*** 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.013) 
ET#DEBT   -0.0001**   -0.0001***   -0.0001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
exp -0.207** -0.155* -0.164* -0.254*** -0.203** -0.211** -0.161* -0.120 -0.125 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.094) 
tax -0.157** -0.016 -0.003 -0.152* -0.039 -0.025 -0.153** -0.065 -0.047 
  (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
DCPS 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.0002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
RQ 4.345*** 3.355*** 3.028*** 3.747*** 2.955*** 2.644*** 2.466*** 2.009*** 1.822** 
 (0.747) (0.746) (0.759) (0.748) (0.749) (0.755) (0.761) (0.757) (0.757) 
GNS 0.166*** 0.074* 0.058 0.205*** 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.295*** 0.239*** 0.232*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) 
          
Human capital equation            Human-skill index 
LCO2 -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
exp 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.010* -0.010 -0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
 (0.028) (0.028 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
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 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative 
specification 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
RQ 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
          
CO2 equation                            Logarithm of carbon dioxide emissions 
ET -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Y 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lpop 1.343*** 1.343*** 1.343*** 1.233*** 1.233*** 1.233*** 1.094*** 1.095*** 1.098*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
OPENG 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
          
Environmental innovation equation      Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ERGRDB 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.180* 0.183* 0.184* 0.142 0.144 0.144 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.014) (0.014) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
FDI -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.087* -0.088* -0.087* -0.117** -0.118** -0.117** -0.050 -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
RDPI 1.619* 1.621* 1.615* 1.301 1.310 1.320 1.674* 1.681* 1.695* 
 (0.926) (0.926) (0.926) (0.933) (0.933) (0.933) (1.036) (1.036) (1.036) 
Observations 589 589 589 558 558 558 527 527 527 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.4: Estimation results in the long term (number of lagged years equals to 1, 2 and 3) 
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 Lags=4 Lags=5 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
  Model A Model B  Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation     Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k -0.022 -0.030 -0.032 0.042 0.038 0.039 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Ht-1 -6.374 -6.600 -6.658 -5.913 -6.006 -6.014 
 (6.974) (6.945) (6.937) (6.644) (6.624) (6.630) 
Change H -24.136** -24.319** -24.644** 4.653 4.631 4.807 
 (12.416) (12.360) (12.351) (11.743) (11.706) (11.720) 
EINNOV -0.016 -0.018 -0.019 -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.142*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
lnY0 2.520 2.573 2.582 3.236 3.259 3.265 
 (2.331) (2.324) (2.322) (2.256) (2.251) (2.253) 
TLF -8.241 -7.053 -6.823 -14.639 -14.071 -14.123 
 (9.446) (9.429) (9.421) (9.533) (9.503) (9.513) 
Exp -0.123 -0.119 -0.118 -0.127 -0.124 -0.125 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Tax -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.0140 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Balance -0.064 -0.059 -0.058 -0.090 -0.087 -0.087 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
INF -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
OPENG 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Physical investment equation      Real gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
ET -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
DEBT  -0.029*** -0.018  -0.025** -0.032** 
  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.014) 
ET#DEBT   -0.0001   0.00004 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Exp -0.049 -0.021 -0.022 -0.075 -0.056 -0.055 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) 
Tax -0.162** -0.099 -0.091 -0.100 -0.047 -0.052 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) 
DCPS -0.002 -0.008* -0.009* -0.006 -0.011** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
RQ 1.039 0.773 0.704 -0.036 -0.226 -0.204 
 (0.818) (0.822) (0.824) (0.829) (0.827) (0.828) 
GNS 0.343*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.314*** 0.282***  0.282*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
       
Human capital equation           Human-skill index 
LCO2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
exp 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
RQ 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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 Lags=4 Lags=5 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
  Model A Model B  Model A Model B 
CO2 equation                         Logarithm of carbon dioxide emissions 
ET -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Y 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lpop 0.914*** 0.911*** 0.913*** 0.799*** 0.793*** 0.794*** 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) 
OPENG 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
       
Environmental innovation equation      Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ERGRDB 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.044 0.045 0.044 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
FDI -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
RDPI 1.199 1.186 1.199 1.193 1.203 1.189 
 (1.121) (1.122) (1.121) (1.129) (1.129) (1.128) 
Observations 495 495 495 463 463 463 
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.5: Estimation results in the long term (number of lagged years equals to 4 and 5) 
 
3.8. Marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate 
The main findings of the previously presented estimations are that energy taxes seem to have 
a negative effect on physical investment and a positive impact on eco-innovation in the short 
and long term. In addition, these taxes can promote human skill through reducing the CO2 
emissions in the short and long term. These results make us wonder about the marginal effect 
of energy taxes on economic growth rate. The marginal effect for imputed data is usually 
calculated by using “mimrgns” Stata command. But, the indirect relationship between energy 
taxes and economic growth rate makes this command does not work in this model. For this 
reason, the marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate per capita was calculated 
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manually by using an Excel program. To know how economic growth rate varies when the 
proxy of energy taxes increases of one percent, three steps were followed. Firstly, the value of 
economic growth rate was calculated at the means of all explicative variables. Secondly, we 
calculated the value of economic growth rate at the mean of energy taxes plus 1% of energy 
taxes mean, and at the means of the other explicative variables. Finally, the variation between 
the value of economic growth rate in the second step and in the first step was calculated. The 
results are presented in the table (3.6). The findings reveal that an increase of 1% of the proxy 
of energy taxes leads to a decrease of economic growth rate per capita by 0,03386 in the short 
term. However, this negative impact decreases in long term and it becomes positive when the 
lagged value equal to three and five years.  
 Short term Long term 
  Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 lag4 Lag5 
Benchmark 
model 
-0,03373 -0,00007 -0,00009 0,00143 -0,00019 0,00311 
Source: author’s calculation 
Table 3.6: Marginal effect of energy taxes on economic growth rate per capita 
 
3.9. Conclusion  
This chapter investigated the effect of energy taxes on physical investment, human capital, 
and environmental innovation in the context of an endogenous growth model, where physical 
investment, human capital and environmental innovation represent the three mains channels 
through which energy taxes can affect economic growth. Moreover, it explored whether the 
impact of energy taxes on physical investment is sensitive to the existence and level of public 
debt-to-GDP ratio. The analysis was performed over the short and long term using a 
simultaneous-equations model with a panel of 31 OECD countries over the 1994–2013 
period. The conditional mixed process (cmp) estimator developed by Roodman (2011) was 
used to estimate the model’s coefficients. The multiple imputation method with an 
Expectation Maximization Bootstrapped algorithm was implemented to complete the missing 
data in our database. The main findings show a negative impact of energy taxes on physical 
investment in the short and long term. This impact is negatively sensitive to the existence and 
to the level of public debt. These results could be insightful for policymakers, especially for 
countries that are planning or implementing environmental tax reforms. Using of a part of 
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energy tax revenues to decrease the level of public debt could reduce the negative impact of 
public debt and of energy taxes on physical investment. In addition, we have found that 
energy taxes have an indirect effect on human capital through their impact on CO2 emissions, 
as the taxes on energy products are able to reduce both flux and stock of CO2 emissions that 
have a negative impact on human skill in the short and long term. Moreover, the empirical 
results show that energy taxes can encourage eco-innovation in the short and long term. 
However, environmental innovation promotes economic growth only after a period of two or 
three years. These empirical insights are of particular interest to policymakers as they help 
build sound economic and environmental policies to sustain economic development and to 
improve environmental quality.  
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General Conclusion 
 
Four and a half years ago, we have started our research work on this thesis, motivated by the 
importance of two key elements: environmental tax and public debt vis-`a-vis of economic 
growth. Tax is one of the fiscal tools that has seen increasing use by the OECD countries as 
an instrument principal in their environmental policies over the last three decades. The main 
objective of environmental tax is to reduce pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, which 
increases the wellbeing of society. However, this can have a negative influence on economic 
growth, especially in the short term (Siriwardana et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015). The use of 
this tool has sparked widespread debate among researchers about the impact of environmental 
tax on economic growth in the short and long term. This prompted them to use many 
theoretical models to answer this question, but without reaching a general consensus on the 
nature of this effect. Some of them found a positive impact whereas others observed a 
negative one. 
 
 Two points raised our attention on this subject. First, the empirical studies that verify the 
validity of these results are very rare. To the best of our knowledge, Abdullah and Morley 
(2014) is the only published econometric study on this topic. Second, the majority of the 
theoretical models applied to studying the effect of environmental tax on economic growth 
ignore the public debt issue. They assume that the government finances its expenditures only 
through taxes and that the government budget is balanced in every period. But in fact, the 
high ratios of public debt-to-GDP, caused by the last financial crisis, have been one of the 
features of advanced economies in recent years. Many studies showed that, high levels of 
public debt can lead fiscal policy to adversely affect economic growth; while low levels allow 
fiscal policy to promote economic progress (Baharumshah et al, 2017; Bhattarai et al., 2014; 
Chen et al. 2016; Gogas et al., 2014; Galstyan and Velic, 2017; Gwartney, 1998 ;Teles and 
Cesar Mussolini, 2014a). Therefore, as the environmental tax is a fiscal instrument used by 
environmental policy, its effect on economic growth could be sensitive to the existence and 
level of public debt.  
 
Thus, our main goal in this thesis was to explore the nature of the relationship between 
environmental tax and economic growth, and whether this relationship is sensitive to the level 
of other variables in the economy. Then, in second place, we aimed to examine the channels 
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through which this tax can affect economic growth, and whether the existence and level of 
public debt could alter this effect.  
 
In order to achieve the thesis’ goals, we started a long research path by firstly determining the 
main drivers of economic growth according to the empirical and theoretical literature, in 
particular the endogenous growth models. Four groups of control variables were determined 
in this phase: the conditioning variables of economic growth; the variables of fiscal policy; 
human capital variables, and macroeconomic variables. Then, a proxy of environmental tax 
was added to these indicators. In the first chapter, this proxy measured the total revenues of 
all environmentally related taxes as a percentage of GDP, while in the second and the third 
chapters we focused our analysis on the most important category of environmentally related 
taxes: energy taxes. Therefore, we built a new proxy for energy taxes which takes into 
account changes in its tax base. 
  
In the second phase, we reviewed the literature examining the effect of environmental tax on 
economic growth, which allowed us to identify three main channels through which this tax 
could influence economic growth. They are: physical capital, human capital and 
environmental innovation. For each of them, we determined a set of explanatory variables 
used in the existing literature. 
 
Afterwards, we proceeded to the collection of data on the chosen indicators that will be later 
submitted to different estimation approaches. At this stage, we had a concern about the 
missing data, which is recognized to have serious consequences on results validity. To 
address this problem, the multiple imputation method  developed by the seminal work of 
(Rubin 1976) was used, giving our inferences further validity; compared to those resulting by 
using missing values. However, if the variable has zero observation, this method cannot create 
its missing data by using the observed value of other variables in the database. For this reason, 
we were obliged to exclude Chile, Mexico and United States from our database, because they 
have no data about productive expenditure variable. Therefore, we constructed a balanced 
panel dataset of 31 OECD countries for the period 1994-2013. In addition, information about 
the implementation of environmental tax reforms was collected by using a literature review. 
After that, two approaches were employed to estimate the parameters of models in this thesis. 
In the first and second chapter, we used the Correlated Random Effects estimator developed 
by Wooldridge (2010). This method is able to address the problem of endogeneity caused by 
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the correlation between model variables and unobserved effects of time-invariant variables 
(Bache et al., 2013). In the third chapter, the conditional mixed process (cmp) estimator 
developed by Roodman (2011) was used in order to estimate the simultaneous-equations 
model’s coefficients. Instrumental variables were employed with this estimator to treat the 
endogeneity issue which may arise due to simultaneity. For both approaches, we verified that 
there is no harmful multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables by using the Variance 
Inflation Factor test, and that the time series of environmental tax proxy and economic 
growth rate are stationary, by using a group of panel root tests. 
 
Consequently, four and a half years' efforts have resulted in three empirical chapters. Table 
(A.1) presents briefly the main contributions to this thesis which are of empirical nature: 
 
Chapter Contribution 
Global contributions - This thesis represents the motivation of a new theoretical 
model that takes into account the three channels through 
which environmental tax can affect economic growth, in 
addition to the existence of the public debt. 
-  It handles the problem of missing data by using the multiple 
imputation method which showed an improvement in data 
quality and statistical inference. 
Chapter 1 The empirical contribution of this chapter lies in three aspects: 
(i) Exploring the nature of the relationship between the 
overall environmentally related tax revenues and the 
economic growth rate in the short and long term. 
(ii) Investigating whether this relationship is sensitive to the 
level of revenue generated from environmentally related 
taxes or to the initial level of a country’s richness. 
(iii) Examining whether this relationship differs between the 
countries which have implemented ETRs and those which 
have not? 
Chapter 2 This chapter proposes a new approach to measure energy taxes. This 
approach takes into account not only the revenue generated from 
these taxes but also the changes in its tax base. After that, the new 
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proxy of energy taxes was used to achieve two goals: 
(i) Exploring the nature of the relationship between energy 
taxes and economic growth rate in the short and long term. 
(ii) Verifying whether this relationship depends on the initial 
level of a country’s richness, polluting energy use (as 
internal factors in the economy) and commercial openness 
of goods (as an external factor in the economy). 
Chapter 3 Two novelties are provided by this chapter: 
(i) It is the first attempt to empirically examine the channels 
through which energy taxes can affect economic growth 
rate in the short and long term, by using a simultaneous 
equations model. 
(ii) It is the first macro-econometric evidence on the 
sensitivity of the effects of energy taxes on physical 
investment and thus on economic growth for the existence 
and level of public debt. 
Table A.1: Thesis contributions 
 
In Chapter 1, the share of total environmentally related tax revenues in GDP was used as a 
proxy of environmental tax. In the first phase, our interest was to investigate whether there is 
a relationship between this proxy and the economic growth rate in the short and the long term. 
The answer to this question shows whether the use of tax as an instrument for environmental 
policy has any correlation with economic growth, and whether it will have a positive or 
negative association. In the second phase, the significant rise in the revenues generated from 
these taxes in the OECD zone, which have increased from 420.754 billons US$ in 1994 to 
786.134 billion US$ in 2013, led us to wonder whether this relationship is sensitive to the 
level of revenues generated. On the other side, we wanted to explore whether the nature of the 
relationship between environmental tax and the economic growth rate is sensitive to the initial 
level of a country’s richness. The former has been measured by the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita in the year 1994. It was coded as (lnY0). To achieve these goals, we allowed the 
proxy of environmental tax to interact with itself and with (lnY0). Finally, motivated by the 
wave of environmental tax reforms that started in the early 1990s in a number of OECD 
countries; we investigated whether the nature of the relationship between environmental tax 
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and the economic growth rate differs between the countries that have implemented these 
reforms and those that have not implemented them.  
 
Using the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) panel data estimator, we found that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the overall share of environmentally related tax 
revenues in GDP and economic growth rate in the short and long term. However, when we 
allowed ETRT to interact with lnY0, this relationship became significant and negative, 
reflecting the importance of a country's richness level in determining the nature of this 
relationship. Furthermore, we found that, the higher the initial level of GDP per capita, the 
more environmentally related tax revenues can promote the economic growth rate. The 
coefficient of the interaction between the total revenue of environmentally related taxes and 
itself did not show a significant effect. The results also revealed that the association between 
environmentally related tax revenues and the economic growth rate, in the short and long 
term, is statistically insignificant in the countries which have not implemented ETRs, whereas 
this association is statistically significant and negative in the countries which have 
implemented ETRs. 
 
In Chapter 2, we have focused our analysis on energy taxes which represent the most 
important category of environmentally related taxes in terms of the number of taxes imposed 
and the revenues achieved. This allowed us to propose a new approach to measure these taxes. 
In fact, the insignificant relationship between total environmental tax revenues and the rate of 
economic growth, which we obtained in the first chapter when the interaction with other 
variables was ignored, made us question how well the units used to measure these revenues 
could show the real impact of these taxes on economic growth. According to the statistics 
provided by the OECD, there is only a data about the revenue generated from environmentally 
related taxes. These revenues are measured in four unites: millions of USD, a share of total 
tax revenues, per capita, and a percent of GDP. However, we noticed that these measurements 
do not take into account the changes in the tax base. This may weaken the role that 
environmental taxation can play in the economy and does not reflect its real impact on the 
economic variables. Consequently, in this chapter, we proposed an alternative approach 
taking into account, not only the revenue generated, but also the variations in the tax base. 
The total final consumption of energy products that pollute the environment through carbon 
emissions was considered as a proxy of energy taxes’ base. Then, the new proxy of energy 
taxes was calculated through dividing energy tax revenues measured in millions of American 
109 
 
dollars by the total final consumption of polluting energy products measured in tons of oil 
equivalent. After that, this new measurement was used to explore the nature of the 
relationship between energy taxes and the economic growth rate in the short and long term. In 
addition, we compared our estimations results from this proxy to those obtained from the 
other measurements of energy taxes provided by the OECD statistics. Finally, this proxy was 
employed to test whether this relationship is sensitive to the initial level of a country’s 
richness, polluting energy use and commercial openness of goods. 
 
The estimation results of the Correlated Random Effects estimator revealed a negative 
relationship between the new proxy of energy taxes and economic growth rate in the short 
term, whereas the four units provided by the OECD statistics to measure energy taxes did not 
show any significant association. When we allowed this proxy to interact with the other 
variables, energy taxes negatively correlated with the economic growth rate in the short and 
the long term. This association is negatively sensitive to the level of the economy's 
dependence on polluting energy use as a share of total energy used in the production process 
in the short and long term, and to the commercial trade openness only in the long run. In 
addition, the results show that an increase in energy taxes can significantly enhance the 
economic growth rate, as the initial level of a country’s richness increases. To know the net 
effect of these taxes on the economic growth rate, we calculated the average marginal effect. 
We found that the average marginal effect of these taxes on economic growth is negative in 
the short term. However, this negative impact decreases in the long term and it becomes 
positive after three years.  
 
Motivated by the results of chapter 2, we empirically investigated in chapter 3 the channels 
through which energy taxes could influence economic growth rate in the short and long term. 
The theoretical literature of environmental economics supposes that imposing taxation on 
energy products can affect economic growth through three main channels: physical capital 
(physical investment); human capital; and environmental innovation. The impact of these 
taxes on physical investment is expected to be direct and negative, whereas the effect on 
human capital is supposed to be positive and indirect, through its impact on pollution 
emissions. The authors also assume that these taxes can promote economic growth through 
encouraging environmental innovation. However, all these assumptions are theoretical and to 
date there is no empirical evidence that examines the validity of these hypotheses together in 
the same model. Therefore, this chapter complements this shortage of empirical studies. In 
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addition, the majority of the theoretical models applied for studying the effect of 
environmental taxation on economic growth ignored the public debt issue by supposing that 
the government budget is balanced in each period, whereas the high level of public debt-to-
gross domestic product ratio is one of the features of advanced economies in recent years. 
This was our motivation to include the public debt in our analysis in this chapter. More 
precisely, we firstly determined the main channel through which public debt can affect 
economic growth by reviewing theoretical and empirical literatures. We found that this 
channel is the physical investment. We examined then whether the effect of energy taxes on 
physical investment is sensitive to the existence and level of public debt.  
 
The analysis was performed in the short and long term by using simultaneous-equations 
model in case of 31 OECD countries over the 1994–2013 period. The conditional mixed 
process (cmp) estimator developed by Roodman (2011) was used to estimate the model’s 
coefficients. The endogeneity problem that can occur in this model because of simultaneity 
was treated by using instrumental variables. In consistent with the expectation, estimation 
results showed four mains results. First, there is a negative effect of energy taxes on physical 
investment in the short and long term. This effect appeared to be negatively sensitive to the 
presence and to the level of public debt. In other words, the higher the level of a country’s 
public debt, the more the negative impact of energy taxes on physical investment increases. 
Second, we found that there is an indirect and positive effect of energy taxes on human capital 
through its impact on pollution where, the taxes on energy products are able to reduce the 
polluting emissions, which have a negative impact on human skill in the short and long term. 
Third, the results showed that energy taxes can encourage environmental innovation in the 
short and long term. However, environmental innovation promotes economic growth only 
after a period of two or three years. 
A.1. Policy implications 
The findings generated by these works point to many implications for policymakers. Firstly, 
the questions of fairness and the inequitable effects of environmental policies on the poor 
countries were primary concerns for policymakers during the negotiations of the Paris 
Agreement (2015). This thesis showed that the effect of environmentally-related taxes, in 
general, and energy taxes, in particular, on the economic growth rate is positively sensitive to 
the initial level of a country’s richness. This means that introducing these taxes in countries 
having a low level of initial GDP per capita (poor countries) will damage the economic 
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growth rate, while these taxes could promote the economic growth rate when the initial level 
of GDP per capita is high (rich countries). Consequently, this finding validates the argument 
made by developing countries that using the tax as an instrument of environmental policy may 
constitute a barrier to economic growth of which they are just beginning to reap its benefits. 
In this case, rich countries can provide financial and technological assistance to developing 
countries to help them reduce the negative effects of these taxes on their economies. 
Secondly, chapter 2 found that the effect of energy taxes on the economic growth rate is 
negatively sensitive to the level of a country’s fossil fuel consumption, in the short and the 
long term, and to the level of country’s trade openness of goods, only in the long term. Based 
on these results, we suggest that governments having introduced energy taxes or planning to 
increase these taxes in order to reduce polluting emissions, should, at the same time, work to 
encourage the shift toward clean energy use and to increase the efficacy of polluting energy 
use, because this could reduce the consumption of fossil fuel and thus reduce the negative 
effect of energy taxes on economic growth. Additionally, the government should provide 
support to industrial enterprises that direct their production for export, in order to compensate 
for part of the increase in costs resulting from energy taxes. This may improve their 
competitiveness in the global markets and thus increase their exports. However, we suggest 
that the government's subsidy to the affected industrial sectors should not be in the form of 
lump-sum payments, as this could eliminate the effect of costs increases resulting from energy 
taxes, thus canceling the economic motivation to switch to clean energy or invest in 
environmentally friendly technology. Therefore, the consumption of polluting energy will not 
decrease. Instead, the government can provide support in the form of direct funding for 
research projects provided by industrial enterprises to invest in environmentally friendly 
technology or in clean energy use. On the other side, this chapter showed that the method 
used to measure energy taxes is an important issue and it can change the implications of 
public policy. Consequently, we propose to build a new measure of environmentally-related 
tax categories that takes into account the variation in their bases. Thirdly, the findings 
obtained by the third chapter help policymakers to answer the question: what should be done 
to reduce polluting emissions at minimum economic cost? Through the empirical study, we 
found that energy taxes have a negative impact on CO2 emission in the short and long term. 
Thus, in order to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide, governments of developed countries 
can expand energy taxes use, either by increasing their rates, or expanding their tax base. But 
this will have negative effects on some engines of economic growth (physical investment) and 
positive effects on others (human capital and environmental innovation). Consequently, in 
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order to reduce the negative effects of these taxes on economic growth, the expansion of their 
use must be accompanied by supporting for the channels that are negatively impacted by these 
taxes and by promoting the channels that are positively affected. This can be achieved through 
an energy tax reform based on the use of its revenues as follows: 
1. A part of the revenues could be used to reduce the public debt, especially in countries 
with a high public debt to GDP ratio. This could first reduce the negative impact of 
public debt on physical investment, and secondly reduce the negative impact of energy 
taxes on physical investment, as energy taxes are negatively sensitive to the existence 
and level of public debt. 
2. The government could use a part of the revenue to increase the expenditure on 
physical investment in the education sector (building schools and universities). 
3. A part of the revenues could be used to increase the environmentally related 
government R&D budget as a percentage of total government R&D (ERGRDB), which 
shows a positive impact on environmental innovation when the explanatory variables 
are lagged for two years. 
In addition, increasing the R & D personnel intensity by recruiting more researchers can 
promote environmental innovation. 
A.2. Limitations and future perspectives 
During the preparation of this thesis we have faced some limitations that mainly concern data 
collecting. The data was restrained to include only 31OECD countries, because of completely 
missing patterns of data that concern productive expenditure variables for Chile, Mexico and 
USA. Additionally, Latvia, which recently joined to the OECD, has no data on 
environmentally related tax revenues. Therefore, it was excluded from the sample. The 
selection of the period of study, which was from 1994 to 2013, was constrained by the 
availability of data about environmentally related tax revenues that have been newly 
introduced in most OECD countries, and about human capital variable. The environmentally 
related tax revenue data provided by the OECD statistics cover the period 1994-2014. But as 
the data on capital human is available only until 2013, we decided to restrict our study to the 
period from 1994 to 2013. As a result, our sample was built to contain only (31) countries’ 
members in the OECD over the 1994-2013 period. 
 
At the end of this thesis in which many technical tools and concepts have been used, we can 
see through it the start of further future works. From a theoretical point of view, the empirical 
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results obtained in this work can serve as an incentive to develop a theoretical model which 
takes into account the three channels through which energy taxes can affect the economic 
growth rate, in addition to the existence of the public debt at the same time. From an empirical 
perspective, the first proposition could be an extension of Chapter 1, where we investigated 
whether the relationship between environmentally related tax revenues and economic growth 
rate varies between the countries that implemented ETRs and those that did not. However, we 
did not estimate the impact of ETRs on the economic growth rate. This question could be a 
project for a future work. The second one is inspired from Chapter 2, where we explored the 
nature of the relationship between energy taxes and the economic growth rate. As we found a 
significant relationship, without interacting energy taxes with other variables, this creates a 
motivation to explore the ‘causal relationship’ between them. Finally, the questions proposed 
by this thesis could be re-examined in the future by using: (i) a longer time series, which 
allows employing other models like time series estimators or dynamic models, (ii) a new 
database for the countries non-members in the OECD. 
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Chapter 1 Appendix 
Appendix 1.A: Brief of variables and source of data 
 
Code Description Data source 
 Dependent variable  
gr Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita  (WDIs, 2015) 
 Environmental taxes  
ETRT The total revenues of all environmentally related taxes as a 
percent of GDP 
(OCDE, 2015) 
   
 Conditioning variables  
Lny0 The natural logarithm of initial value of the real GDP per capita for 
each country in the year 199427. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
k Real gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) (a proxy of physical 
capital) 28. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
Change k Annual change of physical capital. it is defined as (𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡−1). Author according to data 
from (WDIs, 2015) 
TLF Total labor force growth rate. (WDIs, 2015) 
 Human capital   
H Human capital stock. The human-skill index is used as a proxy of 
human capital. 
(LEAD, 2015) 
𝐻𝑡−1 The level of human capital in the previous year. Author according to data 
from (LEAD, 2015) 
Change H Annual change in human capital. Author according to data 
from (LEAD, 2015) 
 Fiscal policy  
exp Productive expenditure, defined as the sum of general government 
spending on education, health, housing, public order and safety, and 
defense as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD and GFS, 2015) 
                                                          
27 The gross domestic product is measured at constant 2005 U.S. dollars and purchasing power parity (PPP). 
28  Gross fixed capital formation is measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
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Code Description Data source 
tax Distortionary taxation. It is the sum of taxes imposed on income, 
profit and capital gains, payroll and workforce, as well as social 
security contributions as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD, 2015) 
Balance Fiscal balance (surplus/deficit) as a percent of GDP. (OECD, 2015) 
 Macro control variables  
INF Inflation rate is measured by the annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
OPENG Openness to international trade of goods is calculated as (exports 
plus imports of goods) as percentage of GDP. 
(OCDE, 2015) 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDIs), World Governance Indicators (WGIs), Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Government Finance Statistics (GFS), “Laboratoire d’Économie Appliquée au 
Développement (LEAD)” in Toulon University (France). 
 
Table 1.A: Brief of variables and source of data 
  
136 
 
Appendix (1.B) 
Missing Data & How to Deal 
The issue of incomplete data sets is a common obstacle in the world of empirical economic 
studies. It prevents scientists from obtaining unbiased results in their research. Many methods 
are proposed to deal this problem. In this section, we provide a brief survey of missing data 
solutions.  
1. Listwise and pairwise deletion are common techniques used by most statistical packages to 
handle missing data (Peugh and Enders, 2004; Honaker et al., 2011). Listwise deletion 
(complete-case analysis) excludes all data for a case that has one or more missing value. 
Consequently, the number of observations used in the analysis declines. This can cause biased 
estimates, leading to invalid conclusions (Kang, 2013). Pairwise deletion only removes the 
specific missing values from the analysis (not the entire case). That is, all available data is 
included to produce estimates of mean, correlations and covariance. Nevertheless, there are 
many problems of this method. When a correlation on multiple variables is conducted, 
pairwise deletion will conduct the bivariate correlation between all available data points, and 
ignore only those missing values if they exist on some variables. In this case, pairwise 
deletion will result in different sample sizes for each correlation, which can generate 
correlations outside the range [-1,+1]. In addition, it is not clear which sample size should be 
used for calculating standard errors. Using the average sample size yields standard errors that 
are too small  (Little, 1992). 
2. Estimation the missing values and then using the new values is another solution to handle 
missing data. There are different methods to do the estimation: mean imputation; using 
regression; stochastic regression imputation; Last Observation Carried Forward (LOCF) 
and Baseline Observation Carried Forward (BOCF); and indicator method. More details 
about these methods are provided by (Buuren 2012). The standard calculations of these 
methods make no distinction between the observed data and the imputed data. This makes the 
standard errors after imputation ‘too small’ (Buuren, 2012). Multiple imputation (MI) method 
can solve the problem of ‘too small’ standard errors. In addition, it separates the solution of 
the missing data problem from the solution of the complete data problem. It solves first the 
missing data problem, then the complete data problem. Buuren (2012) states that multiple 
imputation method is the best solution given all other imputation methods disadvantages. 
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The alternative approach to handle missing data: multiple imputation 
Since the seminal work of Rubin (1976), multiple imputation (MI) has become the most 
popular method for dealing with missing data in last three decades. The multiple imputation 
technique consists of three mean steps: imputation, analysis and pooling. In the first step, 
multiple imputation imputes 𝑚 values29 for each missing observation using the Expectation-
Maximization with Bootstrapping (EMB) algorithm, which generates estimates of missing 
data using the observed ones. It then fills every missing cell with imputed values, creating 𝑚 
“completed” data sets. In the second step, multiple imputation analyzes each of the m 
completed data sets, resulting in m analyses. In the last step, the m analysis results are 
integrated into a final result using  Rubin’s (1987) original formula that combines variability 
within and between data sets (for more details, see Honaker and King, 2010 and Honaker et 
al., 2011). 
To complete missing values in our data,  we used a multiple imputation approach proposed by 
the Amelia II package available in R program (Honaker et al., 2011). The Amelia II package 
implements an expectation-maximization with bootstrapping (EMB) algorithm for large 
numbers of variables. The database employed for imputation purpose includes all the 
variables that we used in this thesis. It means, in addition to the variables used in chapter 1, 
we add the variables that will be used in the analysis models in chapter 2 and chapter 3. This 
procedure is recommended by (Honaker et al., 2011), because it adds more information to 
imputation model and thus increases its predictive power. Consequently, the proxy of energy 
taxes (ET), total final consumption share of polluting energy products in total final 
consumption of energy (TFCPEP_sh), environmental innovation (EINNOV), domestic credit 
accorded to private sector (DCPS), regulatory quality (RQ), carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), 
total fertility rate (FERT), Technology Infrastructure Development (TID), GDP per capita (Y), 
population (POP), environmentally related government R&D budget as a percent of total 
government R&D (ERGRDB), foreign direct investment (FDI), R & D personnel intensity 
(RDPI) and public debt (DEBT) were added to imputation model. The explanation of these 
variables exist in chapter 2 and 3. 
                                                          
29 Where 𝑚 >  1 is the number of imputations. 
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Before starting the multiple imputation procedure, we wanted to get a good idea of the type 
and pattern of missingness in our data. The fraction of missing data is the tool used for this 
purpose. Table (1.B.1) presents this fraction for each variable30. 
 
Variables  Fraction missing Variables Fraction missing 
RQ 0.25 k 0.003 
RDPI 0.18 TLF 0.00 
exp 0.16 lnY0 0.00 
ERGRDB 0.14 INF 0.00 
Balance 0.08 TFCPEP_sh 0.00 
DCPS 0.04 ETRT 0.00 
DEBT 0.03 Y 0.00 
FDI 0.03 FERT 0.00 
EINNOV 0.01 CO2 0.00 
OPENG 0.009 POP 0.00 
ET 0.008 TID 0.00 
tax 0.006 H 0.00 
gr 0.006   
Source: The author’s calculation, according to the Amelia View results. 
Table 1.B.1: The fraction of missing data in decreasing order  
 
 
 We can immediately see that: (i) the data of (H, TID, POP, CO2, ETRT, Y, ETRT, 
TFCPEP_sh, INF, lnY0, TLF) variables are always observed; (ii) a few of values are missing 
for the variables (gr, tax, ET, OPENG, EINNOV, FDI, DEBT, DCPS, and Balance); and (iii) 
(ERGRDB, exp, RDPI, RQ) are the variables with the highest level of missingness in the data 
set. This is the reason why we focused our analysis on these four variables. After exploring 
the pattern of missingness in the data, we started the multiple imputation procedure.  
Identification of the variables that were to be included in the imputation model was the first 
step. According to Honaker et al. (2011), it is not appropriate to include country names and 
years variables in the imputation model. Therefore, we added the transformation of ID for the 
country and year variables (see Honaker and King, 2010). We then set 𝑚 = 100 and executed 
the multiple imputation process31. In order to verify imputation validity and the fitness of the 
                                                          
30 It is calculated as “the number of missing observations in the variable across all countries”/ “the total number 
of data set lines”. The total number of data set lines is equal to number of countries multiplied by number of 
years in the sample. 
31 Concerning the question of how many imputations are required to get good results, it is always better to use a 
high value of  𝑚 because it leads to  higher statistical power (Graham et al., 2007) and less standard error in the 
multiple imputation point estimate (Honaker et al., 2011). However, we followed the recommendation of  
Buuren (2012, p.50) on the number of imputations, by starting the imputation with  𝑚 = 5, then increasing it to 
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imputation model, we used two diagnostic tests available with the Amelia II package: 
Comparing Densities, and Over-imputation. As already mentioned, our focus was on the 
variables that own the largest fraction of missingness. These are: RQ, RDPI, exp and 
ERGRDB.  
Comparing Densities  
One of the methods for assessing the plausibility of imputations is to compare the distribution 
of imputed values with the distribution of observed values. The idea is that high quality 
imputed values will have a distribution similar to the observed value. Figure (1.B.1) shows 
kernel density estimates of the observed values and of the mean of imputed values over the m 
datasets. For each variable, the distribution of mean imputations is (in red) and the 
distribution of observed values is (in black). We see that imputed values of RDPI and 
ERGRDB are slightly similar to observed RDPI and ERGRDB values, but the imputations of 
RQ and exp are different from their observed values. This meant that the imputation model 
required some improvements.  
 
Over-imputation 
Over- imputation is the second tool used to check the plausibility of the imputation model. 
The idea of this method was to apply our imputation procedure to data that was not missing. 
Consequently, for each observed value, several hundreds of imputed values were generated. 
“This large number of imputations allows us to construct a confidence interval of what the 
imputed value would have been, had any of the observed data been missing. We can then 
graphically inspect whether our observed data tends to fall within the region where it would 
have been imputed had it been missing” (Honaker et al, 2011: 28). Figure (1.B.2) shows our 
over-imputation diagnostic for the four selected variables. On these graphs, the black line 
refers to the line of perfect agreement; which implies that, if the imputation model was a 
perfect predictor of the true value, all the imputations would fall on this line. The vertical 
lines show the 90% confidence intervals for imputed values. The colors of the lines indicate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
20, 40 and to 100. The diagnostics of over-imputation were almost identical with 𝑚 = 5, 20, 40 𝑎𝑛𝑑 100, for the 
four variables that had the largest missing data fraction. Consequently, we decided to complete the treatment 
with 𝑚 = 100 for the reasons mentioned above. (See appendix (1.C) which shows a comparison of over-
imputation diagnostics). 
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the fraction of missing observations in the pattern of missingness for that observation (with 
red being a higher fraction and blue being a lower fraction). By looking at how many of the. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.B.1: Comparing Densities, the distribution of relative density of the observed values (in 
black) and the distribution of relative density of mean imputations (in red) for each variable. 
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Figure 1.B.2: Over-imputation diagnostic. The dots represent the mean imputation. The color of the 
line (as coded in the legend) represents the fraction of missing observations. 
confidence intervals cover the black line, we can tell how often the imputation model can 
confidently predict the true value of the observation. From the four graphs, we can observe 
that the majority of confidence intervals fall on the black line, which means the true observed 
value falls within this range. However, there are some confidence intervals that do not fall on 
this line. We can observe them on both sides of every square. Taking this into consideration 
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along with the results of the density diagnostic for the (RQ) and (exp) variables in the 
previous section, it was clear that the imputation model needed to be improved 
Imputation model improvement 
 As our data is panel, many variables can vary smoothly over time and/or within cross-
sectional units. In this case, when the known values are close in time to a missing value, this 
may aid the imputation of that value enormously. However, there may be periods of decline, 
stability, or growth for which the observed values would be used in a different way to impute 
missing values. Consequently, the exact pattern may vary over time within any cross-section 
or may exist in some and not in others. Thanks to Amelia a general model of patterns within 
variables across time could be built by creating a sequence of polynomials of the time index. 
For example, if the economic growth rate (gr) varies smoothly over time, the modeling 
assumption supposes that there are some polynomials that describe the economy in cross-
sectional unit (𝑖) at time (𝑖) as: 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑡2 + 𝛼1𝑡3 … 
 
By including enough higher order terms of time, the pattern between observed values of the 
economic growth rate can be estimated. Amelia creates polynomials of time up to the user 
defined 𝑘-th order (𝑘 ≤ 3). In this way, the covariates that correspond to time and its 
polynomials are added to the model by Amelia. On the other hand, these polynomials can 
interact with the cross-section unit to allow the patterns to vary between cross-sectional units 
over time, when cross-sectional units are specified. There is also a probability that all units 
have the same patterns over time in all variables. In this case, 𝑘 will take the value of zero. 
That means every unit has a uniquely estimated constant term (Honaker et al., 2011). 
Consequently, there were three types of information that could improve the quality of 
imputation: The first being a sequence of polynomials of the time index, where  𝑘 =
1 𝑜𝑟 2 𝑜𝑟 3 ; the second an interaction between the sequences of polynomials of the time 
index and the cross-section unit; and the third an interaction between the cross-section unit 
and the polynomials of the time index, but with 𝑘 = 0. We tested these cases using the 
Amelia program. We found that the best result was when we used (𝑘 = 0) and interaction 
with the cross section, which is equivalent to using fixed effects, where every unit has a 
uniquely estimated constant term. Figure (1.B.3) shows the density comparing diagnostic 
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when we used a fixed effect (the best result of the three tests). Compared to the density 
comparing diagnostic performed before the improvement made to the of imputation model, 
presented in figure (1.B.1), we can see that the imputed curve for the four variables, has  
 
 
 
Figure 1.B.3: Comparing Densities, with 𝑘 = 0, and interaction with the cross section 
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Figure 1.B.4: Over-imputation diagnostics, with 𝑘 = 0, and interaction with the cross section. 
improved. There is remarkable convergence between the relative intensity distribution curves 
of observed and imputed mean’ values. This reflects a significant improvement in the 
imputation. This improvement is probably due to large number of countries that have the 
same pattern of missingness especially for the RQ variable. As a result, when we used the 
interaction with cross-section units, a lot of information was added to the imputation model. 
Over-imputation diagnostics presented in figure (1.B.4) also show that compared to figure 
(1.B.2), there is an improvement in the number of confidence intervals that cover the black 
line for the four variables. This reflects the plausibility and the fitness of the imputation model 
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with 𝑚 = 100, 𝑘 = 0 and interaction with the cross section. Consequently, we used the 
multiple imputation with these options to impute the missing values in our dataset. 
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Appendix (1.C) 
Over-imputation diagnostics for (RQ), (RDPI), (exp), and (ERGRDB) 
variables for m = 5, 20, 40, 100 respectively. 
 
 
 
1. 𝑚 = 5 with added ID transformation for country and year variables 
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2. 𝑚 = 20 with added ID transformation for country and year variables 
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3. 𝑚 = 40 with added ID transformation for country and year variables 
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4. m = 100 with added ID transformation for country and year variables 
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Appendix (1.D) 
Variables Selection: QIC program  
In order to determine whether certain or all the four groups of control explanatory variables 
that we determined before should be included in the (CRE) model, we run the QIC program32 
in generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses for four scenarios. As the number of 
imputations in our database is equal to 100, so we have 100 databases imputed. For this 
reason, we calculate the value of QIC for every data base imputed and after that we calculate 
the average value of QIC for every scenario. The best fitting scenario (model) is the one that 
has the smallest QIC average. The four scenarios are as follow: 
The first includes the share of environmentally related taxes revenues in GDP and 
conditioning variables. In the second, we add the variables of human capital to the first 
scenario. In the third, the variables of fiscal policy are added to the second scenario. Finally, 
we add the variables of macroeconomic control to the third scenario. Table (D.1) shows the 
descriptive statistics of QIC values for every scenario.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
QICS1 100 301537.8 435.0818 301137.2 304337 
QICS2 100 291369.6 333.9393 291062.4 293431.4 
QICS3 100 265485.2 878.2393 264427.2 269870 
QICS4 100 236990.5 472.0661 236384.2 239105.3 
Source: The author 
Table D.1: The descriptive statistics of the values of QIC for every scenario        
 
We find that the best scenario is the fourth. It has the least value of the mean of QIC 
(236990.5). Therefore, the CRE equation contains all the explanatory variables.  
 
 
                                                          
32 This program was developed by Cui and others (2007). The best fitting model and the best correlation 
structure can be selected by using the value of QIC. A subset of covariates with the smallest QIC will be the 
preferred model.  
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Appendix (1.E) 
Multicollinearity and VIF test 
Multicollinearity (correlation between predictors) can lead to: an “incorrect” parameter 
estimates sign or implausible magnitudes; a large increase in standard errors for coefficients; a 
model in which variables have low significance levels even though 𝑅2 is large; and/or create 
situations in which small changes in the data produce big swings in parameter estimates 
(Greene 2012). These problems can be severe and sometimes crippling. The Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is widely used to measure the degree of ith independent variable 
multicollinearity with the other independent variables in a regression model33. VIF measures 
how much the variance (the square of the estimate's standard deviation) of an estimated 
regression coefficient is “inflated” because of linear dependence on other predictors.34 The 
high value of the VIF index indicates that the variance of the estimated coefficient is high, 
which means that severe multicollinearity effects are present. (Kennedy 1992) notes that “for 
standardized data VIFi >10 indicates harmful collinearity.” Consequently, we built our 
analyses on this rul. Table (1.E) shows the VIF values of our predictors. We can see that all 
the regressions have low VIF values indicating a low degree of multicollinearity. Therefore, 
there is no harmful collinearity between the explanatory variables.  
Variable VIF 
ETRT 1.16 
lnY0 1.11 
Change k 1.08 
TLF 1.19 
Ht-1 1.39 
ChangeH 1.06 
exp 1.31 
tax 1.51 
Balance 1.33 
INF 1.25 
OPENG 1.14 
Table 1.E: VIF values for predictors 
                                                          
33 The formula of the variance inflation factor (VIF) is   1
1−𝑅𝑘
2 ; where 𝑅𝑘2  is the unadjusted R
2 obtained by 
regressing the kth predictor on the remaining predictors in the model (see the site: 
https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat501/node/347). 
34 Please see the site: http://support.minitab.com/en-us/minitab/17/topic-library/modeling-
statistics/regression-and-correlation/model-assumptions/what-is-a-variance-inflation-factor-vif/  
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Appendix (1.F) 
Panel unit root tests 
Given that one of the objectives in this chapter is to explore the nature of relation between 
environmentally related taxes and economic growth rate in the long run, we needed to verify 
whether the time series for economic growth rate (gr) and environmentally related taxes 
revenues (ETRT) were stationary. In order to achieve this goal, we ran a series of panel unit 
root tests. As the number of imputations (m) in our database was 100, there were 100 imputed 
databases. With the absence of a direct panel unit root test for 100 databases at the same time, 
we implemented the tests on the hundredth imputed database35. Before performing the tests, 
we produced a plot of time series of (gr) and (ETRT) which gave an idea of the overall levels 
and variability of the series. This enabled us to see whether there was any time trend in the 
series. If we observed a rising or decreasing time trend in the plot, the “trend” option was to 
be included in Stata commands for panel unit root tests for the variable36. In order to visualize 
the longitudinal data over time, we used a twoway graph which to show the relationship 
between the time and the values of a variable. In addition, we put the prediction from a linear 
regression of a variable for a year on top of the visualized data. Figure (1.F.1) shows the time 
series of gr using the twoway graph. It indicates a decreasing trend of (gr) over the time. 
Consequently, the trend option was included in panel unit root tests for (gr). Figure (1.F.2) 
shows the time series of ETRT using the twoway graph. We note that environmentally related 
taxes revenues don’t have a clear rising or decreasing trend over the time; consequently, the 
trend option will not be included in panel unit root tests for (ETRT). In order to mitigate the 
impact of cross-sectional dependence, we remove the cross-sectional averages from the series 
by using the “demean” option in Stata command. This procedure was suggested by Levin et 
al. (2002). 
 
                                 
 
 
                                                          
35 We ran these tests on an imputed database with m=5, 25, 50, 75,100. We obtained the same results. 
36 Trend includes a linear time trend in the model, which describes the process by which the series is generated. 
Please see : http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtunitroot.pdf 
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Figure 1.F.1: Time series of (gr) using the twoway graph 
 
 
Figure 1.F.2: time series of ETRT using twoway graph 
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Panel unit root tests could thus be implemented for (gr) and (ETRT) including “trend” and 
“demean” options for (gr), and only “demean” option for (ETRT). Table (1.F.1) presents the 
null hypothesis (𝐻0) and the alternative hypothesis (𝐻𝑎) for every type of panel unit root tests. 
We notice that all these tests have the same null hypothesis.  
 
Test 𝑯𝟎 𝑯𝒂 
Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) All panels contain unit roots All panels are stationary 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots Some panels are stationary 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) All panels contain unit roots At least one panel is stationary 
Table (1.F.1): Panel unit root tests hypotheses 
 
These various tests have differing assumptions about the rates at which the number of panels, 
N, and the number of time periods, T, tends to infinity or whether N or T are fixed. Table 
(1.F.2) presents these assumptions. As this paper deals with a macroeconomic analysis of 
OECD countries, we could assume that N is fixed whereas T tends to infinity. In this case, the 
Fisher-type test ((Choi 2001) would have been the appropriate test for our sample. However, 
our dataset included 𝑁 > 𝑇 where 𝑁 = 31 and 𝑇 = 20, because data collected about 
environmentally-related taxes had been in place since 1994. In this situation, if we supposed 
that N and T were fixed, (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003) would have been the best test for our 
data. However, we ran all the tests, considering the other tests as robust tests. 
 
Test Option Asymptotics 
Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) Trend, demean 𝑁/𝑇 ⟶ 0 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) Trend, demean 𝑁 ⟶∞, T fixed 
or N and T fixed 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) Demean 𝑇 ⟶ ∞, N finite or infinite 
Table 1.F.2: The assumptions of panel unit root tests about N and T 
 
The results of stationary tests for economic growth rate and the environmentally related taxes 
revenues are reported in the tables (1.F.3) and (1.F.4) respectively. The three tests strongly 
rejected the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots. Therefore, all panel’s series 
of (gr) and (ETRT) were stationary.  
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Test  Statistics P-values N T 
Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) Adjusted t* -3.7123 0.0001 31 20 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) W-t-bar -5.4286 0.0000 31 20 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) P 182.6029 0.0000 31 20 
Z -8.5012 0.0000 
L* -8.7033 0.0000 
Pm 10.8305 0.0000 
Table 1.F.3: The results of panel unit root tests for economic growth rate 
 
Test  Statistics P-values N T 
Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) Adjusted t* -2.6995 0.0035 31 20 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) Z-t-tilde-bar -2.2778 0.0114 31 20 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) P 160.5550 0.0000 31 20 
Z -7.0763 0.0000 
L* -7.2839 0.0000 
Pm 8.8505 0.0000 
Table 1.F.4: The results of panel unit root tests for environmentally related taxes revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
Appendix (1.G) 
The result of Variable Addition Test (VAT) of equation 1.4 in the short and long 
term 
 Null hypothesis 
( 1) ETRTbar = 0 
( 2) Changekbar = 0 
( 3) TLFbar = 0 
( 4) H-t1bar = 0 
( 5) ChangeHbar = 0 
( 6) expbar = 0 
( 7) taxbar = 0 
( 8) Balancebar = 0 
(9) INFbar = 0 
(10) OPENGbar = 0 
 F( 10,279878.2)= 3.10 
Prob > F = 0.0006  
 
Table 1.G.1.The result of Variable Addition Test (VAT) of equation 1.4 in the short term 
 
Null hypothesis 
 Lag=1 Lag=2 Lag=3 Lag=4 Lag=5 
( 1) ETRTbar = 0 ETRTbar = 0 ETRTbar = 0 ETRTbar = 0 ETRTbar = 0 
( 2) Changekbar = 0 Changekbar = 0 Changekbar = 0 Changekbar = 0 Changekbar = 0 
( 3) TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 
( 4) Ht_1bar = 0 Ht_1bar = 0 Ht_1bar = 0 Ht_1bar = 0 Ht_1bar = 0 
( 5) ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 
( 6) expbar = 0 expbar = 0 expbar = 0 expbar = 0 expbar = 0 
( 7) taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 
( 8) Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 
(9) INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 
(10) OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 
 F(10,776301.4) =  
3.40 
F(10,885557.5) = 
4.62 
F(10, 2.7e+06)= 
5.41 
F(10,416318.7) = 
7.86 
  F(10,183397.4) =     
2.98 
Prob > F =     0.0002      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 1.G.2.The result of Variable Addition Test (VAT) of equation 1.4 in the long term 
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Appendix (1.H) 
Evolution of value added in agriculture, industry and services sectors  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the World Bank. 
Evolution of value added in agriculture, industry and services sectors as % of GDP over time, 
OECD average (30 countries37). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 When we calculated the average of value added in these sectors, Israel was excluded from our sample because 
it doesn’t have a data for added value as (% GDP) in agriculture, industry and services sectors. 
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Chapter 2 Appendix 
Appendix (2.A): Summary and sources for variables 
Code Definitions Data source 
 Dependent variable  
gr Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 U.S. dollars is 
used as an indicator of economic growth rate per capita. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
 Energy taxes proxy  
ETR_MUSD Energy tax revenues, in million USD, equal to the sum of revenue 
from taxes imposed on petrol and diesel for transport purposes, 
and taxes on fossil fuels and electricity for stationary purposes. 
(OCDE, 2015) 
Coal_Ktoe Total final consumption of coal and coal products, in thousands of 
tons of oil equivalent. 
(IEA, 2015) 
Oil_Ktoe Total final consumption of oil products, in thousands of tons of 
oil equivalent. 
(IEA, 2015) 
Gas_Ktoe Total final consumption of natural gas, in thousands of tons of oil 
equivalent. 
(IEA, 2015) 
ELEC_Ktoe Total final consumption of electricity, in thousands of tons of oil 
equivalent. 
(IEA, 2015) 
PELEC_% The rate of total final consumption of electricity generated from 
oil, gas and coal sources (% of total electricity generated) during a 
given year. 
(IEA, 2015) 
TFCE_Ktoe Total final consumption of energy, in thousands of tons of oil 
equivalent.  
(IEA, 2015) 
PELEC_Ktoe Total final consumption of polluting electricity, in thousands of 
tons of oil equivalent. 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶_𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑒 =  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶_𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑒 ×
 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶_% 
Author 
TFCPEP_Ktoe Total final consumption of polluting energy products. 
TFCPEP_Ktoe = Coal_Ktoe + Oil_Ktoe + Gas_Ktoe +
PELEC_Ktoe  
Author 
ET Proxy of energy taxes, tax revenue from energy taxes per unit of 
fossil fuel energy use, in US $ per ton of oil equivalent38 
Author 
                                                          
38 Since energy tax revenues are measured in millions and total final consumption of polluting energy products in 
thousands, we multiply energy tax revenues by 1000 in order to convert it to thousands. To obtain energy tax 
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Code Definitions Data source 
𝐸𝑇 = ETR_MUSD×1000
TFCPEP_Ktoe
.  
TFCPEP_sh Share of total final consumption of polluting energy products in 
total final consumption of energy, TFCPEP_sh = TFCPEP_Ktoe
TFCE_Ktoe
×
100 
Author 
 Conditioning variables  
Lny0 The natural logarithm of real GDP per capita for each country in 
the year 199439. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
k Real gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). (A proxy of 
physical capital). 
(WDIs, 2015) 
Change k Annual change of physical capital. It is defined as (𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡−1). Author according to 
data from (WDIs, 
2015) 
TLF Total labor force growth rate. (WDIs, 2015) 
 Human capital   
H Human capital. The human-skill index is used as a proxy of 
human capital 
(LEAD, 2015) 
𝐻𝑡−1 The level of human capital in the previous year. Author, according to 
data from (LEAD, 
2015) 
changeH Annual change in human capital. Author, according to 
data from (LEAD, 
2015) 
 Fiscal policy  
exp Productive expenditure, defined as the sum of general government 
spending on education, health, housing, public order and safety, 
and defense as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD and GFS, 
2015) 
tax Distortionary taxation. It is the sum of taxes imposed on income, 
profit and capital gains, payroll and workforce, as well as social 
security contributions as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD, 2015) 
Balance Fiscal balance (surplus/deficit) as a percentage of GDP. (OECD, 2015) 
 Macro control variables  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
revenues in USD per ton of oil equivalent, we divide energy tax revenues measured in thousands by total final 
consumption of polluting energy products measured in thousands. 
39 The gross domestic product is measured at constant 2005 U.S. dollars and purchasing power parity (PPP). 
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Code Definitions Data source 
INF Inflation rate, is measured by the annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
OPENG Openness to international trade of goods, is defined as (exports 
plus imports of goods) as percentage of GDP. 
(OCDE, 2015) 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDIs), World Governance Indicators (WGIs), Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Government Finance Statistics (GFS), and International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Data on human capital stock are performed by the “Laboratoire d’Économie Appliquée au Développement (LEAD)” in 
Toulon University (France). 
 
Table 2.A: Summary and sources for variables 
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Appendix (2.B)  
Variables Selection: QIC program  
By following the same methodology that we used in the appendix (1.D) to determine whether 
certain or all the four groups of control explanatory variables should be included in the (CRE) 
model, we run the QIC program for four scenarios. The first includes the proxy of energy 
taxes and conditioning variables. In the second, we add the variables of human capital to the 
first scenario. In the third, the variables of fiscal policy are added to the second scenario. 
Finally, we add the variables of macro control to the third scenario. Table (2.B) shows the 
descriptive statistics of QIC values for every scenario. We find that the best scenario is the 
forth. It has the least value of the mean of QIC (231405.6). Therefore, the CRE equation 
contains all the explanatory variables.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
QICS1 100 283430.1 145.3388 283292.6 284329.6 
QICS2 100 277289.8 219.5893 277108.7 278931.6 
QICS3 100 254680 635.2565 253813 257857.7 
QICS4 100 231405.6 477.4187 230776.2 233415.2 
Source: The authors 
Table 2.B: The descriptive statistics of the values of QIC for every scenario 
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Appendix (2.C) 
Multicollinearity and VIF test 
The analysis here is built on the same rule that we followed in the appendix (1.E). 
Consequently, the VIF test is run and the table (2.C.1) shows the results. We find that all the 
regressions have low values for VIF indicating a low degree of multicollinearity.  
 
Variable VIF 
ET 1.46 
TFCPEP_sh 1.43 
lnY0 1.09 
OPENG 1.18 
changek 1.09 
TLF 1.25 
Ht-1 1.35 
ChangeH 1.07 
exp 1.31 
tax 1.74 
Balance 1.44 
INF 1.27 
Table 2.C.1: VIF values of predictors 
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Appendix (2.D) 
Panel unit root tests 
In the appendix (1.D) of chapter 1, we showed that the time series of economic growth rate is 
stationary. In this appendix, we test whether the time series of energy taxes proxy (ET) is 
stationary. To this end, we followed the same methodology used in the appendix (1.F). Firstly, 
we showed the relationship between the time and the values of energy taxes proxy by using a 
twoway graph. In addition, we put on top of visualized data the prediction from a linear 
regression of variable on year. The objective of this procedure was to know whether there is a 
rising or decreasing time trend in the plot. Figure (2.D) shows the time series of ET using the 
twoway graph. We observed that the proxy of energy taxes had a rising trend over the time. 
Consequently, the trend option had been included in panel unit root tests for (ET). 
 
 
Figure 2.D. Time series of ET using twoway graph 
 
Following the suggestion of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), the cross-sectional averages is 
removed from the series by using “demean” option in Stata command. Now, we can 
implement panel unit root tests for (ET), including “trend” and “demean” options. Based on 
the discussion that we did in the appendix (1.F) about the unit root tests which fit our sample, 
we used three tests. They are Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002); Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003); and 
Ficher-type Choi (2001).  
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The results of these tests are reported in tables (2.D). The results showed that p-values for 
Fisher-type Choi (2001) tests are less than 0.01. For Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) tests, p-value is less than 0.05. Consequently, at a 5% critical value, 
we rejected the null hypothesis that all panel’s series of (ET) contain a unit root. Thereby, the 
proxy of energy based taxes had stationary panel series.   
 
Test  Statistics P-values N T 
Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) Adjusted t* -1.972 0.0243 31 20 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) W-t-bar -1.8073 0.0354 31 20 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) P 110.9507 0.0001 31 20 
Z -3.2029 0.0007 
L* -3.2709 0.0007 
Pm 4.3959 0.0000 
Table 2.D: The results of panel unit root tests for the proxy of energy taxes 
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Appendix (2.E) 
The results of Variable Addition Test (VAT), equation 2.2 and 2.3 (before and 
after MI) 
 Before MI After MI 
 Null hypothesis Null hypothesis 
(1) ETbar = 0 ETbar = 0 
(2) changekbar = 0 changekbar = 0 
(3) TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 
(4) Ht_1bar = 0 Ht_1bar = 0 
(5) ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 
(6) expbar = 0 expbar = 0 
(7) taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 
(8) Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 
(9) INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 
(10) OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 
 chi2( 12) =33.83 F(10,614128.4) =    3.67 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 Prob > F = 0.0001 
 
Table 2. E.1: The results of Variable Addition Test (VAT), equation 2.2 (before and after MI) 
 
 Before MI After MI 
 Null hypothesis Null hypothesis 
(1) ETbar = 0 ETbar = 0 
(2) TFCPEP_shbar = 0 TFCPEP_shbar = 0 
(3) OPENGbar = 0 OPENGbar = 0 
(4) changekbar = 0 changekbar = 0 
(5) TLFbar = 0 TLFbar = 0 
(6) Ht-1bar = 0 Ht-1bar = 0 
(7) ChangeHbar = 0 ChangeHbar = 0 
(8) expbar = 0 expbar = 0 
(9) taxbar = 0 taxbar = 0 
(10) Balancebar = 0 Balancebar = 0 
(11) INFbar = 0 INFbar = 0 
 chi2( 11) =    25.66 F(11,585050.5) =    2.26 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0073 Prob > F = 0.0095 
 
Table 2. E.2: The results of Variable Addition Test (VAT) test, equation 2.3 (before and after 
MI) 
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
Appendix 3.A: Summary and source of variables 
Code Definitions Data source 
gr Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 U.S. dollars is 
used as an indicator of economic growth rate per capita. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
ET Proxy of energy taxes, tax revenue from energy taxes per unit of 
fossil fuel energy use, in US $ per ton of oil equivalent. 
(Appendix 2.A in chapter 2 provides the details of calculation)  
Author 
TFCPEP_sh Total final consumption share of polluting energy products in 
total final consumption of energy (Appendix 2.A in chapter 2 
provides the details of calculation) 
Author 
k Real gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)   (WDIs, 2015) 
Change k The annual change in real gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) 
Author, according to 
data from (WDIs, 
2015) 
H Human capital. The human-skill index is used as a proxy of 
human capital 
(LEAD, 2015) 
𝐻𝑡−1 The initial level of human capital measured as the value of human 
capital in the previous year  
Author, according to 
data from (LEAD, 
2015) 
changeH Annual change in human capital. Author, according to 
data from (LEAD, 
2015) 
EINNOV Environmental innovation measured by the development of 
environment-related technologies as a percentage of all 
technologies. 
(OECD, 2016) 
Lny0 The natural logarithm of real GDP per capita for each country in 
the year 199440. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
TLF Total labor force growth rate. (WDIs, 2015) 
Exp Productive expenditure, defined as the sum of general government 
spending on education, health, housing, public order and safety, 
and defense as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD and GFS, 
2015) 
                                                          
40 The gross domestic product is measured at constant 2005 U.S. dollars and purchasing power parity (PPP). 
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Code Definitions Data source 
Tax Distortionary taxation. It is the sum of taxes imposed on income, 
profit and capital gains, payroll and workforce, as well as social 
security contributions as a percentage of GDP. 
(OECD, 2015) 
Balance Fiscal balance (surplus/deficit) as a percentage of GDP. (OECD, 2015) 
INF Inflation rate, is measured by the annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index. 
(WDIs, 2015) 
OPENG Openness to international trade of goods, is defined as (exports 
plus imports of goods) as percentage of GDP. 
(OECD, 2015) 
DCPS Domestic credit to private sector, as a percentage of GDP (WDIs, 2017) 
RQ Regulatory quality (WGIs, 2017) 
GNS Gross national saving, as a percent of GDP (WEOD, 2017) 
CO2 Carbon dioxide emissions measured in (kt) (WDIs, 2017) 
FERT Total fertility rate, (births per woman) (WDIs, 2017) 
TID Technology-Infrastructure development measured by 
Technology-Infrastructure Index 
(LEAD, 2017) 
Y Real GDP per head, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base 
year is 2010 
(OECD, 2017) 
 
LPop Logarithm of all population (OECD, 2017) 
ERGRDB Environmentally-related government R&D budget as a percentage 
of total government R&D 
(OECD, 2017) 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) (WDIs, 2017) 
RDPI R&D personnel intensity=(R&D personnel/employments)*100 Author, according to 
data from (OECD, 
2017) 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDIs), World Governance Indicators (WGIs), Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Government Finance Statistics (GFS), World Economic Outlook Database 
(WEOD), and International Energy Agency (IEA). Data on Human capital stock are performed by “Laboratoire 
d’Économie Appliquée au Développement (LEAD)” in Toulon university (France). 
   
Table 3.A: Summary and source of variables 
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Appendix (3.B) 
Multicollinearity and VIF test 
As mentioned in the appendix (1.E), we follow the rule of (Kennedy 1992) to decide whether 
there is a harmful collinearity between the explanatory variables. The rule is that, if the value 
of VIF is greater than 10, this means that there is a harmful collinearity. The tables (3.B.1- 4) 
report the values of VIF for each of model’s equations. The results show that all the 
regressions have low values for VIF indicating a low degree of multicollinearity. Therefore, 
there is not harmful collinearity between the explanatory variables for each equation in the 
model.  
 
Variable VIF 
Change k 1.08 
Ht-1 1.33 
ChangeH 1.06 
EINNOV 1.17 
lnY0 1.20 
TLF 1.19 
exp 1.31 
tax 1.49 
Balance 1.33 
INF 1.27 
OPENG 1.12 
Table 3.B.1: VIF values for predictors in the economic growth equation 
 
 
Variable VIF 
ET 1.53 
exp 1.19 
tax 1.90 
DCPS 1.81 
RQ 1.94 
GNS 1.25 
DEBT 1.53 
Table 3.B.2: VIF values for predictors in investment equation 
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Variable VIF 
LCO2 1.09 
exp 1.21 
FERT 1.34 
TID 1.15 
RQ 1.15 
Table 3.B.3: VIF values for predictors in human capital equation 
 
 
Variable VIF 
ET 1.65 
Y 1.58 
TFCPEP_sh 1.79 
LPop 1.96 
OPENG 1.23 
 
Table 3.B.4: VIF values for predictors in environmental innovation equation 
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Appendix (3.C) 
Correlation between the instruments and error 
To examine whether the instruments are correlated with the error term of the structural 
equation, Roodman and Morduch (2014) add them linearly to the structural equation (the 
second-stage equation). An F-test is then conducted to see whether the instruments are jointly 
significant. If the instruments are not jointly significant, this means that they are not 
correlated with the error term. Thus, the first condition of instrument validity is satisfied. To 
apply this test on our instruments, we added GNS, FERT, FDI and RDPI linearly to the 
economic growth equation and ET to the human capital equation.  In this case, our model 
would still identify, because the equations were over-identified as we see in appendix (D). We 
then estimated the model and we conducted an F-test for GNS, FERT, FDI and FDPI. The 
results of the F-test are presented in table (3.C). They show that the coefficients of GNS, 
FERT, FDI and RDPI are jointly equal to zero. Therefore, these instruments do not directly 
affect the economic growth rate, and thus they are not correlated to the error term of (gr). In 
addition, estimation results show that the P-value of (ET) in the human capital equation is 
equal to 0.305, indicating that the proxy of energy taxes is not correlated with human capital. 
Consequently, these results show that our instruments satisfy the first condition of validity. 
However, the results must be regarded with caution in view of the fact that only 9 out of 100 
imputations were taken into account when we conducted this test.  
 Null hypothesis 
(1) [gr]GNS = 0 
(2) [gr]FERT = 0 
(3) [gr]FDI = 0 
(4) [gr]RDPI = 0 
 F (4, 437.7) =    1.59 
 Prob > F =     0.1767 
Table 3.C: F-test results 
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Appendix (3.D) 
The order and rank conditions  
D.1 The order condition for identification 
In order to be able to estimate the system equations coefficients, each equation in the system 
need to be identified. This is called the order condition for identification. An equation in a 
system of equations is said to be identified, if the number of excluded exogenous variables 
from this equation is at least as great as the number of right-hand side endogenous variables 
included in this equation (Wooldridge, 2013). To make this condition clearer, let us suppose 
that: 
x 𝐾 is the number of all exogenous variables included in the model (system), and 𝑘 is 
the number of exogenous variables included in the equation under consideration. 
(𝐾 − 𝑘) represents the number of exogenous variables excluded from the equation 
under consideration. 
x 𝑀 is the number of endogenous variables included in the right-side of the equation 
under consideration. 
The order condition requires that: (𝐾 − 𝑘)  ≥  𝑀.  
If (𝐾 − 𝑘) <  𝑀, the equation under consideration is not identified. 
If (𝐾 − 𝑘) =  𝑀, the equation under consideration is exactly identified. 
If (𝐾 − 𝑘) >  𝑀, the equation under consideration is over-identified. 
The order condition is used to verify that each equation in our model is over-identified (please 
see table (3.D.1). 
 
Equations 𝑲 𝒌 (𝑲 − 𝒌) 𝑴 Identified? 
Economic growth  20 7 13 3 Over-identified 
Investment  20 6 14 0 Over-identified 
Human capital  20 4 16 1 Over-identified 
Dioxide carbon emissions  20 5 15 0 Over-identified 
Environmental innovation 20 5 15 0 Over-identified 
Table 3.D.1: Order condition verification 
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3.D.2 The rank condition for identification 
The aim of the order condition is simply to verify whether sufficient variables have been 
excluded from an equation for identification. However, this condition does not verify whether 
the excluded variable appear anywhere in the system. The role of rank condition is to check 
that not only sufficient exclusion restrictions have been implemented, but also that the 
variables excluded actually do something in the rest of the model. Consequently, if a model 
contains M endogenous variables and M equations, an equation is identified by the rank 
condition if and only if at least one-non zero determinant of order (𝑀 − 1) × (𝑀 − 1) can be 
constructed from the coefficients of the variables excluded from that equation (Asteriou and 
Hall, 2011). This condition requires the matrix of all structural equations of the model to have 
full rank. 
The checkreg3 command in Stata software is used to check whether the rank condition is 
satisfied for each of the M equations in the system (Baum, 2007). Table 3.D.2 and table 3.D.3 
show the results of this command, which indicate that our simultaneous equations system is 
identified. The value of 0.5 is used only as placeholder to check the identification status. 
 
 gr k H LCO2 EINNOV 
gr -1 0 0 0 0.5 
k 0 -1 0 0 0 
H 0 0 -1 0.5 0 
LCO2 0 0 0 -1 0 
EINNOV 0 0 0 0 -1 
Table 3.D.2: Endogenous coefficients matrix 
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 Change k lnHt-1 changeH lnY0 TLF exp tax Balance INF OPENG ET 
gr 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
k 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 
H 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
LCO2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
EINNOV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 
 
 DCPS RQ GNS FERT TID Y TFCPEP_sh LPop ERGRDB FDI RDPI 
gr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
k 0.5 0.5 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LCO2 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
EINNOV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Table 3.D.3: Exogenous coefficients matrix 
Eq 1 is identified; Eq 2 is identified; Eq 3 is identified; Eq 4 is identified; Eq 5 is identified. 
The system is identified 
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Appendix (3.H) 
Estimations results when we use ACO2 instead of CO2 in the model 
In the short term 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation   Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055 
Ht-1 48.724** 45.343** 45.199** 
 (19.153) (19.115) (19.142) 
Change H 73.049*** 69.804*** 69.550*** 
 (22.032) (21.938) (21.959) 
EINNOV -1.245*** -1.247*** -1.249*** 
 (0.414) (0.425) (0.425) 
lnY0 -0.960 -1.110 -1.102 
 (1.740) (1.733) (1.733) 
TLF 4.046 4.666 4.714 
 (7.910) (7.911) (7.912) 
Exp -0.367*** -0.358*** -0.358*** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) 
Tax -0.082 -0.083 -0.083 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Balance 0.081** 0.087** 0.087** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
INF -0.041** -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
OPENG 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
Physical investment equation Real gross fixed capital formation 
ET -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
DEBT  -0.055*** -0.042*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
ET#DEBT   -0.00005* 
   (0.000) 
Exp -0.108 -0.057 -0.065 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) 
Tax -0.152** -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) 
DCPS 0.029*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
RQ 4.325*** 3.104*** 2.870*** 
 (0.757) (0.759) (0.777) 
GNS 0.091** -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
    
Human capital equation Human-skill index 
LACO2 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exp 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
175 
 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
RQ 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
LACO2 equation Logarithm of  accumulated carbon dioxide emissions 
ET -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Y 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
LPOP 9.072*** 9.074*** 9.062*** 
 (0.797) (0.800) (0.799) 
OPENG -0.003 -0.003 -0.030 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Environmental innovation equation  Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ERGRDB -0.070 -0.070 -0.071 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
FDI 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.041 -0.038 -0.038 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
RDPI 1.524** 1.526** 1.524** 
 (0.640) (0.646) (0.645) 
Observations 620 620 620 
Number of countries 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.H.1: Estimations results in the short term, when we use ACO2 instead of CO2  
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In the long-term 
 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation      Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k 0.168** 0.147** 0.143** -0.080 -0.104 -.0109 -0.001 -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Ht-1 0.417 -0.981 -1.072 -6.737 -8.142 -8.275 -0.495 -1.170 -1.280 
 (9.841) (9.846) (9.836) (8.125) (8.083) (8.069) (7.100) (7.067) (7.063) 
Change H 27.093* 26.675* 26.517* -12.094 -12.954 -13.478 10.114 11.113 10.729 
 (14.457) (14.415) (14.402) (13.436) (13.338) (13.323) (12.458) (11.491) (11.476) 
EINNOV 0.026 0.029 0.029 0.080** 0.083** 0.082** 0.094** 0.093** 0.092** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
lnY0 -0.899 -1.002 -0.961 2.252 2.616 2.642 1.217   1.391 1.407 
 (2.536) (2.523) (2.522) (2.503) (2.494) (2.491) (2.314) (2.306) (2.306) 
TLF 1.506 2.783 3.091 -22.929** -20.762** -20.179** -31.636*** -30.128*** -29.799*** 
 (8.514) (8.519) (8.524) (9.020) (9.008)  (9.015) (9.113) (9.088) (9.080) 
exp -0.130 -0.129 -0.130 -0.078 -0.075 -0.076 -0.090 -0.085 -0.084 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
tax -0.023 -0.020 -0.021 -0.038 -0.035 -0.036 -0.025 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Balance 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.033 0.037 0.037 -0.033 -0.028 -0.026 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
INF -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
OPENG 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.016* 0.018* 0.018* 0.016* 0.017* 0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
          
Physical investment equation    Real gross fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP 
ET -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DEBT  -0.052*** -0.032***  -0.049*** -0.025***  -0.040*** -0.016 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.013) 
ET#DEBT   -0.0001**   -0.0001***   -0.0001** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
exp -0.207** -0.154* -0.163* -0.255*** -0.201** -0.201** -0.164* -0.121 -0.126 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
tax -0.135* -0.015 -0.013 -0.131* -0.026 -0.023 -0.115 -0.027 -0.018 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
DCPS 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
RQ 4.356*** 3.353*** 3.025*** 3.762*** 2.960*** 2.645*** 2.484*** 2.042*** 1.819** 
 (0.745) (0.744) (0.758) (0.746) (0.747) (0.754) (0.760) (0.755) (0.755) 
GNS 0.165*** 0.074* 0.062 0.203*** 0.121*** 0.109*** 0.291*** 0.233*** 0.228*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) 
          
Human capital equation            Human-skill index 
LACO2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
exp 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
RQ 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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 Lags=1 Lags=2 Lags=3 
Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
          
ACO2 equation               Logarithm of accumulated carbon dioxide emissions  
ET -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Y 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Lpop 8.475*** 8.468*** 8.446*** 7.462*** 7.463*** 7.460*** 6.736*** 6.715*** 6.750*** 
 (0.855) (0.858) (0.857) (0.907) (0.908) (0.907) (0.966) (0.964) (0.966) 
OPENG -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
Environmental innovation equation      Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ERGRDB 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.173* 0.173* 0.176* 0.136 0.138 0.138 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
FDI -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.089* -0.089* -0.089* -0.118** -0.118** -0.118** -0.049 -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
RDPI 1.458 1.464 1.464 1.229 1.237 1.247 1.598 1.606 1.620 
 (0.933) (0.933) (0.933) (0.937) (0.936) (0.936) (1.040) (1.040) (1.040) 
Observations 589 589 589 558 558 558 527 527 527 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.H.2: Estimations results in the long term, when we use ACO2 instead of CO2 
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 Lags=4 Lags=5 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
  Model A Model B  Model A Model B 
Economic growth equation     Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
Change k -0.016 -0.023 -0.026 0.039 0.036 0.036 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Ht-1 -3.524 -3.817 -3.875 -4.277 -4.395 -4.402 
 (6.890) (6.865) (6.856) (6.584) (6.568) (6.572) 
Change H -20.590* -20.863* -21.248* 5.109 5.043 5.149 
 (12.358) (12.307) (12.295) (11.618) (11.587) (11.597) 
EINNOV -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.142*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
lnY0 1.831 1.902 1.910 2.856 2.885 2.889 
 (2.310) (2.304) (2.302) (2.243) (2.239) (2.240) 
TLF -8.823 -7.722 -7.408 -15.610* -15.119* -15.154* 
 (9.405) (9.386) (9.377) (9.463) (9.437) (9.443) 
Exp -0.122 -0.118 -0.117 -0.130 -0.127 -0.127 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Tax 0.015 0.013 0.012 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Balance -0.066 -0.062 -0.061 -0.095* -0.093* -0.093* 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
INF -0.029* -0.029* -0.029* 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
OPENG 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Physical investment equation      Real gross fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP 
ET -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
DEBT  -0.028*** 0.014  -0.022** -0.027** 
  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.014) 
ET#DEBT   -0.0001   0.00002 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Exp -0.051 -0.024 -0.024 -0.079 -0.062 -0.062 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 
Tax -0.125* -0.060 -0.055 -0.067 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) (0.084) 
DCPS -0.003 -0.009* -0.010** -0.007 -0.012** -0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
RQ 1.072 0.831 0.732 -0.023 -0.189 -0.174 
 (0.816) (0.818) (0.821) (0.831) (0.829) (0.831) 
GNS 0.335*** 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.305*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
       
Human capital equation           Human-skill index 
LACO2 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exp 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
FERT -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TID 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.061** 0.062** 0.062** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
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 Lags=4 Lags=5 
 Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification Benchmark 
model 
Alternative specification 
  Model A Model B  Model A Model B 
RQ 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
ACO2 equation                         Logarithm of accumulated carbon dioxide emissions 
ET -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Y 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TFCPEP_sh 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.0138) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lpop 5.607*** 5.571*** 5.590*** 4.515*** 4.477*** 4.478*** 
 (1.065) (1.062) (1.065) (1.176) (1.174) (1.173) 
OPENG -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Environmental innovation equation      Development of environment-related technologies 
ET 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ERGRDB 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.047 0.048 0.048 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
FDI -0.029* -0.029* -0.029* 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
TFCPEP_sh -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
RDPI 1.101 1.101 1.121 1.142 1.150 1.142 
 (1.130) (1.130) (1.129) (1.138) (1.137) (1.137) 
Observations 495 495 495 463 463 463 
Number of 
countries 
31 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively based on the two-tailed test. 
Standard error estimates are in parentheses. The country-specific effect ( 𝜂𝑖), the time-specific effect (𝜆𝑡), and 
the constant were included in the regressions of each equation in the model but they are not presented in this 
table. 
Table 3.H.3: Estimations results in the long term, when we use ACO2 instead of CO2 
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 mots-clés : Fiscalité environnementale, Dette publique, Croissance économique, Imputation 
multiple, Effets aléatoires corrélés, Modèle à équations simultanées. 
 
 
 
 keywords: Environmental taxation, Public debt, Economic growth, Multiple imputation, Correlated 
random effects, Simultaneous equations model. 
 
 
 
  
R
ÉS
U
M
É Les politiques environnementales, notamment celles recourant aux instruments fiscaux, ont pris une place de plus en plus importante dans un grand nombre de pays durant les trois dernières 
décennies. Tous les pays de l’OCDE ont introduit des taxes liées à l'environnement et un nombre 
croissant d'entre eux procèdent à une réforme dite "verte" de leur fiscalité. L’utilisation de la taxe 
comme un instrument pour la politique environnementale a suscité un large débat parmi les 
chercheurs sur ses impacts sur la croissance économique, mais sans parvenir à un consensus sur la 
nature de ces effets. Certains trouvent un effet négatif, alors que d’autres montrent un impact 
positif. Deux points ont attiré notre attention sur ce sujet. Premièrement, les études empiriques qui 
vérifient la validité de ces résultats sont très rares. Deuxièmement, la majorité des modèles 
théoriques qui ont étudié l’effet de la fiscalité environnementale sur la croissance économique 
supposent que le gouvernement finance ses dépenses uniquement par les taxes et que le budget 
d’Etat est équilibré à chaque période, évitant ainsi tout fardeau associé au remboursement de la 
dette publique. Par conséquent, cette thèse a pour objectif d’abord d’explorer empiriquement la 
nature de la relation entre la fiscalité environnementale et la croissance économique, et si cette 
relation est sensible au niveau d'autres variables dans l'économie. Ensuite, nous examinons les 
canaux par lesquels cette taxe peut affecter la croissance économique, et si l'existence et le niveau 
de la dette publique peuvent modifier cet effet. 
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introduced environmentally-related taxes, and a growing number of them are carrying out a so-
called "green" reform of their taxation. The use of the tax as an instrument for environmental 
policy has sparked wide debate among researchers on its impacts on economic growth, but without 
reaching consensus on the nature of these effects. Some find a negative effect; while others show a 
positive impact. Two points raised our attention on this subject. First, the empirical studies that 
verify the validity of these results are very rare. Second, the majority of theoretical models that 
have studied the effect of environmental taxation on economic growth assume that the government 
finances its expenditures solely through taxes and that the state budget is balanced each period, 
thus avoiding any burden associated to repayment of public debt. Therefore, this thesis aims firstly 
to explore empirically the nature of the relationship between environmental taxation and economic 
growth, and whether this relationship is sensitive to the level of other variables in the economy. We 
examine then the channels through which this tax can affect economic growth, and whether the 
existence and level of public debt can modify this effect. 
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Environmental taxation, public debt and economic growth: a macroeconomic 
analysis 
Résumé 
 
Les politiques environnementales, notamment celles 
recourant aux instruments fiscaux, ont pris une place de 
plus en plus importante dans un grand nombre de pays 
durant les trois dernières décennies. Tous les pays de 
l’OCDE ont introduit des taxes liées à l'environnement et 
un nombre croissant d'entre eux procèdent à une 
réforme dite "verte" de leur fiscalité. L’utilisation de la 
taxe comme un instrument pour la politique 
environnementale a suscité un large débat parmi les 
chercheurs sur ses impacts sur la croissance 
économique, mais sans parvenir à un consensus sur la 
nature de ces effets. Certains trouvent un effet négatif, 
alors que d’autres montrent un impact positif. Deux 
points ont attiré notre attention sur ce sujet. 
Premièrement, les études empiriques qui vérifient la 
validité de ces résultats sont très rares. Deuxièmement, 
la majorité des modèles théoriques qui ont étudié l’effet 
de la fiscalité environnementale sur la croissance 
économique supposent que le gouvernement finance 
ses dépenses uniquement par les taxes et que le 
budget d’Etat est équilibré à chaque période, évitant 
ainsi tout fardeau associé au remboursement de la dette 
publique. Par conséquent, cette thèse a pour objectif 
d’abord d’explorer empiriquement la nature de la 
relation entre la fiscalité environnementale et la 
croissance économique, et si cette relation est sensible 
au niveau d'autres variables dans l'économie. Ensuite, 
nous examinons les canaux par lesquels cette taxe peut 
affecter la croissance économique, et si l'existence et le 
niveau de la dette publique peuvent modifier cet effet. 
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Abstract 
 
Environmental policies, especially those using fiscal 
instruments, have become more and more important in 
a large number of countries over the last three decades. 
All OECD countries have introduced environmentally-
related taxes, and a growing number of them are 
carrying out a so-called "green" reform of their taxation. 
The use of the tax as an instrument for environmental 
policy has sparked wide debate among researchers on 
its impacts on economic growth, but without reaching 
consensus on the nature of these effects. Some find a 
negative effect; while others show a positive impact. 
Two points raised our attention on this subject. First, the 
empirical studies that verify the validity of these results 
are very rare. Second, the majority of theoretical models 
that have studied the effect of environmental taxation on 
economic growth assume that the government finances 
its expenditures solely through taxes and that the state 
budget is balanced each period, thus avoiding any 
burden associated to repayment of public debt. 
Therefore, this thesis aims firstly to explore empirically 
the nature of the relationship between environmental 
taxation and economic growth, and whether this 
relationship is sensitive to the level of other variables in 
the economy. We examine then the channels through 
which this tax can affect economic growth, and whether 
the existence and level of public debt can modify this 
effect. 
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